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Abstract 
 
The subject of this thesis is the development of tripartite arrangements between 
representatives of the trade union organisations, the employers’ organisations and the 
government or the state bureaucracy in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania after the three countries 
regained their independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. I have studied and compared the 
contents of tripartite agreements and the work of tripartite councils. I have divided the time 
into the two periods from 1991 to the end of 1995 and from the beginning of 1996 to the end 
of 2001. I started the research with some assumptions. The first was that pressure from the EU 
after the three countries applied for membership in late 1995, would pull the countries 
towards developing stronger systems for tripartite bargaining at state level. Secondly, I 
assumed that openness of economy, measured as high value of trade as a proportion of GDP, 
would have a favourable effect on the development of tripartite arrangements. Thirdly, I 
assumed that long time of social democratic or socialist parties in government would have 
positive effect on the development of tripartite arrangements. Finally, I assumed that bloc 
politics combined with occurrence of radical shifts of all government parties simultaneously, 
would have negative effect on the development of tripartite arrangements at state level.  
 
When I had compared the systems of tripartite arrangements at state level, my major finding 
was that Estonia and Latvia were closer than Lithuania to a model of democratic corporatism 
by the end of 2001. I also found that all three countries were closer to a model of democratic 
corporatism on state level by the end of 2001 than by the end of 1995. These findings, 
combined with historical elaborations of the different factors, gave support to the assumption 
that pressure from the EU had contributed to strengthen the systems of tripartite arrangements 
at state level. Openness of economy could not explain the differences between the cases. The 
findings did not support the assumption about the role of social democratic or socialist parties 
in government. Lithuania was furthest from the model of democratic corporatism by the end 
of 2001, despite the fact that the social democratic party formed the government alone from 
late 1992 to late 1996. The only factor, which could explain the differences between the cases 
by the end of 2001, was the occurrence of bloc politics combined with radical shifts of 
governments. The conclusion is that this can explain why Lithuania was further away from a 
model of democratic corporatism than Estonia and Latvia by the end of 2001. 
 1
1: Introduction: 
 
What factors have influenced the corporatist arrangements at state level in post communist 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania? The subject for this thesis is the development of democratic 
corporatist arrangements in these countries. Philippe Schmitter has developed a distinction 
between state corporatism and societal corporatism. State corporatism described the systems 
in some authoritarian and totalitarian countries where the organisations were created by the 
state and kept as auxiliary and dependent organs of the state (Schmitter1974: 20). The 
corporatist system, which was forced upon the Baltic republics during the Soviet occupation, 
was extremely state corporatist.1 Societal corporatism described the systems in some 
democratic countries where interest group organisations acted independently from the state2 
(ibid: 20 – 21). This thesis is devoted to the development of the latter kind of corporatism in 
the time after the three countries regained their independence in 1991. In the place of societal 
corporatism, I have chosen to employ the concept of Katzenstein – democratic corporatism 
(Katzenstein 1985: 32). The concept of democratic corporatism in this thesis is a revision of 
Katzenstein’s concept, and consists of the following three components: A centralised system 
of interest groups, a concentrated system of interest groups and a system of bargaining 
between central trade union organisations, central employers’ organisations and the 
government at state level. Katzenstein also included ‘an ideology of social partnership 
expressed at the national level’ (ibid: 32). I will consider this as a factor favourable to the 
development of democratic corporatism, but not as a part of democratic corporatism itself.    
 
I have two different approaches to my topic of research.  On one side, I will emphasis 
strongest the last part of the concept - the system of bargaining between central trade union 
organisations, central employers’ organisations and the government at state level. The reason 
is that, I view democratic corporatism as a phenomenon, which does not necessarily rely upon 
broad membership in trade unions. It can also be initiated as elite co-operation on state level. 
That’s why I have given membership rates in trade unions and coverage of employers’ 
organisations only secondary importance in defining democratic corporatism. The same 
                                                 
1
 Schmitter himself sorted the systems in authoritarian Portugal, Spain Brazil, Chile, Peru Mexico, and Greece – 
as well as the defunct experiences of Fascist Italy, Petainist France, National Socialist Germany and Austria 
under Dollfuss under the label of state corporatism (Schmitter 1974: 22).   
 
2
 Schmitter found that Sweden, the Netherlands, Norway and Denmark came closest to the model of societal 
corporatism (Schmitter 1974: 22).  
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applies to centralisation of the systems of interest group organisations. It is far from obvious 
that corporatist arrangements become weaker, when the number of central organisations 
increases. The situation in a number of Western European countries where corporatist 
arrangements function well with several central trade union organisations indicates this. I 
have solved the problem of how to define democratic corporatism in the following way. I 
have included all components from the concept of Katzenstein except ‘ideology of social 
partnership’. I have put an extra stress upon the system of bargaining between the central 
organisations and the government and governmental institutions at state level. When I finally 
compared the level of democratic corporatism between Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, I gave 
this component the decisive weight. Chapter 3 will consider this concept of democratic 
corporatism more thoroughly in a theoretical perspective, as well as present the way I have 
measured the level of democratic corporatism in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.  
 
This is a comparative analysis, which includes two steps. The first step aims to compare the 
levels of democratic corporatism between the three countries in the two time periods from the 
regaining of independence in 1991 to the end of 1995 and from the beginning of 1996 to the 
end of 2001. I have chosen the beginning of 1996 as a cutting point because of occurrences in 
the late 1995. All three countries signed Europe Agreements in June 1995 and applied for 
membership in the European Union in the late 1995 (Nørgaard and Johannsen 1999: 169-170, 
200). The Europe Agreements included a promise of eventual membership in the EU, 
provided that each country was able to meet the preconditions for membership, the so-called 
Copenhagen criteria (ibid: 170, Commission of the European Communities 2002a: 19). This 
means that the three countries had to start the process of political reforms necessary for the 
future EU accessions. In the conclusion of the first part, I will simplify all my findings on the 
three components of democratic corporatism in order to divide my six cases into two groups – 
cases with a relatively high level and cases with a relatively low level of democratic 
corporatism.  
 
The second step involves analysing different factors, which may have affected the 
development of democratic corporatism. I will consider each of the cases in accordance to 
each of the factors in order to decide whether it possesses the factor or not. It further involves 
applying comparative methods to single out those factors, which most likely can explain the 
differences in level of democratic corporatism between the countries in the two time periods. 
In the first comparative analysis, I will single out the most likely explanations by looking for 
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factors, which coexist with the same level of democratic corporatism in all cases. If all cases 
possessing a certain factor have a high level of democratic corporatism, I will conclude that 
this factor has been explanatory to high level of democratic corporatism. If all cases not 
possessing a certain factor have a relatively high level of democratic corporatism, I will 
conclude that absence of this has been explanatory to high level of democratic corporatism. In 
the second comparative analysis, I will only look at cases sharing as many as possible of the 
factors expected to influence the level of democratic corporatism, but one of the cases has a 
different level of democratic corporatism than the other cases. Here I will conclude that the 
factors that occur only in this case and are absent in the others (or vice-versa) are likely to 
have caused the different level of democratic corporatism in the deviant case. The first 
analysis will follow John Steward Mill’s Method of Agreement. The second analysis will be a 
combination of this method and Mill’s Indirect Method of Difference (for a thorough 
elaboration of these methods, see Ragin 1987: 36 – 42).  
 
Both steps involve considerable judgements. The judgements in the first step will serve to 
reduce the abundance of information about each of the three components of democratic 
corporatism in each of the six cases into a binary classification between cases with relatively 
low and relatively high level of democratic corporatism. In the second step the factors 
expected to affect the level of democratic corporatism will be subject for the same kind of 
judgements serving to create a binary classification.  Abundant information about each of the 
factors considered, have to be assessed in order to decide whether each of the cases either 
possesses or does not possess each of the factors. Out of this it is clear that the conclusion of 
this thesis depends very much on these judgements. If the judgements are unsound, the 
conclusion cannot be reliable. Because of this, I will thoroughly present and discuss the 
premises upon which my judgements are based.  Hence it will be possible for the reader to 
assess whether the judgements are reasonable and the conclusion rests on solid ground.  This 
means that a large part of the thesis will be devoted to elaborations of the conditions 
connected to each of the four components of democratic corporatism and each of the factors 
expected to have influenced these in each of the countries.  I will present and discuss my use 
of comparative method in combination with historical and sociological elaboration more 
thoroughly in chapter 4. 
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An additional, but not insignificant, value of this thesis lies in the exploration itself. The role 
of interest group organisations in state politics in these three post-communist countries has not 
been treated systematically before.      
 
I do not expect that the comparative analysis alone will give well enough evidence that the 
detected factors can explain the difference in level of democratic corporatism. There have to 
be some kind of explanation of how this factor can have influenced the level of democratic 
corporatism in these specific cases. That’s why I will complete the final analysis of chapter 7 
with an investigation of how the factors detected in the comparative analysis, may have 
influenced the level of democratic corporatism. To investigate this I will draw from the 
historical elaborations of the development of democratic corporatism and each of the possible 
explaining factors in chapter 5 and 6. I will also draw from the answers from the persons I 
have interviewed who were involved in tripartite bargaining at state level in each of the three 
countries.  
 
So what factors can we expect to have affected the development of democratic corporatism in 
post communist Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania? There are some similarities between the 
countries. All three countries were occupied by the Soviet Union after World War 2 and 
remained a part of the empire until 1991. The Soviet Union had a totalitarian system of trade 
unions, which had extremely high membership rates3, but were completely controlled by the 
Communist party. In the terms of Schmitter, the Soviet system represented state corporatism 
to an extreme extent.  After regaining independence all three countries have become liberal 
parliamentarian democracies, private business is established and trade unions and employer 
organisations’ have organised themselves after the Western European prototype. I expect the 
process of transforming the industrial relations from the Soviet system to a system based upon 
market economy and the right of the organisations to have another opinion than the 
government, to take time. Therefore I expect the level of democratic corporatism, or societal 
corporatism in Schmitter’s terms, to be higher in all three countries in period from 1996 to the 
end of 2001 than in the period from 1991 to the end of 1996.  
 
Another common factor between the three countries is that they have all gone through the 
process of being admitted as members of the European Union (EU). All three applied for 
                                                 
3
 It is estimated that approximately 98 per cent of the Soviet workforce were members of trade unions in the 
early 1980s (Ruble 1986: 28). 
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membership in the EU in late 1995 (Nørgaard and Johannsen 1999: 200). They completed 
their negotiations for membership on the Copenhagen summit in December 2002, after the 
Commission had recommended conclusion of negotiations with ten candidate countries in 
October (for the press release from the Commission on the 9th of October see EU web c, 
03.05.03). The three countries signed the Treaty of Accession in Athens on the 16th of April 
2003 (for a full text version of the Treaty, see EU web b, 03.05.03).4 Provided that the voters 
embrace membership in the referenda, all three will be members of the EU from the 1st of 
May 2004. The three Baltic countries are the only countries, which used to be a part of the 
Soviet Union that applied for membership in the EU and did not become members of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Scholars have noticed a revitalisation of 
corporatism in Western Europe in the 1990s after corporatism was declared dead in the 1980s 
(e.g. Schmitter 1989, Schmitter and Grote 1997).5  That’s why I expect that the EU has 
brought its influence to bear on the development of systems for bargaining between the 
interest group organisations and the governments in the applicant countries. This could 
contribute to a development giving a higher level of democratic corporatism in the later 
period in all three countries.  
 
In the middle of the 1980s, Peter J. Katzenstein called the Western European countries the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria, Denmark, Sweden and Norway for Small States in World 
Markets (Katzenstein 1985). In Katzenstein’s thesis the open economies of these countries 
explain their development of democratic corporatist policies. They were dependent on the 
world market and vulnerable to international imposed economical changes. Therefore they 
developed comprehensive structures for and wide practices of bargaining between the interest 
group organisations and the government in order to achieve consent on national policies 
aimed at doing the best of possible out of the international imposed economical situation. It is 
tempting to call Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania for Small States in New Markets. They are 
small and, as chapter 6.1 will show, they have open economies in the form of being active 
traders in the world markets. They are also newcomers on these markets, shielded or 
imprisoned as they used to be in the economical system of the Soviet Union. Is the argument 
of Katzenstein valid also for these three Eastern European countries? In that case one could 
                                                 
4
 All web addresses are listed in appendix G. 
5
 In 1996 the EU Commission President Jackues Santer even proposed to construct a European social pact 
aiming at making the member states able to combine acquirement of the EMU convergence criteria without 
raising unemployment. The proposal was however turned down (Pochet and Fajertag 1997: 17). 
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expect that the three countries developed democratic corporatist arrangements at state level in 
the time after regaining independence in 1991.  
 
But there are also important differences between the countries. On its 20th Party Congress in 
December 1989, the Lithuanian Communist Party declared itself independent from the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The independent communist party was very active in 
the struggle for independence and contributed to Lithuania being the first Republic to declare 
full independence on the 11th of March 1990 (Vardys and Sedaitis 1997: 152, 156). After 
independence the successor party of the communist party, the Lithuanian Democratic Labour 
Party (LDLP), has been a very competitive social democratic party. The LDLP formed 
government alone, with a majority of the Members of Parliament, in the time between the 
parliamentary elections in 1992 and 1996. At the time of writing in April 2003, the party has 
been forming government since July 2001 together with the centrist New Union. In Latvia and 
Estonia, the voters have marginalized the successor parties of the communist parties. The 
Estonian nascent social democratic party, the Moderates, has been represented in three 
governments, but always together with economically rightist parties (Zarates Political 
Collections web a, 07.05.03). In Latvia, no social democratic party has been in government 
for more than the four months the Social Democratic Workers Party was in a wide 
government coalition with economically rightist parties in 1999 (Zarates Political Collections 
web b, 07.05.03). Many observers have perceived social democratic parties as guardians and 
initiators of democratic corporatist arrangements in Western Europe (i.e. Castles 1978, Shalev 
1983). The extremely close ties that the Soviet Communist Party had to the Soviet trade union 
movement, is yet another reason to expect that a social democratic party in government, 
which also is the successor party of the Soviet era Communist Party, has contributed to 
develop corporatist arrangements at state level. Has this implied that Lithuania has developed 
a more comprehensive system of corporatist bargaining on state level than Estonia and 
Latvia? 
 
It is reasonable to expect that corporatist arrangements involving the government are less 
exposed to setbacks with high continuity of government parties. In Latvia, Latvia’s Way was 
continuously in government from the Popular Front supported government of Ivars Godmanis 
resigned in July 1993 until it failed to enter parliament in the October 2002 election. At the 
time of writing in April 2003, the For Fatherland and Freedom Union has been in all 
governments since the December 1995 election. The situation in Lithuania seems to be 
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contrary to that in Latvia. The parliamentary elections in 1992 forced through a shift of the 
Popular Front supported government with a LDLP government. After the election in 1996, the 
situation was reversed. The LDLP government had to resign to the favour of a government 
where the successor party of the Popular Front, the conservative Homeland Union, was the 
biggest party. Has the greater continuity of government parties in Latvia contributed to 
develop a more comprehensive system of corporatist bargaining on state level than in 
Lithuania? In that case: Has the continuity of government parties in Latvia been more 
important in developing corporatist structures and filling them with state level bargaining than 
the time and power the LDLP in government in Lithuania? In chapter 3, I will discuss these 
initial questions in a broader theoretical perspective, and I will also present my way of 
measuring the characteristics that the questions deal with. Figure 1.1 is a rough model of the 
thesis, presenting external factors to the left and factors related to the governments to the 
right. Each of these independent variables is subject for closer scrutiny in chapter 6. The 
examinations in that chapter will serve to evaluate and further develop the definitions of the 
factors.  
 
Figure 1.1 illustrates the logic of my thesis. I will explore what factors can have influenced 
the level of democratic corporatism. I have placed possible external causes, not a part in 
tripartite arrangements their-selves, on the left side of the figure. Factors related to the 
government are placed to the right.   
 
Figure 1.1: Model of the thesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Time of social 
democratic or 
socialist parties 
in government 
Level of 
democratic 
corporatism 
Continuity of 
government 
parties 
Pressure from 
international 
organisations, 
especially the 
EU  
 
Openness of 
economy 
Time since 
independence 
from Soviet 
totalitarianism 
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Possible implications of the findings 
 
Enormous changes in working life that have occurred in he three countries since the middle of 
the 1980s. Out of a democratic principle that those concerned and affected should be listened 
to, people should have some influence on policies from their workplace through interest group 
organisations. This means that a lack of development of mechanism where the organisations 
of workers and employers can influence the state policy-making would represent a deficit in 
the democratic consolidation process. According to Linz and Stepan a consolidated 
democracy is composed of five major inter-relating arenas. These are a free and lively civil 
society, a relatively autonomous and valued political society, rule of law to ensure legal 
guarantees for citizens’ freedoms and independent associational life, a state bureaucracy that 
is usable by the new democratic government, and an institutionalised economic society. By an 
economic society they refer to “a set of socio – politically crafted and socio-politically 
accepted norms, institutions, and regulations that mediates between state and market” (Linz 
and Stepan 1996: 11). A consolidated democracy is characterized by an interacting system 
between these arenas (ibid: 7 - 13). Interest group organisations, like trade unions and 
employer’s federations form an important part of both a civil and an economic society. The 
way I interpret Linz and Stepan, a system of industrial relations were trade unions and 
employers’ organisations constitute a part of state politics, is a necessary characteristic of any 
consolidated democracy. When interest group representation in politics is viewed as a matter 
of democratic consolidation, this is a very good reason to study interest group representation 
in post communist and post Soviet countries like Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.   
 
All three countries directed large shares of their exports to the EU countries in 2001/ 2002. 
Especially Estonia had a large share of her export to this market where she hardly participated 
at all during Soviet times. Estonia directed 68% of her exports to the EU countries in 2002. 
Latvia directed 61% of her exports to the EU countries during the ten first months of 2001. 
Lithuania directed 48% of her export to the EU countries in 2002. At the same time the 
market of the successor countries of the Soviet Union, which were members of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), had become a minor destination for exports. In 
2002 only 5% of Estonian exports had a CIS country as destination, while 10% of Latvian 
exports during the first ten months of 2001 went to the CIS countries. In Lithuania a larger 
share of 19% of all merchandise exports went to a CIS country in 2002 (Statistical Office of 
 9
Estonia web a, 07.05.03; Statistics Lithuania web c, 07.05.03; Ministry of Economy of the 
Republic of Latvia 2001: 32, figure 3.14)  
 
Figure 1.2 illustrates the net inflow of Foreign Direct Investments to the area. 
Figure 1.2: Net inflows of FDI in current US$    
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Source: Various World Bank6 
 
Figure 1.2 show that net inflows of Foreign Direct Investment had increased to a considerable 
level by 1998 and 2000. Estonia had an increased inflow of FDI from 266 million US$ in 
1997 to 539 million US$ in 2001. In contrast, the net inflow of FDI to Latvia declined from 
521 million US$ in 1997 to 177 million US$ in 2001. The inflow of FDI to Lithuania was on 
355 million US$ in 1997 and 446 million US$ in 2001. Net inflows of FDI to Lithuania was 
on remarkably 926 million US$ in 1998.     
 
Measured per capita, especially Estonia had a high density of Foreign Direct Investments. 
Estonia attracted 276 US$, Latvia 170 US$ and Lithuania 105 US$ in FDI per capita in 2000. 
The World Development Indicator Database of the World Bank Group shows that only the 
Czech and the Slovak republics out of the nine Eastern European countries taken up to be 
members of EU from 2004 attracted larger sums of FDI per capita than Estonia. In addition to 
                                                 
6
 Sources: World Development Indicators. Values for 1997, 2000 and 2001: The World Bank Group web a, b 
and c, 07.05.03. Values for 1999: The World Bank 2001b: 340 – 341, table 6.7. Values for 1998: The World 
Bank 2000: 334 – 335, table 6.7  
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these three countries also Poland attracted a larger sum of FDI per capita than Latvia. Only 
Slovenia and Romania attracted a smaller sum of FDI per capita in 2000 than Lithuania. On 
the other hand, the amount of FDI per capita to Lithuania was larger in 1998, amounting to 
257 US$ per capita7 (World Bank Group web a, b, c and d, 07.05.03).  
 
The two clearly largest countries of origin for FDI to Estonia by the end of September 2002 
were Sweden and Finland. 67.2% of the total amount of FDI to Estonia at this time came from 
these two countries (Bank of Estonia web, 04.03.03). At the same time Sweden was followed 
by Germany as the countries of origin of the largest sums of FDI to Latvian companies 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia web, 04.02.03). By the 1st of October 
2002, Sweden and Denmark were the two countries of origin of the largest sums of FDI to 
Lithuania. 67.3% of the cumulative amount of FDI to Lithuania by this time came from these 
countries (Lithuanian Development Agency web, 04.03.03)  
 
In the beginning of the new millennium Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had the main shares of 
their export directed towards the EU countries. At the same time they were recipient countries 
of large shares of Foreign Direct Investments, and much of these came from Western Europe.  
Hence industrial relations in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania should be of interest for Western 
European investors and employers in the area and for the employees and the governments in 
the European trading partner countries. It should also be of interest to employees and trade 
unions in the investor countries. As chapter 2 will show, the three Baltic countries, along with 
other Eastern European countries, have significantly lower wage levels than the Western 
European countries. Strong trade unions have been accredited for the increase in wages of 
most workers in the time after the Second World War in countries like the Scandinavian 
countries and Germany. If the Baltic countries do not develop a similar model, where 
bargaining between strong organisations of employers and employees serve to upgrade wages 
and safety and health regulations at the workplace, production costs may be held artificially 
low. This may make the three Baltic countries attractive to employers, which aim to maximise 
surplus by giving very low wages and at the cost of the health, security and environment on 
the workplace and the job-security of the employees. This scenario is very unfortunate for 
both employees in three Baltic countries and for the employees in other countries who risk 
                                                 
7
 The calculations to per capita values are my own for all the countries. 
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losing their job because the company decides to move the production to these countries where 
the production costs are lower.  
 
In this way a lack of development of corporatist arrangements in Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania, could become an even bigger problem when these countries become members of 
the European Union. EU countries with no participation of the labour organisations in state 
politics could in worst case represent a threat to the rights of workers and the industrial 
democracies in Western Europe as well. On the other side there is a possibility that since these 
three countries are amongst the first eight Eastern European countries to be admitted as 
members of the EU, their models of interest group representation will serve as prototypes for 
other Eastern European countries seeking to become members of the EU in the future. This 
would imply that the development in these three countries have implications for the 
development of interest group representation in a wider range of countries.  
 
Still my findings from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania cannot be used to draw generalisations 
valid for a wider range post-communist Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. These 
three countries are not representative for the group of CEE countries, which never were 
republics of the Soviet Union. Neither are they representative of the successor states of the 
Soviet Union, which all are considered to be much less democratic. The three Baltic countries 
constitute a group on their own as they are the only former Soviet republics who were 
accepted to become members in the EU in the first round of enlargement eastwards and did 
not become members of the CIS.      
 
An outline of the contents 
 
Chapter2 is a presentation of the historical background for the key factors of the analysis. The 
main subjects of this chapter will be the history of trade unions and employers’ organisations 
in the time of the pre-war republics and some features of the Soviet system of trade unionism. 
I will also look at some economical indicators through the transitions and the emergence of 
the new political elites. The last section deals with the placement of tripartite structures in the 
new political systems in a very broad outline.  In chapter 3, I will lay down the theoretical 
framework for the analysis. Here I will also develop the framework of how I will measure the 
level of democratic corporatism in the three countries. Chapter 4 deals with methodological 
issues of my comparative design. The main concern is related to the process of singling out 
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independent variables explaining the differences in level of democratic corporatism.  Chapter 
5 is the elaboration of the level of democratic corporatism in each of the three countries in the 
period from regaining independence in 1991. Here I will introduce a division of the three 
countries into six cases. Each of the countries in each of the periods from 1991 to the end of 
1995 and from 1996 to the end of 2001 constitutes one case. Chapter 5.1 deals with the aspect 
of ideology of social partnership amongst the elites. Chapter 5.2 is about concentration and 
centralisation of interest group organisations. Chapter 5.3 deals with the aspect of developing 
a system of bargaining between central trade union organisations, central employers 
organisations and the government at state level. The conclusive chapter 5.4 simplifies the 
findings from the rest of chapter 5 and divides my six cases into the two categories of 
relatively high level and relatively low level of democratic corporatism. Chapter 6 deals with 
factors that may have influenced the development of corporatist arrangements at state level in 
the three countries.  Chapter 6.1 is about openness of economy measured as the value of 
imports and exports in proportion to the size of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Chapter 
6.2 is devoted to governments and the factors of occurrence of bloc politics combined with 
radical shifts of governments, staying time of the longest staying government parties, and the 
length of time with socialist or social democratic parties in government.  Chapter 6.3 deals 
with pressure from the international organisations ILO and EU. In chapter 7, John Steward 
Mill’s Method of Agreement and Indirect Method of Difference are applied in a comparison 
of the cases in order to find likely explanations of the differences in level of democratic 
corporatism between the countries in the two time periods. In chapter 8 you will find the 
conclusion to what factors can most likely explain the difference of the level of democratic 
corporatism between the cases. In this chapter I will also look shortly back on the thesis to 
interpret the meaning of my findings.   
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2: Historical background for the key factors of the analysis  
 
Chapter 2 is a presentation of the historical background for the key factors of the analysis. The 
chapter briefly presents the history of trade unions and employers’ organisations in the time of 
the pre-war republics. Then some features he Soviet system of trade unionism will be touched 
upon.  After that I will look at some economical indicators through the transitions. Then I will 
deal with the emergence of the new political elites. The last section is a presentation of the 
placement of tripartite structures in the new political systems in a very broad outline. These 
arrangements will however not be elaborated in detail before in chapter 5. 
Table 2.1: Some facts  
 
 Estonia  Latvia Lithuania 
Time of first modern 
state 
1918 1918 19188 
Three largest ethnic 
groups (1999) 
Estonians: 66% 
Russians: 27% 
Ukrainians: 3% 
Latvians: 57% 
Russians: 29% 
Belarusians: 4%  
Lithuanians: 
84% 
Russians: 7% 
Poles: 6% 
Official language  Estonian (Finno-
Ugrian) 
Latvian (Baltic) Lithuanian 
(Baltic) 
Main religions  Lutheran, Russian 
orthodox  
Lutheran, Roman Catholic, 
Russian orthodox 
Roman 
Catholic 
 
Sources:  Norbalt 2 survey (ethnic groups); Misiunas and Taagepera 1993: 8 – 10 (time of 
first modern state) 
 
Table 2.1 presents only a few introductory facts about the three countries. The large Russian 
minorities, especially in Latvia and Estonia, could be a factor influencing the direction of the 
development of central trade union organisations. Still, none of the ethnic minorities have 
ever founded their own central trade union organisation in any of the countries, in the post-
                                                 
8
 The first Lithuanian state was established in the 1240s, and Mindaugas was crowned as king of Lithuania in 
1253 after he defeated the Brothers of the Sword (Kiaupa et. al. 1999: 41). Lithuanians still celebrate the 
anniversary of the crowning of King Mindaugas on the 6th of July (The Baltic Times 21.02.02 a).  
 14
Soviet time. On the contrary, in both Latvia and Estonia associations organising 
predominantly employees from the Russian, or other Slavic, minorities have been affiliated to 
the same central organisations as the associations consisting mainly of members from the 
indigenous majorities. Because of this I will not focus upon ethnic relations in this thesis.          
 
The simultaneous collapse of the Russian and German empires during the First World War 
gave the three Baltic peoples an opportunity to create their own states.  Lithuania and Estonia 
declared their independence on the 16th and the 24th of February 1918, while the Latvians 
made their declaration on the 18th of November the same year.  Still the three countries could 
not take their independence for granted before they after several battles concluded peace 
treaties with the Soviet state in 1920  (Misiunas and Taagepera 1993: 8 - 10). All three 
countries adopted liberal democratic constitutions and exercised democratic politics. In 
Lithuania the democracy did not last longer than to 1926 when the army installed the small 
Nationalist Union in government. One of their leaders Antanas Smetona became President 
(Vardys and Sedaitis 1997: 36).  In Estonia and Latvia the authoritarian regimes of Konstantin 
Päts and Karlis Ullmanis took power in 1934 (Misiunas and Taagepera 1993: 12).  
 
In 1930, manufacturing engaged 17.4 % of the labour force in Estonia and 13.5 % of the 
labour force in Latvia. On the other side, manufacturing engaged only 6 % of the labour force 
in Lithuania (Misiunas &Taagepera 1993: 11). Trade unions were established in the region 
during the 1905 revolution. The first congress of Estonian trade unions was held on the 30th of 
August 1919. It is worth noticing that the government disbanded this congress. The second 
national congress of trade unions in 1922 elected the United Central Council of Estonian 
Workers’ Unions. The Ministry of the Interior issued a decree in 1924, which stopped the 
activity of the united trade union organisations. The Central Union of Estonian Workers’ 
Associations was established on the national conference of Workers’ Unions in 1927, as a 
central organisation of trade unions. On its first congress in 1928, the union decided to join 
the international trade union association ETK RAL. In March 1934, President Pâts used the 
new authoritarian constitution to declare a state of emergency and deactivate the Parliament. 
He ruled by decree until 1938 (Misiunas & Taagepera 1993: 12). The new Labour Law of 
1936 obstructed the development of the trade unions. A new government friendly trade union 
association, the Estonian People’s Work Union, was founded. The cooperation with the 
international trade union association ceased. In 1940 the Central Union of Estonian Workers’ 
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Associations started its political left oriented activity, though the activity of trade unions 
stopped during wartime 1941 – 44 (Confederation of Estonian Trade Unions web, 11.11.02) 9.  
 
A central organisation of trade unions was established in Riga in July 1920. This organisation 
joined the international trade union organisation in Amsterdam. There were 40 trade unions 
with about 50 000 members in Latvia in 1933. The new authoritarian government disbanded 
the trade unions and prohibited strikes in 1934. A new trade union organisation was 
established under the authority of the Ministry of Interior the next year (Balodis 1990: 215 – 
216). The Christian democratic Lithuanian Labour Federation (LLF) was established in 1919 
and recreated in 1991 (LLF web, 11.11.02).  
 
Employers’ organisations existed in all three countries. The Union of Lithuanian Traders, 
Industrialists and Handicraftsmen was founded in April 1930. The Confederation of 
Lithuanian Industrialists claim to be the heir-taker of this organisation10. The Estonian 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry was established in 1925 (ECCI web 06.11.02). All three 
countries were members of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) from 1921, two years 
after the organisation was established.  
  
The Soviet occupation 
 
In 1985 Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had been republics of the USSR for forty years. The 
economical and industrial systems of the three republics were a part of the planned economy 
of the USSR. The emphasis of the USSR on heavy industry was implemented also in the 
Baltic republics.  According to Misiunas and Taagepera, industrial production increased by a 
factor of 20 in Estonia, 19 in Latvia and 24 in Lithuania between 1940 and 1980 (Misiunas 
and Taagepera 1993: 361). Even though these numbers come from Soviet sources, and may 
well be overestimating Soviet production, there is little doubt that grand industrialisation took 
place in the Baltic republics during Soviet times. From the 1960s, Moscow ministries 
controlled more and more of the industrial production. By 1971 Latvian Soviet authorities 
controlled 10 per cent of industrial production, mostly food and light industry (Misiunas & 
Taagepera 1993: 228). This system meant that even the directors at enterprises had little 
                                                 
9
 I have translated the text from Estonian. 
10
 On their web site they state that when CLI held their constituent congress, the union that functioned in pre-war 
Lithuania was restored (CLI web a, 11.11.02). 
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opportunity to make their own decisions, because they had to follow detailed directives from 
Moscow. What was the employees’ influence on issues concerning their workplace?  
 
According to the ideology, the USSR was the state of the workers. So trade unions had a 
central place in the Soviet political system. It is estimated that approximately 98 per cent of 
the Soviet workforce were members of trade unions in the early 1980s (Ruble 1986: 28). The 
tenth Soviet Communist Party Congress in 1921 drew up the principle for the work of trade 
unions throughout the Soviet period. It has been referred to as; “the doctrine of dual 
functioning trade unions” and “classic dualism”. According to this doctrine, trade unions had 
two functions. First and foremost they were supposed to mobilise labour production. Second 
they were supposed to protect the rights and interests of the members. In order to achieve the 
first principle, all employees in a given sector of economy, both workers and managers, were 
members in the same union. This can be understood by considering the Soviet political 
ideology. According to this, social conflicts between workers, employers and owners of 
enterprises could not exist in the socialist society of the Soviet Union. The Communist Party 
was seen as the representative of the interests of the workers.  Because the Communist Party 
owned all enterprises, the workers in the principle owned all enterprises through the 
Communist Party. Since the enterprise directors followed the directives from the central 
ministries, which were controlled by the Communist Party; they also served the interests of 
the workers.  
 
Even though any fundamental cleavage between the state as employer, directors and 
employees in the principle could not exist, short-term differences in priorities and preferences 
might persist. This implied some room for participation of workers through trade unions in 
order to resolve any disagreement and “ensure it did not disturb the overriding harmony of 
relations between labour, management, party and government” (Pravda and Ruble 1986: 3). 
This meant that trade unions had to subordinate the protection of the interests of their 
members to the promotion of party and government policies. Directives and communications 
generally flew vertically downwards, and all contact between union locals was channelled 
through higher bodies. The nomenklatura and party executives received all the important 
union appointments, and all communist unionists formed party caucuses to make sure that 
union decisions complied with party policy. Only at the enterprise level did trade unions 
possess anything approaching autonomy. Nevertheless, close collaboration between 
management and party officials within the enterprise severely limited independent union 
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activity, especially because management rather than workers usually dominated the trade 
union committees.  Within the enterprise trade unions were seeking to achieve their ends 
through collaboration and not confrontation (ibid: 1, 3 - 5). 
 
Even though trade unions were not channels of political influence for workers, they had a 
central position at enterprise level. Because the main responsibility of trade unions was to 
increase productivity, a large part of the Soviet social and welfare policies were channelled 
through the trade unions. This meant that the trade unions distributed a wide range of social 
welfare benefits, including places in vacation centres and sanatoria, kindergartens and pioneer 
camps, the allocation of housing and the administration of the bulk of the state social security 
system. Because of the role as welfare distributors and the total dominance of the communist 
party over trade unions, the 1994 deputy director of the official Russian trade union federation 
called Soviet trade unions “not trade unions at all, but the social and welfare department of 
the central committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union” (CPSU) (quoted in Clarke 
and Fairbrother 1994: 370). Even though the Communist Party and the management 
dominated the trade unions, the unions could in some cases defend the interests of the 
workers. The unions had to approve any revision of norms at enterprise level, and no worker 
could be dismissed without approval from the union (ibid: 369 – 370).   
 
Clark and Fairbrother described the strategy of using trade unions to mobilize the Soviet 
workforce and increase production as not successful on the great majority of the Soviet 
workers (ibid: 370). On the other hand Soviet workers were responding to the lack of 
influence on the organisation of their working life through the significant degree of control 
they imposed over work speed, job organisation and product quality (Filtzer 1992: 112). This 
meant that labour turnover and absenteeism were high and productivity and product quality 
were low compared to Western standards. One observer described this reaction of the workers 
as taking the “freedom not to work to hard” (Ruble 1986: 40). Even though Baltic labour 
efficiency was markedly above the Soviet average, it was low compared to Western standards 
(Misiunas & Taagepera 1993: 236). Nevertheless, the production quotas should be achieved. 
The result was often storming, which was the breakneck attempt to clear out backlogs at the 
end of the month, quarter or year (Filtzer 1992: 113, Misiunas & Taagepera 1993: 189). Since 
the managers needed cooperation from the workforce to fill the quotas, especially if storming 
was necessary, a sophisticated informal system of bargaining over areas of control developed 
between workers and management at the individual enterprises. The employees could not 
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decide their own work speed on all workplaces. The workers in high intensity production such 
as textiles, the garment industry and assembly line production in light engineering (e.g. watch 
manufacture), was subject to higher intensity of labour than other workers, for instance in 
heavy industry. Mostly women worked in these high intensity industries, while mostly men 
worked in heavy industry. Filtzer pointed out that Soviet industry had a severe and 
reproducible labour shortage since the introduction of the five years plans (Filtzer 1992: 116). 
This meant that work was easy to find. Also in the Baltic republics in the 1980s it was easy 
for workers fired for “continual tardiness, absence and drinking on the job” to find work 
elsewhere (Misiunad & Taagepera 1993: 237)   
 
Wage inequality in the Soviet Union decreased somewhat as the result of major wage reforms 
in 1956 and 1968 (Ruble 1986: 45). Still large inequality existed in the Soviet Union. In the 
Baltic republics as elsewhere in the Soviet Union there were special stores for Communist 
Party leaders, and pharmacies reserved special items for these privileged persons. Foreign 
lingerie used to be distributed at top-level party meetings even in the late 1970s (Misiunas & 
Taagepera 1993: 225 – 226).   
 
The conclusion of this section about working life in the Soviet period is that Baltic workers 
did not have any real influence on decisions concerning their working life, unless they didn’t 
actually mean the same as the Communist Party. Though they had, at least in theory, some 
influence on decisions taken at their workplace through trade unions. This influence was 
severely constrained by the dominance of the Communist Party over trade unions. Baltic 
employers also had very limited opportunities to take their own decisions. Most of big 
enterprises were fully or partly under the control of all-Union ministries, which also set the 
production quotas. The Baltic people did not live in a society featured by economical equality 
and equal access to goods and services, but in a society featured by privileges to the 
nomenklatura of the Communist Party. Nevertheless, some protection against absolute 
poverty existed in the form of minimum wage, socialised medicine, and not at least, through 
the abundance of work. 
 
Coping with the Soviet legacy  
 
The Soviet legacy should be important for how people evaluate trade unions in the post 
communist countries. Anton Steen measured the level of people’s confidence in trade unions. 
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The Norbalt 2 survey contained a question about trust in trade unions for 1999. The following 
table is a contraction of these data: 
 
Table 2.2: Confidence in trade unions 
Percentage of persons with confidence – percentage of persons without confidence in 
trade unions in 1992, 1997 and 1999 
 
 Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
 Difference Don’t know/ 
no answer 
Difference Don’t know/ 
no answer 
Difference Don’t know/ 
no answer 
1992 -32 27% -52 21% -38 32% 
1997 -30 32% -30 30% -30 46% 
199911 -6 48% -29 29% -24 45% 
 
Sources: 1992 and 1997: Steen 1998: 12 – 13, table 2. 1999: Norbalt 2 survey 
 
The level of trust or confidence can be measured as the shares of respondents distrusting 
(1999) or not having very much confidence or not at all having confidence (1992 and 1997) in 
trade unions subtracted from the shares of the respondents trusting (1999) or having a great 
del or quite a lot of confidence (1992, 1997) in trade unions. Out of this we see that there were 
more distrusters than trusters of trade unions in all the there countries in all three years. The 
largest difference was in Latvia in 1992 (52 percentage points). The difference has however 
been declining in all three countries between 1992 and 1999. In 1999 there were only six 
percentage points more distruters than trusters of trade unions in Estonia, while the difference 
in favour of distrusters was still 29 percentage points in Latvia and 24 percentage points in 
Lithuania.  It is worth noting the high frequencies of respondents, which did not know or had 
not answered. These shares were increasing over the period in all three countries. This 
indicates a widespread insecurity about the work of trade unions in the 1990s. The low level 
of confidence or trust, especially in the beginning of the 1990s, may reflect the soviet legacy 
of trade unions being under the authority of the communist party. It may also be a result of the 
legacy of the past in another way, reflecting that trade unions could not deliver the same 
amount of social security and goods that they provided in the Soviet times.  
                                                 
11
 The Norbalt 2 survey of 1999 asked about trust and distrust.   
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Figure 2.1 shows the percentages of ordinary employees and persons engaged in lower, 
middle and higher management in the three countries that were members in a trade union in 
1994 and in 1999.   
Figure 2.1: Membership in trade unions  
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  Source: Norbalt 1 and 2 survey.  
 
As figure 2.1 shows the membership in trade unions declined sharply in the 1990s. In 1999 
the membership rates in trade unions amongst employees and persons engaged in 
management were very low in all three countries. The membership rates were lowest in 
Lithuania on 8%, on 12% in Estonia and on 16% in Latvia.  It is also clear that the decline in 
membership rates started later in Latvia than in Lithuania and Estonia. In 1994 Latvia had still 
an extremely high membership rate on 84%. Presumably most of the members gained their 
membership in the Soviet times. In Lithuania, and especially in Estonia, union membership 
had already fallen to a low level by 1994.   
 
In the Soviet times the state was the only employer.  Especially private employers are alive to 
the necessity of being organised in employer’s organisations. Therefore increasing 
employment in private enterprises is critical to the development of employers’ organisations. 
Figure 2.2 on the next page shows the percentage of employees in private companies in 1994 
and 1999. 
 21
Figure 2.2: Employees in private companies 
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Sources: Norbalt 1 and 2 survey 
 
Figure 2.2 shows that Estonia had a considerable share of 45% of employees in private 
companies already in 1994.  This share increased to impressive 67% by 1999. Latvia came in 
a middle position, having 37% of employees in private companies in 1994, increasing to 59% 
by 1999. The increase in employment in private companies until 1994 was much more modest 
in Lithuania, than in Estonia and Latvia. Only 17% of the employees in Lithuania worked in 
private companies in 1994. On the other hand, the increase in employment in private 
companies from 1994 to 1999 was on 28 percentage points in Lithuania, compared to smaller 
22 percentage points in Estonia and Latvia. Private employers had emerged in all three 
countries by 1994.  In 1999 they employed the major shares of employees in Estonia and 
Latvia, and almost half of them in Lithuania. This should be most favourable for the 
development of employers’ organisations in all three countries - most favourable for the 
development in Estonia and least favourable for the development in Lithuania before 1994. 
    
Some economic indicators through the transitions 
 
The following sections presents some economic indicators aimed at illustrating the situation 
that employees, employers and people generally have lived in during the 1990s. This is 
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relevant background information the economical context the interest group organisations and 
the governments are functioning in.      
Figure 2.3: Real GDP per capita (PPP US $) 1991 - 2000 
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Source: UNDP: Human Development Indicators 1993 - 2002  
(UNDP web, 07.05.03) 
 
Gross Domestic Product per capita is the value of the total output of all goods and services 
produced in a country divided with the number of inhabitants (UNDP 2002: 264). When 
measured in Purchasing Power Parity US$ (PPP US$), the value is comparable between 
countries since one PPP US$ has the same purchasing power as $1 has in the United States 
(ibid 266 – 267). Figure 2.3 reflects the economical development in the countries between 
1991 and 2000. One should however interpret the data from the beginning of the 1990s with 
care, because overestimation from the Soviet period might remain. Yet there is little doubt 
that the transformation of the economies followed by prise hikes and bankruptcies, resulted in 
an economical decline during the first years of the 1990s. The economy has been recovering 
in all three countries after 1995. The growth between 1995 and 2000 was strongest in Estonia, 
which had a significantly higher GDP per capita than Latvia and Lithuania in 2000. The 
economical growth in Latvia and Lithuania seems to have slowed down in the aftermath of 
the Russian financial crisis in 1998.   
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Table 2.3: Income distribution 
 
 Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
 
Gini 
coefficient 
Decile ratio 
(90/10) 
Gini 
coefficient 
Decile ratio 
(90/10) 
Gini 
coefficient 
Decile ratio 
(90/10) 
1990 0.24 3.31 0.24 3.08 0.25 3.11 
1994 0.34 5.05 0.41 8.92 0.36 6.56 
1997 – 199912 0.37 4.70 0.32 4.13 0.37 4.89 
  
Sources: Values for 1990 and 1994: Nørgaard 1999: 124, table 4.6.  Values for 1997 – 1999:  
World Bank 2000: 425, 428. 
 
The decile ratios (90/10) refer to the income of the upper tenth income group as a factor of the 
income of the bottom tenth income group. The Gini coefficients are more general measures of 
inequality, as they include all income groups and not only the top and bottom tenth. The 
World Bank data in table 2.1 show that income inequality radically widened between 1990 
and 1994 in all three countries. Latvia had the largest income inequality in 1994. At that time 
the top 10 per cent of persons had almost 9 times the income of the bottom 10 percent. The 
income inequality in Latvia narrowed after 1994. The income distribution in Latvia in 1997 – 
1998 was somewhat more equal than the income distribution in Lithuania in 1999 and in 
Estonia in 1998.  Compared to other post-communist European and Central Asian countries, 
the three Baltic countries, together with Poland, figured with a middle term income inequality. 
On one side the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia had all Gini coefficients on 0.25 
showing considerably lower income inequality. On the other side all the Caucasian and 
Central Asian countries, as well as Russia, had Gini coefficients between 0.4 and 0.5, showing 
much higher income inequality  (World Bank 2001: 421 - 433). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 Estonia 1998, 4th quarter, Latvia 1997 – 1998 and Lithuania 1999. 
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Figure 2.4: Unemployment rates  
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  Sources: Various sources 13   
 
The unemployment rates in figure 2.4 refer to the ILO definition. According to this, an 
unemployed person is a person that does not work anywhere, is not temporarily absent from 
work, is available for work within two weeks and is actively seeking work (Statistical Office 
of Estonia 2001b: 281). Using this concept, the surveys report higher unemployment rates 
than the rates based on persons registered at the state employment boards. The Estonian 
unemployment rate for 2002 is for the third quarter. All other are average annual numbers. 
The figure shows that unemployment increased in Lithuania from 14.3% of the labour force in 
1997 to 17.4% in 2001, when it was clearly higher than in Latvia and Estonia. By 2002 the 
Lithuanian unemployment rates had declined to 13.8%. During the same period the Latvian 
unemployment rates decreased from 15.2% of the labour force in 1997 to 13.1% in 2001 and 
12.0% in 2002. The Estonian unemployment rates increased from 9.6% of the labour force in 
1997 to 13.6% in 2000. After that it declined sharply to 9.1% in the 3rd quarter of 2002. The 
unemployment rates in each of the three countries in 2001 were higher than in all of the EU 
countries. Greece and Spain, with unemployment rates on 10.5 % and 10.6 %, were closest to 
                                                 
13
 Sources: Lithuania 1997 – 2000: Statistics Lithuania 2001c: 28, table 3.2. Lithuania 2001 –2002: Statistics 
Lithuania web d: 4, 07.05.03. Estonia 1997 – 3rd quarter 2002: Statistical office of Estonia web c, 07.05.03. 
Latvia 1997 – 2002: Central statistical Bureau of Latvia web d, 07.05.03.  
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the unemployment rates of the three Baltic countries14 (Commission of the European 
Communities 2002: 111).  
 
In the Norbalt 1 survey of 1994, 458 respondents between 18 and 62 years of age, who were 
currently without work and having previously been employed, were asked about the main 
reason why they did not work. In the Norbalt 2 survey of 1999, 791 respondents between 18 
and 68 years of age in the three countries without work, who had previously been employed, 
were asked about the main reason they had stopped working. The results are presented in 
figure 2.5.    
Figure 2.5: Share of persons previously employed, but currently without job, that lost 
their job because of closures or redundancies   
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  Source: Norbalt 1 and 2 survey   
   
Figure 2.5 shows that in Estonia the share of persons previously employed, but currently 
without job, that lost their job because of closures or redundancies increased from 36% in 
1994 to 43% in 1999.  The Latvian figure increased from 37% in 1994 to 47% in 1999. The 
Lithuanian figure decreased slightly from a very high 49% in 1994 to 45% in 1999. The 
                                                 
14
 Some regions and districts were affected much harder than other. The Ida-Viru county in North-eastern 
Estonia had an ILO unemployment rate on 18.9% in 2002 (Statistical Office of Estonia d, 08.05.03). In the 
Rezekne district in South-eastern Latvia 27.6% of the economically active population were registered as 
unemployed (Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia web e, 08.05.03).  In November 2000 the Siauliai county in 
central Lithuania had an ILO unemployment rate on 19.3% (Statistics Lithuania 2001b: 37, table 5.6).  
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general picture is that very high shares of persons that had quitted from their job, had to do 
this because of closures or redundancies. In 1994 the situation was the worst in Lithuania, 
while in 1999 it was just as bad in Estonia and Latvia. In Estonia and Latvia the situation was 
worse in 1999 than in 1994.   
 
Since 1995 the share of long-term unemployed has been increasing in Estonia. 32% of the 
unemployed had been without work for more than 12 months. In 1996 this share had 
increased to 55%. In 2000 the share having been without work for more than a year was on 
69%, and 26% of the unemployed had been without work for more than two years (Statistical 
Office of Estonia 2001b: 105, Eamets et al. 1999: 38). In Lithuania 52% of the unemployed 
had been without work for more than a year in 2000, compared to 39% in 1999 and 55 percent 
in 1998 (Statistics Lithuania 2001 c: 36). In Latvia 58% of the unemployed had been without 
work for more than a year in May 2001. 29% of the unemployed had been without work for 
more than three years, and 16% was without work for more than 60 months. In May 2000, 
56% of the unemployed had been without work for more then one year. The figure for 
November 1996 was 59% (Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia 2001a: 46, own calculations to 
percentages).  
 
Persons who have been unemployed for more than 6 months in Lithuania and 9 months in 
Estonia and Latvia are not eligible to receive unemployment benefits. The state financial 
insurance for unemployed in all three countries has been very small. In Estonia 400 Estonian 
Kroons (EEK) was granted each month in 2000 (Estonian Ministry of Social Affairs web c, 
02.10.02). This amounted to only one third of the national minimum subsistence level. In 
Lithuania, the Law on Support of the Unemployed of 1990 (revised 1996) regulates 
unemployment benefits. An amount between 135 and 250 Litas was granted each month, 
depending on the length of the period the recipient had been paying to the mandatory state 
social insurance system (Ministry of Social Security and Labour web b and c, 02.10.02). The 
minimum subsistence level of the same year was on 125 Litas per month.  In Latvia, the 
average 2000 the average unemployment benefit in 2000 was 45 Latvian Lats a month. 
(Ministry of Welfare of the Republic of Latvia 2001: 31).  This amounted to only 53% of the 
national minimum subsistence level.  
 
Workers have paid the bitter prise for enterprises not able to cope in the new market economy, 
not only through redundancies and enterprise closures. Sometimes the salaries have failed to 
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appear. 21% of the working respondents in Lithuania in the Norbalt 2 survey of 1999 reported 
that they had experienced delays in receiving salaries during the last twelve months. The 
figures for Latvia and Estonia were on 15 % and 14 %.  Out of these, 28 % in Lithuania 
reported that the delay had lasted less than one month. 40 % reported a delay between one and 
two months. 28 % said the delay had lasted between two months and a year, and 1 % (four 
respondents) had experienced a delay on more than one year. The figures for Latvia were 
respectively 46%, 35%, 18% and 0.4 % (one respondent). In Estonia the figures were 53%, 
28%, 17% and 2% (seven respondents). In March 2000, workers from the bankrupt Inkaras 
sports shoe factory in Kaunas, Lithuania’s second largest city, were on hunger strike for more 
than two weeks to have their wages, which they had not received for a year (The Baltic Times  
(TBT) 16.03.00, 23.03.00 and 30.03.0015, see also Woolfson and Beck 2002: 750). 
  
Monthly average gross wages and salaries in the fourth quarter of 2002 were very low in 
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia compared to the wages in Western European countries. Still 
they were somewhat higher in Estonia (436 US$) than in Latvia (311 US$), while Lithuania 
(346 US$)16 was in between (Statistical Office of Estonia web b, 11.04.03; Central Statistical 
Bureau of Latvia web b, 04.05.03, Statistics Lithuania web b, 11.04.03). The same year, the 
minimum legal gross wage was on 111 US$ in Estonia, 97 US$ in Latvia and 117 US$ in 
Lithuania17 (translation of Estonian tripartite agreement of 25.09.01, interview Jaunzeme 
14.12.01, Ministry of Social Security and Labour web a, 04.05.03). 
 
The political elites 
 
The subject of this thesis is cooperation and negotiations at elite level. After all, corporatist 
arrangements on state level involve negotiation between elite persons in the central 
organisations and in the state bureaucracies or the government. Therefore I will draw some 
historical lines aimed to tell something about the conditions for elite relationships in the three 
countries.  
 
Anton Steen and Jüri Ruus have called the Soviet elite monolithic in nature. All members 
were communists, approved by the top level of the Party and obliged to profess Marxist-
                                                 
15
 Appendix D is a list of references to the articles from the Baltic Times.  
16
 The values in US$ for all three countries are calculated from the currency rates at the end of 2002. Source: 
IMF web, 28.04.03. 
17The values in US$ for all three countries are calculated from the average currency rates of 2002. Source: IMF 
web, 28.04.03.  
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Leninist ideology. Dissent and fractions within the Party were prohibited (Steen and Ruus 
1999: 4 – 5). The appointment of Mikhail Gorbachev to the general secretary of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in March 1985 and the following 
implementation of the political programs of perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost 
(openness) meant legalisation of some kinds of political movements outside the Communist 
Party. The result was a number of interacting political campaigns. The term movement 
society, which Rein Rutsoo applied to Estonia from 1986 to 1991 (see Arter 1996: 124), could 
also describe the Latvian and Lithuanian societies. The popular fronts were very important 
parts of the movement societies and the independence forces. These fronts held their 
inaugural conferences in all three countries in 1988  (Misiunas & Taagepera 1993: 318). 
Large shares of the political elites in the independent countries including important 
personalities had a common past in the popular fronts. When the communist parties became 
minority parties in the Supreme Councils of the three republics from 1990, the popular fronts 
took over as the governing party. The popular front controlled the government in Estonia until 
January 1992, in Lithuania until November 1992 and in Latvia until July 1993 (Zarates 
Political Collections web a, b and c, 07.05.03).  Furthermore, several new political parties 
emerged from the popular fronts. 
 
Only in Lithuania, the successor party of the pro-independence wing of the communist party 
was successful after independence. The Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party (LDLP) had a 
majority of the members in the Seimas and formed government alone from December 1992 to 
November 1996 (Zarates’ Polical Collections web c, 07.05.03). Important personalities from 
the communist parties went over to other parties in Estonia and Latvia. Arnold Rûûtel, the 
chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council from 1983 to 1992, became the leader of 
the Estonian Country People’s Party (Nørgaard 1999: 73, Misiunas & Taagepera 1993: 352). 
He was elected to President of Estonia in September 2001 (TBT 27.09.01). Club 21 was 
founded before the 1993 parliamentary elections in Latvia, as a meeting point for both Latvian 
and Russian speaking elites. This club was the forerunner of the centre – right party Latvia’s 
Way, which was a member of all governments between July 1993 and November 2002 (Steen 
1997: 353, Zarates’ Political Collections web b, 07.05.03). 
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More homogenous elites than populations 
 
Table 2.4 shows that the elites were more homogenous than the populations, according to 
important demographical and an attitudinal criteria. This may be related to the common past 
of large parts of the political elites in addition to requirements of proficiency in the Baltic 
languages for Members of the Parliament and civil servants. The data on attitudinal 
differences are based on the response to the statement: “Income must be made more equal / 
individual initiative must be stimulated materially. The values refer to the share of 
respondents that situated themselves from 1 to (including) 4, on a scale with the ‘more equal’ 
extreme on 1 and the ‘stimulated materially’ extreme on 10.  
 
Table 2.4: Differences between elites and populations in 1993/ 94 
 
 Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
 Elite Population Elite Population Elite Population 
Demography       
Indigenous ethnicity 89 66 *a 83 57 *a 95 83 *a 
Previous membership in the 
Communist Party 
53 7 63 6 48 5 
Higher education  94 15 91 15 94 16 
Attitudes       
Agree that ‘individual initiative 
must be stimulated materially’ 
94 66 91 55 80 59 
Agree that ‘Income must be made 
more equal’ 
3 20 4 29 5 21 
 
Source: Reconstructed from various tables of Steen 199718 
 
The elites in Steen’s survey are members of the parliament, political and administrative 
leaders of ministries in the state bureaucracy, leaders of state owned business activities and 
banks, leaders of private companies and financial institutions, leaders of political parties and 
movements, leaders in higher education, mass media and culture institutions, judges in courts 
and prominent lawyers, and political and administrative leaders in local government (Steen 
1997: 21). Table 2.2 shows that in 1993 – 1994 much higher shares of the elites than of the 
                                                 
18
 Elite ethnicity: Steen 1997: 46, table 3.8. Elite previous membership in the Communist Party: Ibid: 36, table 
3.2. Population previous membership in the Communist Party and higher education: Ibid 250, table 14.1. Elite 
higher education: Ibid: 60, table 4.1. Attitudinal variable: Ibid: 253, table 14.2.  Population ethnicity: Norbalt 1 
survey.  Steen’s data are based on interviews conducted in the spring 1993 in Latvia, the late autumn 1994 in 
Lithuania and the spring 1994 in Estonia. The Norbalt 1 survey is from 1994.   
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populations were of indigenous ethnicity. The elites also distinguished themselves from the 
populations by having an extremely high frequency of higher education. More than 90% of 
the elites in all of the three countries had higher education, in contrast to the 15% – 16% of 
the populations. Further, more than half of the elites in Latvia and Estonia and almost half of 
the elites in Lithuania had previous membership in the Communist Party, while the shares in 
the populations were only 5% – 7%.   Finally, the elites were much less divided than the 
populations in their attitudes towards income-equality. In each of the countries, 5% or less of 
the elites placed themselves on the egalitarian side, opposed to the great majorities of the 
elites, which meant that individual initiative should be stimulated materially. On the other 
side, the populations were more divided on this question. A share of 20% or more of the 
population placed themselves on the egalitarian side19.   
 
Altogether the common demographical features and the very small opposition to 
economically liberal attitudes amongst the elites, indicate that the elites were more 
homogenous than the populations. This may provide good conditions for an ideology of social 
partnership functioning on elite level. This may again provide a good foundation for state 
level corporative arrangements gathering elite persons from the central interest group 
organisations and the government or the bureaucracy. On the other hand, if the ideology of 
social partnership is restricted to elite level, it may impose restraints for the development of 
corporative arrangements on enterprise level 
 
Tripartite structures placement in the new political systems 
 
In all three countries, the participants in tripartite councils and tripartite agreements at state 
level are representatives from the government or the state bureaucracy and the central 
organisations of employees and employers. The other state branches, as the parliament or the 
president, have not been involved in these formal corporatist negotiations. This means that 
tripartite councils and agreements may be advisory or binding to the government, a ministry 
or a state institution. Tripartite decisions can however not bind the legislature. This means that 
the tripartite negotiations at state level can influence the preparation of draft laws, which the 
government pass on to the parliament. The conclusion of the social partners can however not 
                                                 
19
 Steen found the same pattern of more homogenous distribution of attitudes amongst the elites than the 
populations, regarding the attitudes to private versus public responsibility for welfare and ownership in business 
and industry (see Steen 1997: 253 – 254 (table 14.3 and 14.5). 
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hinder the parliament in rejecting or amending a draft law. The social partners can also bring 
their influence to bear on decisions of the government, which do not need approval from the 
parliament. A very important issue here is the stipulation of the legal minimum wage rates. In 
all three countries, the law provides that the government stipulates the minimum rates of 
hourly and monthly wages, and that these rates are valid for all employees in the countries, 
irrespective of whether they are members of a trade union or not. All three countries have also 
developed a practice where the government, and the central organisations of employers and 
employees meet on state level to stipulate the minimum wage rates.  
 
Tripartite negotiations may also have decisive or advisory influence on state institutions, 
which make important decisions on their own. The Lithuanian State Social Insurance Fund 
Council is an example of this. This council has approved the budget of the State Social 
Insurance Fund and the quarterly budgets for pension funds since the council was established 
in 1991. Another example is the Estonian Council of the Health Insurance Fund. Since the 
council was established in 2000, it has approved the development plan, the budget and the 
structure of the Health Insurance Fund. 
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3: Theoretical Chapter 
 
In this chapter I will lay down the theoretical framework for the analysis. First I will very 
briefly present two different ways of understanding the emergence of democratic corporatism 
in general. I will proceed by presenting Schmitter’s and Katzenstein’s definitions of societal 
corporatism and democratic corporatism, with the particular stress on the latter. After that I 
will discuss a small selection of literature related to the emergence of democratic corporatism 
in post-communist Eastern Europe, before I present my way of measuring democratic 
corporatism with the starting point in Katzenstein’s definition. After that I will discuss what 
factors may have influenced the level of democratic corporatism in Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania. Finally I will present my way of measuring these factors.    
 
Bottom-up versus top-down approaches to democratic corporatism 
 
Studies of democratic corporatism or the study of the relationship between government and 
interest groups like trade unions, employers’ federations and farmers’ organisations, can be 
divided between a bottom-up and a top-down approach. The bottom-up approach is 
represented by amongst others Stein Rokkan (1966). This approach considers cooperation 
between interest groups and government in policy making a result of the emergence of 
organisations.  These organisations are mobilising large groups of workers, employers and 
farmers and controlling important resources essential to the state, as workforce, capital 
(factories, business etc) and agricultural products. Accordingly, the integration of the interest 
groups is considered as a result of the strength of the organisations. The strength of the 
organisations is again based upon the membership. An organisation is very strong if the 
members constitute major parts of the population and the voters and control the essential 
resources the state needs to exist and the people need to live. According to this approach, the 
origin of democratic corporatism is the political mobilisation of the people of the different 
economical sectors in society, mainly the workers, the capital owners and the businessmen 
and the farmers and the fishermen (Rokkan 1966: 105 - 110). Following this, you would not 
find democratic corporatism without strong organisations representing the interests of the 
main economic sectors of the society. This means that high membership rates in trade unions 
and farmers organisations and employers federation covering important parts of the economy, 
is considered as one of the defining hallmarks of democratic corporatism. According to 
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Francis Castles, the corporatist system has been seen as the “instrument by which working-
class organisations have been politically integrated into the fabric of capitalist society” 
(Castles 1978: 131). In this way strong labour organisations and socialist or social democratic 
parties are seen as a precondition for the emergence of corporatism.    
 
In this thesis I will follow the top-down approach to democratic corporatism, presented by 
Peter J. Katzenstein. In “Small states in World Markets” (1985) he seeks the historical origins 
of democratic corporatism in small European states in the responses of the governments and 
the leaders of the main interest group organisations to the economical crisis of the 1930s 
(Katzenstein 1985: 136 – 137). At this time the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Switzerland, 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden were facing high unemployment and witnessing the rise of the 
extreme right in large parts of Europe and the takeover of power by the Nazis in Germany. On 
this background, compromises and agreements between the main organisations of trade 
unions and the employers’ organisations and between agrarian and social democratic political 
parties were reached. These arrangements set the path for cooperation and regular bargaining 
between the central interest group organisations and the government, as well as a tradition for 
cross party cooperation and bargaining aimed at compromising. Democratic corporatism has 
emerged out of these arrangements.   
 
Defining democratic corporatism 
 
Philippe Schmitter distinguished between corporatism and interest intermediation, which he 
called concertation. Corporatism distinguished itself from its polar opposite pluralism. In 
corporatist countries, interest groups were relatively large in size and relatively small in 
number, and they were organised into national peak organisations. While in pluralist 
countries, interest group organisations were smaller, dispersed, overlapping and in lesser 
extent hierarchically organised into national peak organisations. Concertation distinguished 
itself from its polar opposite ‘pressure’. In countries with concertation, organised affected 
interests were incorporated within the policy process as recognized indispensable negotiators 
and were made jointly responsible for the implementation of policy decisions, which took on 
a characteristically semi-public or para-state quality. In countries distinguished by ‘pressure’, 
affected interests remained essentially outside the policy process, as consultants or 
combatants, and the implementation took place exclusively under the responsibility of public 
authorities (Scmitter 1982: 263 – 264; see also Lijphart 1999: 172). Schmitter emphasized 
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that corporatism was clearly not something a polity had or did not have. His position was that 
the concepts were defined as polar opposites, but the real world was always located 
somewhere in between (ibid: 265).  
 
Katzenstein’s three defining hallmarks of democratic corporatism were the following: 1. An 
ideology of social partnership expressed at the national level. 2. A relatively centralised and 
concentrated system of interest groups. 3. Voluntary and informal coordination of conflicting 
objectives through continuous bargaining between interest groups, state bureaucracies and 
political parties (Katzenstein 1985: 32). Also Katzenstein made it clear that corporatism was 
not a matter to be or not to be in a state. He viewed democratic corporatism as a matter of 
degree. It could exist nowhere and everywhere, but it appeared in its strongest degree in 
mentioned small Western European states (ibid: 34). Katzenstein further distinguished 
between the liberal and the social model of democratic corporatism20. Because of the limited 
scope of this thesis, I will not attempt to employ these to models to describe the systems in 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.  
 
When democratic corporatism is considered as the strategy of the political elite and the 
government to handle economical changes, it may exist without high membership rates in the 
main interest group organisations. The reason is that democratic corporatism is considered 
created from above by the government and the elites in the peak interest organisations, and 
not from below from political mobilisation of workers, industrialists, farmers and fishermen.  
                                                 
20
 Still a few words of Katzenstein’s distinction between the two models here: Katzenstein sketched out the 
social democratic corporatist model from similarities between Denmark, Austria and Norway. He further 
outlined the liberal democratic corporatist model from similarities between the Netherlands, Belgium and 
Switzerland. Sweden shared the characteristics of both models and was considered as a combination. In the 
countries constituting the social model (with Austria as the prime example), business was weaker and nationally 
oriented, while trade unions were stronger and centralised (Katzenstein 1985: 129). Katzenstein called the 
strategies followed in the social model to compensate for internationally imposed economical change, for 
national adaptation and public compensation. By national adaptation, Katzenstein referred to protectionist 
measures as raising tariffs, bringing anti-dumping cases to the GATT and fostering of industrial concentration, 
including developing of national champions as a defence against foreign corporations (ibid: 112, 113, 115). By 
public compensation, Katzenstein referred to taking use of public measures, as increasing public employment 
and public expenditures for social transfers and social security and implementing large public employment 
programs (ibid 117 – 120). In the countries constituting the liberal model (with Switzerland as the prime 
example), business was stronger and internationally oriented, while trade unions were weaker and decentralised. 
Katzenstein called the strategies followed in the social model to compensate for internationally imposed 
economical change, for global adaptation and private compensation (ibid: 129).  By global adaptation 
Katzenstein referred to more out-turned strategies, as increasing the streams of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
out of the countries and increase production in foreign subsidiaries (ibid: 115). By private compensation, 
Katzenstein referred to having lower taxes and trying to attract foreign investments to repressed areas instead of 
taking use of public measures (ibid: 118 – 119).    
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The best way to measure this kind of corporatism is hence not in membership rates in interest 
group organisations, but by the integration of the interest groups in state politics.  
 
Nevertheless, it is reasonable to expect that this strategy is more likely to be successful and to 
contribute to democracy, social stability and economical growth if the population follows 
along with the cooperation and bargaining at state level. Since this requires some degree of 
membership, one should also look at membership rates to draw daring implications about the 
chances of success for the corporatist strategy in the long run. Still, low membership rates are 
by no means a proof of the failure of a top-down initiated democratic corporatist strategy. If 
the states are at the present in an institution-building phase, a successful completion of this 
phase may raise membership in the interest group organisations later. One might even argue 
that well developed institutions at state level, providing a meeting place for the interest group 
organisations, the bureaucracy and the government, in spite of low membership rates; is an 
indication of a positive attitude from the government towards democratic corporatism. The 
fact that the government has not made use of low membership rates as an excuse for 
excluding the main interest organisations from power may be considered as a proof of their 
commitment to consensus building across society. On the other side one could reply that a not 
consensus oriented government may find including interest group organisations with few 
members in state politics less threatening to its power than including interest group 
organisations with broad membership. Nevertheless, using membership rates to separate 
between democratic and undemocratic top-down initiated corporatism is not recommendable. 
The governments alone do certainly not determine membership rates in organisations in 
democratic countries, and membership rates in interest group organisations may well be lower 
than the governments wish them to be.  
 
When one view democratic corporatism as a strategy to handle economical crisis more than 
an ideological project, it is not necessary a project initiated by strong social democratic or 
socialist parties. It was not only the entry of social democratic parties to government that 
facilitated the corporative arrangements of small Western European states in the 1930s, but 
also the emergence of coalitions between parties that had not cooperated before (see 
Katzenstein 1985: 139 – 150). I will follow Katzenstein’s concept of democratic corporatism. 
Hence I will not measure democratic corporatism by membership rates and economical 
resources of interest group organisations. I will focus on the level of integration of the interest 
group organisations in policy making at state level.     
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Development of democratic corporatism in post-communist countries in Eastern Europe
   
In 1992 Hans Slomp compared the present situation of the Central and Eastern European 
countries with reconstruction periods in Western and Southern European countries. This was 
the situation in the Scandinavian countries in the 1930s and in the reconstruction period after 
World War 2, in Germany in the reconstruction period after World War 2 and in Spain in the 
transition to democracy after the death of general Franco in 1975. These countries pursued a 
strict wage policy to offset the effects of scarcity of consumer goods and to prevent running 
inflation. The wage policies formed a part of a more general state involvement in the 
economy, including the central coordination of large investments and a number of social 
measures like the implementation of systems of social security and worker participation 
within enterprises. This was accomplished through bargaining between the national 
governments, employers and trade unions. The unions got real power over state policies in 
these fields as a form of compensation for the wage restraint. The two conditions for the 
development of these forms of corporatism were that wage policy was made to a part of a 
larger package of social and economic policies and that trade unions and employers had to be 
consulted and, preferably, had to agree with these policies (Slomp 1992: 19 – 21). Slomp 
reminds us that Western and Southern European countries undergoing reconstruction periods 
have granted trade unions a place at the table with the government and legitimacy as political 
players in compensation for wage restraint. The same kind of mechanisms may have resulted 
in democratic corporatist arrangements also in post-communist Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.   
 
In an analysis of the development of labour’s rights in Lithuania, Charles Woolfson and 
Matthias Beck also looked at the emergence of tripartite structures. The ILO and the EU had 
recommended Lithuania to develop such structures. In the view of these authors, this had 
evolved into a faltering and half-hearted social dialogue, developed from above due to the low 
level of workers’ participation (Woolfson and Beck 2002: 760). Referring to the low 
membership rates in trade unions, the authors found that labour had increasingly become a 
silent bystander in Lithuania’s capitalist transformation (ibid: 761). The desire of the 
Lithuanian elites to create a business friendly regulatory environment, attractive to foreign 
investors, had weighted the political process heavily towards the interests of capital. At the 
same time a large part of the population was economically marginalized (ibid: 766). Woolfson 
and Beck pointed out the danger that the corporatist arrangements have not any real functions, 
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but only exist in order to fulfil requirements from the EU and the ILO. If that is the case, they 
can hardly be a good start for the development of a sustainable democratic corporatism, 
existing of real channels of influence to the political system for employees and employers. On 
the other hand, the authors did not rule out the best-case scenario. This was that full 
recognition of the requirements associated with the accession to the EU together with an 
acknowledgement of the domestic necessity of the participation of organised labour in politics 
would lead to the adoption of tripartite policies, which work for all the parties (ibid: 766). I 
have investigated the role of pressure from international organisations, especially the EU and 
the ILO, on labour policies and the development of tripartite structures at state level in the 
three countries in chapter 6.3. 
 
Measuring democratic corporatism in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
 
To measure democratic corporatism, I have taken Katzenstein’s definition of democratic 
corporatism as my starting point. The components of this definition are: 1. An ideology of 
social partnership expressed at the national level. 2. A relatively centralised and concentrated 
system of interest groups. 3. Voluntary and informal coordination of conflicting objectives 
through continuous bargaining between interest groups, state bureaucracies and political 
parties (Katzenstein 1985: 32).    
 
I have chosen not to include ideology of social partnership in my analysis. The most 
important reason for this is that I expect an ideology of social partnership amongst the 
political elites, including the personnel in central organisations of employees and employers, 
to be a favourable condition for development of corporatist arrangements on state level. It is 
very likely that a feeling of partnership between the elites in the employers’ organisations, 
trade union organisations, the government and the bureaucracy makes the development of 
institutionalised negotiations through tripartite arrangements at state level easier.  This means 
that I consider an ideology of social partnership at state level as a factor influencing the 
development of democratic corporatism, rather than a part of democratic corporatism. 
 
The second trait of democratic corporatism by Katzenstein’s definition is a relatively 
centralised and concentrated system of interest groups. According to Katzenstein 
centralisation is a measure of the degree of hierarchical control. “Interest groups in 
corporatist systems are aptly called “peak associations” because power is exercised at the 
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summit over a relatively compliant base. Concentration is a measure of the degree of 
inclusiveness. Peak associations in corporatist systems are broadly based and organize a very 
large proportion of producers and workers” (Katzenstein 1985: 33). Following this I will 
treat concentration and centralisation as two separate features.   I will compare the degree of 
concentration of the systems of interest groups in the three countries by comparing 
membership rates of employed persons in trade unions and by comparing the coverage of 
enterprises and employment by the members of the employers’ organisations. To compare 
centralisation, I will study the development of central organisations of employees and 
employers and the representation of such organisations in tripartite councils at state level and 
in tripartite agreements concluded at state level. I will follow the concept of Katzenstein, 
where centralisation is a measure of hierarchical control. I view this as a situation where the 
mandate to negotiate in tripartite consultations and sign tripartite agreements on state level are 
distributed to few central organisations. I will interpret a high degree of centralisation as few 
central organisations existing or many central organisations existing, but only a few of them 
participate in tripartite arrangements with mandate to negotiate on behalf of the others. 
 
The third of Katzenstein’s characteristics of democratic corporatism is “voluntary and 
informal coordination of conflicting objectives through continuous bargaining between 
interest groups, state bureaucracies and political parties.” (Katzenstein 1985: 32).  I will not 
follow Katzenstein’s definition strictly. First, I will not focus upon bargaining with all 
political parties, but concentrate on the bargaining between the interest group organisations 
and the government. After all, political parties form governments in all three countries. 
Second, I will focus upon formal rather than informal bargaining. I will compare tripartite 
councils and tripartite agreements at state level between the countries. By doing this, I will 
compare formal tripartite bargaining along three aspects – power, continuity and broadness. I 
will compare power by considering whether the tripartite councils are decision-making or 
only advisory. I will further compare the degree of government participation in the councils, 
as it measures how close the councils are to the executive branch of state politics. The level of 
interest that the government put in a council may be rising with the power of the council. I 
will also compare the contents of the tripartite agreements and specificity of the obligations 
they provide. I will compare continuity by measuring the time periods between each new 
agreement on adjusting the minimum legal wage and by counting the number of tripartite 
agreements concluded at state level in each period. Finally, I will compare the broadness by 
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counting tripartite councils operating at state level, as an indication of where the broadest 
parts of state politics have been subject for discussions in tripartite councils. 
 
Identifying and measuring the tentative explanations 
 
Openness of economy was Katzenstein’s main independent variable. In his argument the 
small Western European countries distinguished themselves from larger industrialised 
countries by the openness of their economy, both in the time of economical crisis in the 1930s 
and in 1985 when he published “Small States in World Markets”. Katzenstein gave several 
reasons why the small Western European countries tended to depend on trade and have open 
economies. First, they could not offer the necessary economies of scale to a number of 
industries absolutely critical to the functioning of a modern economy. Second, small domestic 
markets lead the small European states to seek their specialisation and economies of scale in 
export markets (Katzenstein 1985: 81). Further, fear of economic retaliation by larger and less 
vulnerable states inhibited protectionist policies (ibid: 39 – 40). Their open economies and 
dependence on trade and foreign investments had serious implications for these countries. The 
economies in the small states were very dependent on the world economy. In contrast to 
larger US these states could not transport the costs of economical changes in the world 
marked to other states by adopting protectionist trade policies. Neither could they do as bigger 
Japan; conduct large-scale ambitious industrial policies to transform the industrial structure 
along with the incentives of the world market. Because the small states could not escape from 
economic change that was thrust upon them from the international economy, they needed to 
form strategies to live with these changes and to compensate for negative impact. To do this 
they needed consent and cooperation from the different economical sectors, different parts of 
society and from workers and employers. This developed into the democratic corporatism we 
know from the small European states (ibid). 
 
Following Katzenstein, I will consider whether openness of the economy can be an 
explanatory variable to placement on the axis between interest group pluralism and 
democratic corporatism also in post-communist Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. To measure 
openness of economy I will compare the value of trade measured as a share of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP).  
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Looking at 36 democracies worldwide, Arend Lijphart found a strong correlation between 
interest group pluralism and the frequency of minimal winning one party governments 
(Lijphart 1999: 244). Focusing on dividing democracies between the Westminster model and 
the consensus model by looking at ten variables in a factor analysis (ibid: 246), Lijphart did 
not look for reasons why democratic corporatism and low frequency of minimal winning one- 
party governments correlated. I will however examine frequency of one party majority 
governments as an explanatory variable to democratic corporatism.  
 
I expect high frequency one-party majority governments to be unfavourable to democratic 
corporatism, if the one-party majority governments occasionally are replaced. The reason for 
this is that it may lead to a situation where a new government totally changes the corporative 
institutions, which the former government initiated. At the same time the parties of the former 
government cannot hinder this because they are in minority in opposition and generally 
excluded from power. Replacements of coalition governments with another coalition or party, 
which is ideologically distant from the former government parties, can also lead to this 
situation. Therefore I set forward the hypothesis that existence of bloc politics combined with 
radical shifts of governments has negative effect on the level of democratic corporatism. Bloc 
politics means that a clear-cut left–right political cleavage combines with institutionalised 
government alliances that do not encompass both leftist and rightist parties.  
 
When governments, and particularly coalition governments, are replaced, the implied 
governmental shift can be more or less radical. One can imagine that most of the parties of the 
old coalition reappear in the new government. On the opposite end of the scale none of the 
parties of the old government can be found in the new government. In between these two 
extremes one can imagine varying degrees of radicalism in government shifts - depending on 
the number and/ or size of the parties, which are retained in both governments. I have chosen 
a very restrictive definition of “radical” in terms of governmental shifts: Radical shifts of 
government mean replacement of all government parties when all the parties in the old 
government are on different side of the main political cleavages than the parties in the new 
government.  
 
I will also add the variable of staying time of the longest staying government party, because a 
party staying in government for a long time has the possibility to build networks between the 
state and interest group organisations, to institutionalise these networks and to establish stable 
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relationships with the interest group organisations. The two last mentioned variables have 
somewhat overlapping characters. It is impossible, at the same time, to have parties with long 
staying time in government and high frequency of replacements of all government parties 
simultaneously.    
 
To identify occurrence of bloc politics combined with radical shifts of governments, I will 
present some of the models of political cleavages that other authors have identified in the 
three countries. In this way I will consider which of the countries have the clearest divide 
between leftist and rightist parties and where the same parties are allied against the same 
opponent parties on the main important political issues. Bloc politics will finally be known by 
a situation where governments are mainly formed by single parties or party coalitions where 
the engaged parties define each other as politically close on the left–right divide and hence as 
the only possible coalition partners. Coalition governments between the same parties have 
been repeated, while coalition governments between parties on opposite sides of the left – 
right cleavage have not appeared at all. Radical shifts of governments will be identified by 
replacements of all government parties simultaneously, in cases where all the parties in the 
new government are situated on the different side of the political left – right cleavage than the 
parties in the old government. To compare the staying time of the longest staying government 
parties, I will compare the longest staying government party in each of the countries.   
 
The bottom-up approaches consider democratic corporatism as a product of mobilisation of 
the working class through strong socialist parties and labour movements. Therefore I will 
consider the time that social democrat or socialist parties have been in government as an 
independent variable to democratic corporatism in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. To compare 
the time of social democratic and socialist parties in government, I will calculate the 
percentages of days of such parties in government.  
 
Finally, and drawing from the perspective of Woolfson and Beck, I will attempt to identify the 
effect of pressure from the ILO and the EU on the development of democratic corporatism in 
the three countries. I will compare influence from the ILO by studying the number and 
contents of ILO Conventions that the countries have ratified and co-opted in the national 
legislations since they regained their membership in the organisation in 1991 and 1992. I will 
attempt to discover influence from the EU on the development of corporatist arrangements by 
three sorts of indications. The first kind of indication is that corporatist arrangements and 
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labour laws are introduced or amended after the EU Commission has called for such measures 
through its annual reports on progress towards accession. The second kind of indication is 
when the social partners state in agreements that the measures they have agreed to take will be 
in accordance with recommendations or directives from the EU. Finally, I will consider EU 
funding that is directed into projects were the interest group organisations are participating. 
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4: Methodological Chapter 
  
The first part of this section is devoted to a few considerations concerning the way that I have 
measured democratic corporatism and the factors expected to influence this phenomenon. 
Here I have also included a section mentioning some of the ways that I have obtained the 
necessary information. After this I have presented my research design and explained the logic 
of the comparative methods of John Stewart Mill that I have applied. This leads into some 
considerations about the place of my work in the traditions of variable- and case-oriented 
comparative research. The final part of the chapter deals with some methodological 
challenges that I have met. I have conducted a feasibility test of application of Ragin’s 
Boolean contribution to the comparative methods. In the final sections you will find the 
reason why I could not employ this method in my research.         
 
Measuring democratic corporatism and obtaining information    
 
The concept of democratic corporatism consists of three different aspects, which I again have 
measured in several ways. I will emphasize strongest the last part of the concept - the system 
of bargaining between central trade union organisations, central employers’ organisations and 
the government at state level. This is again divided into the three aspects of power, continuity 
and broadness. Here I consider power to be most important and broadness to be least 
important. I have measured power and continuity by three variables each, and broadness by 
one variable.  The justification for measuring democratic corporatism in such a many-sided 
way is that I strive to encompass the whole picture of democratic corporatism in the three 
countries. Such a many-sided phenomenon needs a manifold definition. The problem is that it 
is difficult to simplify the abundant information on each of the parts of the concept into a clear 
division between cases with a relatively high and a relatively low level of democratic 
corporatism. Such a division is also against the wisdom of both Katzenstein and Schmitter 
who claims that corporatism is not something a country has or does not have, but a matter of 
degree.  Despite of all this it is necessary to make a binary classification to apply the logic of 
Ragin’s binary comparative method. Out of this it is clear that the division of the cases into 
relatively low and relatively high level of democratic corporatism must rely on considerable 
judgements.  Therefore I will thoroughly present and discuss the premises upon which my 
judgements are based. This means that I will elaborate each of the aspects of democratic 
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corporatism very thoroughly in each of the countries and periods. Hence it should be possible 
for the reader to evaluate my assessments. 
 
I have collected information from an abundance of different sources. I have studied 
translations of tripartite agreements concluded at state level.21 I have further collected 
information about the agreements, the work of tripartite councils, the employers’ and trade 
union organisations and the government through personal interviews. Altogether, I conducted 
nine interviews in November and December 2001 - four in Estonia, three in Lithuania and two 
in Latvia.22 I have also studied other types of documents, including by-laws, lists of member 
organisations in the different central organisations and internal information sheets. All these 
documents have been English translations. Some of the documents I have obtained from my 
interviewees, while other are collected from the Internet. The fact that I do not read 
Lithuanian, Latvian or much Estonian, represent a restraint on the access to information here. 
I have also studied law texts. For all three countries, official English translations of the most 
important legislation are available on the Internet.23 I have also employed statistical data from 
a number of sources, including the Norbalt 1 and 2 living condition surveys of the Norwegian 
Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science for the three countries in 1994 and 1999. Finally, I 
have found useful information in the literature. Not at least, I have taken advantage of the 
informative articles of the newspaper – The Baltic Times.    
 
The research design 
 
This thesis contains of two main parts. The first part aims to compare the levels of democratic 
corporatism between the three countries in the two time periods from 1991 to the end of 1995 
and from the beginning of 1996 to the end of 2001. The second part aims to discover what 
factors can explain the difference in level of democratic corporatism between the three 
countries in the two periods. This part starts with an historical elaboration of the factors 
expected to influence democratic corporatism. The final comparison in chapter 7 is based on a 
combination of John Stewart Mill’s comparative methods, the Method of Agreement and the 
Indirect Method of Difference.24 The comparative methods aim to discover causal relations 
                                                 
21
 Appendix A is a chronological table of tripartite agreements. 
22
 Appendix B is a list of interviews.  
23
 Appendix E is a list of references to laws in English translations.  
24
 For a thorough presentation of Mill’s Method of Agreement and Indirect Method of Difference, see Ragin 
1987: 36 – 42. 
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through logical elimination. The Method of Agreement follows the principle that only 
independent variables, which are similar between cases, can explain a similar outcome 
between the same cases. Table 4.1 is an illustration of the Method of Agreement. 
Table 4.1: The Method of Agreement 
 
 Case 1 Case 2 
Independent variables A Not A 
 B Not B 
 C Not C 
 X X 
Dependent variable Y Y 
  
Because x is the only independent variable that exists in both case 1 and case 2, the Method of 
Agreement indicates that x is the cause of y.  
 
The Indirect Method of Difference follows the principle that only independent variables, 
which are different between cases, can explain a different outcome between the same cases. 
Table 4.2 is an illustration of the Indirect Method of Difference. 
Table 4.2: The Indirect Method of Difference: 
 
 Case 1 Case 2 
Independent variables A A 
 B B 
 C C 
 X Not X 
Dependent variable Y Not Y 
 
The Indirect Method of Difference indicates that x is the cause of y because x is the only 
independent variable that exists in case 1 and not in case 2.  
 
Application of these methods requires all variables to be arranged with only two possible 
values, present and absent. This is the reason why I have divided my cases into two 
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categories, both regarding the level of democratic corporatism and on each of the six 
independent variables.   
 
There are six cases in my research. These are the three Baltic countries in the period from 
1991 to 1995 and from 1996 to the end of 2001. When I chose to study the three Baltic 
countries from the beginning of the 1990s to 2002, I simultaneously chose several sets of 
factors that the three countries shared. They were all republics of the Soviet Union from 1945 
to 1991. After this they all chose a return to Europe, and from 1995 they were all in the 
process of be admitted as members of the EU. I wanted to explain differences between the 
three countries. Concretely, I wanted to find what differences between the three countries 
could explain the different strength of corporatist arrangements at state level between the 
three countries in the periods from 1991 to 1995 and from 1996 to the end of 2001. Therefore 
I eliminated all the factors being equal between the countries in my search for explanations.  
 
The seminal work of Przeworski and Teune on “The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry” 
may have come to the mind of the reader at this point. My selection of countries of research 
fits into what these authors would refer to as a ‘most similar systems’ design. Such designs 
consist of cases with as many as possible common characteristics, while the topic of research 
represents a difference between the cases. In this way, and in accordance with the logic of the 
Indirect Method of Difference, the common characteristics are viewed as controlled for, while 
differences between the cases are considered as explanatory to the difference in the topic of 
research (Przeworski and Teune 1970: 32 - 34).  
 
All this in mind, I do not exclude the possibility that I will find patterns compatible to what 
Przeworski and Teune would refer to as a ‘most different systems’ design, between some of 
the cases in the comparison. Such designs focus upon cases being similar in the topic of 
research, but having predominance of differences in the factors seen as relevant to this topic. 
The explanatory factors are then identified in the few factors, which are similar between the 
cases (ibid: 34 – 39).  If I discover that, for example,  three of the cases have a relatively high 
level of democratic corporatism while the other three cases have a relatively low level of 
democratic corporatism, I will consider similar factors between the cases with a high level of 
democratic corporatism, and factors that these cases share in contrast to the cases with a low 
level of democratic corporatism, as explanatory to a high level of democratic corporatism. In 
my opinion, the original designs of Mill as presented by Ragin are somewhat more simplistic 
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than the designs of Przeworski and Teune. For my purpose, I give preference to simplicity 
before sophistication. Therefore I have chosen to employ Mill’s designs and terminology, as 
presented by Ragin.           
 
Case-oriented versus variable-orientated comparative research 
 
Charles Ragin distinguished between case-oriented and variable-oriented comparative 
methods. In his view case oriented research involves considering the combinations of 
variables within the cases. In this way the researcher avoids to separate the variables from the 
cases, as some of the variable-oriented statistical research tend to do (see Ragin 1987: 34 – 
68).  
 
Case orientation may be viewed as part of a similarity design. The Baltic states share certain 
relevant characteristics that may be construed as systemic variables, e.g. the relatively low 
membership rates in trade unions may be seen as a reaction to the experience of Soviet style 
unions, an experience unique to the Baltic states among the EU applicant countries. Mill’s 
comparative methods, which I have applied, are illustrative of this point. Each case is divided 
into variables, and variables being equal, eventually unequal, between the cases are excluded 
as possible explanations of an equal, eventually unequal, outcome. This approach that I have 
followed, is undoubtedly case oriented in the sense that the variables are treated as 
compositions within the cases. But this does not mean that the starting point of my analysis 
was exclusively cases, and not variables. My cases are countries in certain time periods. Such 
large cases include an almost indefinite number of variables. My topic of interest was the 
development of democratic corporatist arrangements at state level. The numbers of factors 
that may have influenced such arrangements are very large. Still I have chosen to explore only 
six independent variables. The conclusion is that my research has a case oriented comparative 
orientation. Still, I have taken as my starting point - not the whole cases, but a chosen and 
very limited set of variables from the cases.    
 
Some methodological challenges 
 
I have only six cases in my analysis. Still, my analysis includes six independent variables. 
There exist 64 possible combinations of these variables. I can cover maximum six of these. 
This means that I might have come to other results if I had included more countries in my 
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analysis. It is my intention to study democratic corporatist structures in Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania alone, and I do not intend to generalize my findings to a wider range of countries.  
Application of the Method of Agreement or the Indirect Method of Difference may also 
produce what Ragin calls over-determined cases (see Ragin 1987: 98). Over-determined cases 
in the Indirect Method of Difference have more than one set of unequal independent variables, 
and all may have caused the different outcome on the dependent variable. In the Method of 
Agreement, over-determined cases have more than one set of equal independent variables, 
which may have caused the equal outcome on the dependent variable. Since I have as many 
independent variables as I have cases, the possibility of ending up with over-determined cases 
is large. Therefore I will supplement the comparative analysis with the historical elaboration 
of the variables, singled out by the comparative analysis. In this way I will apply a mixture of 
comparative and historical methods.     
 
The idea that over-determination is a problem comes from the view that the Method of 
Agreement and the Indirect Method of Difference only serve to identify single-variable 
explanations and cannot handle complex causal relationships. Taking the opposite view, more 
than one set of crucial similarities or differences between cases, indicate that the combination 
of these factors explain the outcome.  In this way Theda Skocpol identified a combination of 
three factors as explanatory to the successful revolutions in France, China and Russia by 
applying the Method of Agreement between these three cases and the Indirect Method of 
Difference between these and a set of failed social revolutions (Skocpol 1979, see also 
Skocpol and Somers 1980: 184 – 186). I will take the same position in this thesis. If my 
application of the comparative methods brings out several sets of similar independent 
variables, I will interpret the combination of these as explanatory.  
 
My comparative analysis can only handle one dependent variable. My dependent variable is 
democratic corporatism. This is again a conglomerate of three different variables - centralised 
system of interest groups, concentrated system of interest groups and the level of bargaining 
between representatives of the interest group organisations and the governments at state level. 
Out of this, I will create a binary classification, where the countries at the different points of 
time are divided into the two categories of relatively higher and relatively lower level of 
democratic corporatism. This does not mean that there cannot be some interaction between 
the different components of the dependent variable. It is actually very likely that concentrated 
systems of interest groups, meaning that trade unions have high membership rates and 
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employers’ organisations cover large part of the economy, have a positive effect on the 
development of corporatist arrangements at state level. Neither is it unlikely that a divided 
system of interest group organisations has an unfavourable effect on the development of 
corporatist arrangements at state level, when the different interest group organisations on each 
side cannot agree amongst themselves.  
 
The program FsQCA (Qualitative Comparative Analysis) singles out possible causal 
relationships by applying a variant of the comparative method called Boolean minimisation. 
Boolean minimisation is a logical method to eliminate variables from several combinations of 
independent variables. As for Mill’s comparative methods, the presupposition for standard 
Boolean minimisation is that all variables are arranged with only two possible values – 
present or absent (1 or 0 if you like).25 This method implies setting up the combinations of 
variables as Boolean expressions, where a letter codes each variable. The value of present is 
coded by capital letters, while small letters code the value of absent. Each expression reveals a 
hypothesised causal relationship between several independent variables and one dependent 
variable. The rule for eliminating variables from the expressions and from the causal 
relationships is the following: If two expressions with the same value on the dependent 
variable differ only on one independent variable, this variable is considered irrelevant and 
eliminated (Ragin 1987: 93). The Boolean method has the advantage that it can discover 
combinations of independent variables, by taking use of the logic known from experimental 
designs, where only the experiment variable is allowed to vary26.  
 
I have conducted a feasibility test of application of FsQCA for my analysis. I entered my six 
cases and the dichotomised values they had on each of the independent variables, as well as 
on the dependent variable of level of democratic corporatism, into the program. Then the 
program set up a Boolean truth table for me. In this table the combinations of factors in my 
                                                 
 
25
 Ragin has also developed a fuzzy set Boolean analysis, which handles variables with a continuous range of 
values. For an introduction to this analysis, see Ragin and Giesel 2002: 67 – 88.    
 
26
 For a thorough presentation of the Boolean approach to qualitative comparison, see Ragin 1987: 85 – 171. 
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analysis were presented as Boolean expressions. The next step in the process was to eliminate 
variables from the expressions, and hence eliminate these from the explanatory model. 
FsQCA could not accomplish this. The reason was that too many independent variables 
differed between the cases, both between those with a relatively high and between those with 
a relative low level of democratic corporatism. This made it impossible to eliminate variables 
by the logic of Boolean minimisation. The conclusion was that Boolean minimisation could 
not help me to identify combinations of independent variables. I therefore had to resort to 
Stewart Mill’s original, albeit somewhat more simplistic method27.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27
 In practice, this means that I do not follow as strict rules, when I exclude factors as explanatory to the level of 
democratic corporatism, as I had to be if I had followed the Boolean method. But again, my findings are not 
based only on the comparative methods applied. As mentioned, I will supplement the comparative analysis with 
the historical elaboration of the variables, singled out by the comparative analysis. In this way, I have applied a 
mixture of comparative and historical methods.     
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5: Exploring and comparing democratic corporatism at 
state level 
 
Chapter 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 are devoted to exploring and comparing democratic corporatism at 
state level. I will compare the six cases of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the periods from 
1991 to the end of 1995 and from 1996 to the end of 2001. Chapter 5.1 deals with the second 
trait of democratic corporatism by Katzenstein’s definition. This is a relatively concentrated 
and centralised system of interest groups. I will treat concentration and centralisation 
separately as two different features. The first part of the chapter is devoted to comparing the 
degree of concentration of the systems of interest groups. To do this, I will compare 
membership rates of employed persons in trade unions and coverage of enterprises and 
employment by the members of the employers’ organisations. In the next part of this chapter I 
will compare the degree of centralisation of the systems of interest groups. To accomplish 
this, I will compare the number of central organisations of employees and employers that have 
been represented in tripartite councils and agreements in each of the countries in the two 
periods.  
 
Chapter 5.2 is devoted to the systems of bargaining between central trade union organisations, 
central employers’ organisations and the government. By focusing upon tripartite agreements 
and councils, I will attempt to measure the power of the tripartite arrangements and the 
continuity and broadness of the bargaining that fills these arrangements. At the end of this 
chapter I will divide the six cases between those with a relatively high and those with a 
relatively low score on the variable of power, continuity and broadness of tripartite bargaining 
at state level, measured as one.     
 
In chapter 5.3 I will compare the level of democratic corporatism at state level with basis in 
the elaborations of the three components of the concept from chapter 5.1 and 5.2. I have 
attached most weight to the third component, being power, continuity and broadness of the 
tripartite bargaining through agreements and councils. The reason is that I view this variable 
as a direct measure of the strength of the structures of corporatist arrangements at state level. 
In the end of chapter 5.3, the six cases are divided into a simple dichotomy between cases 
with relatively high and a relatively low level of democratic corporatism at state level.  
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5.1: The degree of concentration and centralisation of the 
systems of interest groups  
 
The second trait of democratic corporatism by Katzenstein’s definition is a relatively 
centralised and concentrated system of interest groups. According to Katzenstein, 
centralisation is a measure of the degree of hierarchical control. “Interest groups in 
corporatist systems are aptly called “peak associations” because power is exercised at the 
summit over a relatively compliant base. Concentration is a measure of the degree of 
inclusiveness. Peak associations in corporatist systems are broadly based and organize a very 
large proportion of producers and workers” (Katzenstein 1985: 33). In the first part of this 
chapter, I will compare the degree of concentration of the systems of interest groups by 
comparing membership rates of employed persons in trade unions and coverage of enterprises 
and employment by the members of the employers’ organisations. I will use membership rates 
in trade unions from 1994 as an indication of concentration in the first period, and 
membership rates in trade unions from 1999 together with data on the size of the main 
employers’ organisations from 2001/ 2002 as indications of concentration in the latest period.  
 
In the next part of this chapter, I will compare the degree of centralisation of the systems of 
interest groups between the countries in periods from 1991 to the end of 1995 and from the 
beginning of 1996 to the end of 2001. To accomplish this, I will compare the development of 
central organisations of employees and employers and the representation of such 
organisations in tripartite councils at state level and in tripartite agreements concluded at state 
level. I will follow the concept of Katzenstein where centralisation is a measure of 
hierarchical control, where only a few central organisations have the mandate to negotiate in 
tripartite consultations and sign tripartite agreements on state level. I will interpret high 
degree of centralisation as few central organisations existing or as many central organisations 
existing, but only a few of them are included in tripartite arrangements with mandate to 
negotiate on behalf of the others. I will first focus on trade union organisations. After this, I 
will deal with employers’ organisations. 
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Mobilizing employees and employers (concentration) 
  
The following table is based on data from the Norbalt surveys of 1994 and 1999. I have only 
included persons employed as ordinary employees or in lower, middle or higher management.  
Table 5.1.1: Membership rates in trade unions in different age groups amongst 
employees and persons employed in management  
 
 Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
 1994* 1999* 1994* 1999* 1994 1999* 
All  23% 12% 84% 16% 33% 8% 
18 – 29 18% 6% 76% 8.5% 26% 5% 
30 – 44 22% 13% 80% 17% 40% 9% 
45 – 59 25% 14% 92% 21% 31% 8% 
60 + 26% 14% 88% 19% 22% 14% 
Source: Norbalt 1 and survey 
* The differences between the age groups are statistical significant on below .05 level.  
 
The top row in table 5.1.1 shows that membership rates of ordinary employees and persons 
engaged in lower, middle and higher management were very low in all countries in 1999. 
They were lowest in Lithuania and highest in Latvia. Latvia distinguished herself with a very 
high membership rate on 84% in 1994. The de-unionisation of employees between 1994 and 
1999 was sharpest in Latvia. The rest of the rows show the membership rates in trade unions 
in different age groups. We see that in Estonia and Latvia 1994 the membership rates were 
lowest in the age group from 18 to 29 years. In 1999 the membership rates were clearly 
lowest in the youngest age group in all three countries. Only between 5% (Lithuania) and 
8.5% (Latvia) in the age group from 18 to 29 years were members of a trade union in 1999. 
This shows that the trade unions in all three countries to a very low extent mobilised young 
employees. 
 
The re-emergence of trade union organisations 
 
The Confederation of Estonian Trade Unions (CETU) was founded at the 20th Congress of 
Estonian trade unions on the 12th of April 1990 (Kaadu 1999: 152). CETU represented some 
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continuity with the Soviet past, since it was founded on the 20th Congress of the Soviet trade 
union organisation and the organisation claimed in its statutes of April 2000 to be the “legal 
successor of the central organisation of trade unions having operated in Estonia in the period 
1940 – 1990” (see appendix F, a: § 2). On the other hand the same paragraph also claimed 
continuity with the first Estonian republic: “CETU carries on the activities of and represent 
the principal aims of The Confederation of Estonian Workers’ Unions (1919 – 1940….) (ibid: 
§ 2). It was an important break from the Soviet past that CETU from the very beginning 
declared its role as an organisation of political independent trade unions (ibid: §1, Kaadu 
1999: 152). This still counted for the 2000 statutes, which stressed to cooperate with political 
parties on a pragmatic basis: “CETU co-operates with all trade unions and political parties 
operating in Estonia which share close views with CETU in the national social and economic 
policies…” (ibid: § 3).  
 
On the other hand, the general secretary of CETU and former chairman Raivo Paavo was a 
Member of Parliament for the social democratic party, the Moderates, from 1995 and vice 
chairman of the Social Affairs Committee from 1999 (Riigikogu web a, 12.12.02, interview 
Kriis 07.12.01). In the interviews co-ordinated by Smith-Sivertsen in 1999, CETU pointed out 
the Moderates as the friendliest political party (Smith-Sivertsen 2000: 231).  CETU has a 
democratic structure, where the Congress is the highest managing body. According to the 
2000 statutes, it shall meet once every fourth year. The members of CETU nominate their 
representatives to the Congress (interview Taliga 01.11.01). CETU joined the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) In December 1994. The organisation joined the 
European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) with observer status in December 1997  
(Kaadu 1999: 153). Also this represented important breaks with the soviet past. In the late 
1990s the three largest member unions of CETU were the Estonian Federation of Food and 
Agricultural Trade Unions with 24 000 members, the Estonian Light Industry Workers’ Union 
with 8600 members and the Estonian Energy Workers Trade Union with 7600 members (ibid: 
178). Altogether CETU had approximately 110 000 members in 1999 (Eamets, Philips and 
Annus 1999: 58). CETU had a central staff on 12 persons in March 1999 (Smith-Sivertsen 
2000: 231, table 9.3).  
 
In 1992 the trade unions representing employees engaged in science, education, culture and 
health, split out of CETU and formed the white-collar Estonian Professional Employees’ 
Unions Association (EPEUA). In the late 1990s the largest member associations in EPEUA 
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were the Teacher’s Union with 23 000 members, the Engineers’ union with 10 000 members 
and the Cultural Workers Union with 7000 members (Kaadu 1999: 153). Altogether EPEUA 
had approximately 50 000 members in 1999 (Eamets, Philips and Annus 1999: 58). Also 
EPEUA was independent in its relations to political parties (ibid: 154). EPEUA had observer 
status in the Confederation of European Trade Unions (ETUC) in 2002 (ETUC web, 
07.11.02).  
 
The Free Trade Union Confederation of Latvia (FTUCL) held its inaugural congress in May 
1990. It had many linkages to the past Trade Unions of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic 
(TULSSR). The last chairman of the TULSSR was also the first chairman of the FTUCL. 
Further, the Latvian state granted property that previously belonged to TULSSR to FTUCL 
and some of its member associations. As an important break from the past, FTUCL declared 
independence from all political parties. The new democratic statutes of the organisation were 
another break with the past (Blasum 1999: 207). FTUCL united 27 branch and professional 
trade union associations with altogether about 200 000 members in 2001  (see appendix F, c: 
1). FTUCL had observer status in the Confederation of European Trade Unions (ETUC) in 
2002 (ETUC web, 07.11.02). Still in 2003 FTUCL was the only central trade union 
organisation in Latvia. The strong position of the successor organisation of the Soviet trade 
union organisation and the fact that it did not split, may have contributed to that the decrease 
in membership rates in trade unions started later in Latvia than in Estonia and Lithuania. 
FTUCL had a central staff of 15.5 persons in March 1999 (Smith-Sivertsen 2000: 231, table 
9.3).  
 
The Lithuanian Labor Federation (LLF) was established in 1919 and re-established in 1991. 
In 2002 it had about 20 000 members28.  According to the Secretary General, the organisation 
followed a “Christian Social Doctrine” in its work, and this was only possible together with 
Christian organisations. Yet they had no close relations with any political party, “but always 
agreed with every party program, which was good for workers and social partners” (e-mail 
correspondence with Rekesiene 19.11.02). The legal advisor of another trade union 
organisation, the Lithuanian Trade Union Unification (LTUU), perceived LLF as working 
with the Christian Democratic party (Interview Pivoras 19.11.01). From 1996 LLF was a full 
                                                 
28
 This makes the membership in LLF very modest compared with the membership in Christian trade union 
organisations in other catholic countries, like Solidarnosc in Poland. 
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member of the World Confederation of Labour (WCL). From 1999 LLF united 10 branch 
associations in addition to regional organisations in all regions of Lithuania (LLF web, 
11.11.02). LLF had a central staff on 3 persons in March 1999 (Smith-Sivertsen 2000: 231, 
table 9.3).  
 
After independence, the Lithuanian branch of the Soviet All-Union Central Council of Trade 
Unions changed name to the Confederation of Free Trade Unions (CFTU). CFTU and eight 
other trade unions founded the Lithuanian Trade Union Centre (LTU Centre) in March 1993. 
The social democratic successor party of the independence minded Communist Party, the 
Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party (LDLP) took over the government in November 1992. 
Following this, the LTU Centre inherited most of the facilities that once belonged to the 
Soviet organisation (Vardys and Sedaitis 1997: 211). Some have claimed that the LTU Centre 
represented the most conservative and least effective of the trade unions in the country 
(Dovydeniene & Casale 1999: 229). According to the legal advisor of the LTUU, the LTU 
Centre consisted of “old method workers” (interview Pivoras 19.11.01). Still it was the 
largest of the central trade union organisations, with more than 80 000 members (LTU Centre 
web, 14.10.01). The organisation had close ties to the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party 
(LSDP).29 In 1997 the LTU Centre appointed Juozas Olekas, a Member of Parliament since 
1996 for the LSDP, to leader of their organisation. Olekas was re-elected to the Seimas in 
2000 (ibid, Seimas web a and b, 11.11.02). The LTU Centre united 14 branch associations in 
2001 (LTU Centre web, 14.10.01). LTU Centre had a central staff on 9 persons in March 
1999 (Smith-Sivertsen 2000: 231, table 9.3). The LTU Centre merged with the Lithuanian 
Trade Union Unification to form the Lithuanian Trade Union Confederation (LTUC) in 2002  
(LTUC web, 06.11.02; interview Pivoras 19.11.01).  
 
Progressively thinking leaders of eight industry trade unions split away from the CFTU in 
1992 and established the Lithuanian Trade Union Unification (LTUU). The organisation 
gained full membership in the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) in 
1994 (Dovydeniene & Casale 1999: 229; interview Pivoras 19.11.01). Through an agreement 
between LTUU and the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party, two of their members were 
                                                 
29
 Until January 2001 there were two different social democratic parties. These were the successor party of the 
Communist Party, the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party (LDLP) and a smaller Lithuanian Social Democratic 
Party (LSDP) that was founded in 1989 by the Soviet dissidents and political prisoners, Sakalas and Andriukatis 
(The Baltic Times: 21.02.02 b). Even though LSDP generally placed itself to the left of LDLP, the two parties 
competed on a common list in the 2000 elections for the Seimas. These two parties, as well as the other 
Lithuanian parties, will be discussed in detail in chapter 6.2.    
 57
elected to the Seimas in 1996 (interview Pivoras 19.11.01). None of them were members of a 
political party, so they could be perceived of as representatives in the Parliament for the 
LTUU. The Chairperson of LTUU, Algirdas Sysas, was elected to the Seimas in 1996. Still 
being Chairperson of LTUU, he was re-elected to the Seimas for the period 2000 – 2004 
(Seimas web g and f, 24.04.03). In contrast, Olekas was already MP for the Lithuanian Social 
Democratic Party before he was appointed to leader of LTUC. Sysas was leader of the 
Committee on Social Affairs and Labour 2000 – 2004 in the Seimas (Seimas web c, 
06.11.02). Legal advisor, Roma Dovydeniene, was the other member of LTUU who was 
elected to Seimas. She was first elected in 1996 and re-elected in 2000. She was also a 
member of Committee on Social affairs and Labour, and she was Minister of Culture in the 
Social Democratic Party30 and New Union government from July 2001 (Seimas web c, d and 
e, 06.11.02). The LTUU had about 45 000 members in 2001  (interview Pivoras 19.11.01). 
The organisation listed 12 branch member associations on their web site in 2001 (former 
LTUU web, 14.10.01). The LTUU had a central staff on 7 persons in March 1999 (Smith-
Sivertsen 2000: 231, table 9.3).   
 
The third Congress of LTUU in 1999 adopted a decision to establish a joint working group to 
prepare a merger of LTUU and the Lithuanian Trade Union Centre. A joint congress was set 
up with the aim to form a joint organisation (former LTUU web, 14.10.01; interview Pivoras 
19.11.01). Consequently the two social democratic trade union organisations merged in 2002 
to form the Lithuanian Trade Union Confederation (LTUC). Adding the estimates on 80 000 
members of former LTUC and 45 000 members of LTUU, Lithuanian Trade Union 
Confederation was from the beginning the largest trade union organisation in Lithuania by a 
very wide margin. In 2002 LTUC united 25 branch trade union associations (LTUC web, 
06.11.02).  
 
The Lithuanian Workers Union was established in 1990 as an outgrowth of the Popular Front  
(Sajûdis) and a competitor to CFTU (Vardys and Sedaitis 1997: 211). LWU had 52 000 dues-
paying members in March 1999. At the same time the organisation had a central staff on 6 
persons (Smith-Sivertsen 2000: 231, table 9.3).  There are many indications that LWU did not 
support the successor party of Sajûdis, the conservative Homeland Union. When the Vice – 
President of LWU in 1996 was elected to the Seimas for the Homeland Union, he 
                                                 
30
 The two social democratic parties,the Lithuanian social Democratic Party (LSDP) and the Lithuanian 
Democratic Labour Party merged in to form the Social Democratic Party (SDP) January 2001. 
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subsequently lost his position in the trade union organisation (Smith-Sivertsen 2000: 231, 
table 9.3). 500 members of LWU gathered in a protest outside the government building in 
Vilnius against the economic policies of the Homeland Union leaded coalition government in 
February 2000. Quotes from the president of LWU Aldona Balsiene and a spokesman from 
the Homeland Union Prime Minister, Andrius Kubilius, indicated strong disagreement 
between LWU and HU. The trade union leader Balsiene blamed the government of “toadying 
to the World Bank” and other foreign interests while “there are fewer and fewer social 
guarantees, social benefits, fewer and fewer working places, and people very often only are 
employed for short-term agreements”. On the other side spokesman for the Prime Minister 
Audrius Baciulis was quoted: “Jobs are more plentiful in Vilnius and Klapeida, places were 
foreign investment is the highest. Maybe people who are protesting against investors cannot 
understand that they are protesting against their jobs”  (TBT 02.03.00, a).  
 
The protest was by no means only against international financial institutions and foreign 
interests. LWU issued a list of demands amongst others including a request not to submit the 
current draft law on labour dispute regulations to the Seimas, because it would reduce the role 
of the trade unions in the disputes and lessen fines for employers paying wages to late (ibid). 
The government reacted negatively to the demands of LWU, pointing out that it was 
impossible to talk with the government in the language of ultimatums and claiming that the 
trade unions wanted money that the government did not have. At the same time LWU had 
established their own Economy Party, and had eight candidates in the March 2000 municipal 
elections (ibid). In March 1999 LWU pointed out the social democrats as the least friendly 
political parties (Smith-Sivertsen 2000: 231, table 9.3). At the same time, the LTUU and the 
LTU Centre were cooperating with the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party. In this respect 
there was a political cleavage between LWU on the one side and LTUU and LTU Centre on 
the other side.      
 
Out of this we can identify important differences between trade union structures in the three 
countries. Estonia had two central organisations from 1992. The EPEUA represented mainly 
white-collar employees with higher education, while the CETU represented mainly blue-
collar employees with lower education. In Latvia, there has only been one central trade union 
organisation. The FTUCL was the successor organisation of the central organisation of trade 
unions from the Soviet period. From 1992 to 2002 there were four different central trade 
union organisations in Lithuania, and two of them were sympathetic to the Lithuanian Social 
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Democratic Party (LSDP). LTU Centre even appointed a Member of Parliament for the LSDP 
to leader of their organisation in 1997. LTUU got two of their members elected to the Seimas 
from 1996 through an agreement with the LSDP. These were however not members of the 
party. The LWU had affiliations to the Popular Front in the early 1990s, but later acted more 
independently. They even established their own Economy Party to compete in the March 
2000 municipal elections. The LLF based their work on a ’Christian Social Doctrine’. The 
LTU Centre was the successor of the soviet era trade union organisation.  Therefore there was 
also a possible cleavage between the LTU Centre on the one side and the LWU, being 
established in opposition to the LTU Centre, the LTUU, a 1992 outbreak of the LTU Centre, 
and the LLF, being a heir of a pre-war organisation, on the other side. The merger in 2002 
between the LTU Centre and the LTUU may reduce the importance of this cleavage. 
Nevertheless, Lithuania had clearly the most politically divided structure of existing trade 
union organisations in both the periods before 1996 and before 2002.  
 
The re-emergence of employers’ organisations 
 
The following section deals with the extent employers have been mobilised through 
membership in the largest employers’ organisation in each of the countries. The 
Confederation of Estonian Industry (CEI) was established in November 1991. Already in 
April 1992, the CEI signed the tripartite Framework Agreement on Social Guarantees of 1992 
on behalf of the employers. In May 1995 the CEI was reorganized into the Confederation of 
Estonian Industry and Employers (CEIE) (Kaadu 1999: 155).  Associations from the unions 
of the service and business sectors united to form the Confederation of Estonian Employers’ 
Organisations (CEEO) in November 1995.  Following a recommendation from the ILO, the 
CEIE and the ECEO started to negotiate about merger in September 1997. Soon after the two 
organisations merged into the Confederation of Estonian Employers and Industry (CEEI) 
(Kaadu 1999: 155). In 2001 the organisation changed name to the Estonian Employers 
Confederation (EEC) (interview Kriis 07.12.01). On their web site in November 2002, the 
EEC listed 49 members from both public and private sector, representing a wide spectre of the 
Economy. 29 of the members were companies, the rest were associations. Also the Estonian 
Farmers Federation and the Central Society of Estonian Consumers were amongst the 
members (EEC web a, 07.11.02).  
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The Estonian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ECCI) was established in 1925 to 
represent the interests of businessmen, bankers, industrialists and ship owners. The 
organisation was re-established in 1989. In the end of December 2001, the organisation had 
3171 members, which according to its web site included the majority of the Estonian large 
enterprises. Still the bulk of the ECCI members were small and medium size businesses  
(ECCI web, 06.11.02). Out of this it is clear that many enterprises were members of both the 
EEC and the ECCI, and that a clear difference existed between the organisations. The EEC 
represented the interests of employers while the ECCI represented the interests of companies 
and businesses. The ECCI was not representing the interests of employers in the state level 
consultations with the trade union organisations and the government, in the same way as the 
EEC. The Estonian Association of Construction Entrepreneurs was for example member of 
both the ECCI and the EEC. They emphasized that they could fulfil their role as a social 
partner through the EEC (EACE web 08.11.02). The Estonian Business Association was 
founded in 1996. It was a supporting member of the Estonian Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, and from 1997 an associated member of the EEC (EEC web a, 07.11.02). In 1988 
the Estonian Association of SME-s (Small and Middle Enterprises) was founded (EAS web, 
07.11.02). This organisation was also a member of the EEC (ibid). 
 
The Latvian Employers’ Confederation (LEC) was founded in mid-1993 as an umbrella 
organisation of several industry associations. The Latvian Employers Central Union (an 
organisation of state owned enterprises) and the Latvian Private Enterprise Union were the 
two founding members. A later change in the statutes allowed direct membership of 
individual companies. In 1997 it had about 70 direct members, of which 14 were associations. 
Nearly all industries and sectors were represented. Roughly 20% of the members came from 
agriculture and forestry, 30% from construction or manufacturing industries, 20% from 
transport and tourism, and the rest came from financial services (e.g. insurance companies and 
banks) (Blassum 1999: 211). According to an internal paper of the National Tripartite Co-
operation Council (NTCC) secretariat, LEC members employed close to 300 000 employees 
in 2001. In addition there existed several business organisations, like the Latvian Industry and 
Trade Chamber, the Union of Latvian Small and Middle Enterprises Organisations, the 
Latvian Association of Commercial Banks, the Latvian Association of Tradesmen and the 
Latvian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (see appendix F, c and Blasum 1999: 213). 
Further, there was a special organisation for state owned enterprises, the so-called Directors’ 
Club. Only the LEC was member in the International Organisation of Employers. The other 
 61
organisations rarely claimed to represent their members as employers. The Latvian Chamber 
of Commerce an Industry (LCCI) was for example a pure business organisation, living mainly 
of selling its services. Most of the larger enterprises were members of both the LEC and the 
LCCI (Blasum 1999: 213).   
 
The Association of Lithuanian Industrialists was established in June 1989. It changed name to 
the Confederation of Lithuanian Industrialists (CLI) in March 1993. The members included 
38 branch organisations, 8 regional associations and some individual enterprises in 2002. The 
members were mainly manufacturing companies, although some banks, trade, commercial 
enterprises, subsidiaries of foreign firms, research institutes and educational institutions were 
represented. By its own words, the organisation represented more than 2700 enterprises in 
2003, covering all the main branches of industry (CLI web a, 25.04.03). Bronislovas Lubys, 
the president of CLI from 1993, was Prime Minister from December 1992 to March 1993 
(CLI web b; Lithuanian Government web, 07.11.02). Generally the CLI represented medium 
and big enterprises, while the Confederation of Lithuanian Business Employers (CLBE) 
represented small and sometimes medium enterprises (interview of Zickute 27.11.01).     
According to the Ministry of Justice, there were there were 11 employers’ organisations 
registered at national level in January 1997 (Dovydeniene & Casale 1999: 231). 
 
Out of all this we see that it is difficult to count employers’ organisations in all three 
countries. The EEC, the LEC and the CLI were however clearly the largest organisations of 
employers in each of the countries. The members of these organisations covered large shares 
of the economies. Only these organisations were represented in the International 
Organisations of Employers (IOE) and the Union of Industrial and Employers’ 
Confederations of Europe (UNICE). The EEC gained membership in the IOE in March 1998 
and was accepted as an observing member in the UNICE in July 1999. The LEC gained 
membership in the IOE in June 1994. In 2002 the CLI was member of the IOE and observer 
in the UNICE (UNICE web, IOE web a, b and c, 05.11.02). The employers’ organisations 
sought influence through lobbying. A legal advisor of the CLI put this very clearly: ‘the main 
activity of CLI is lobbying’ (interview Zickute 27.11.01). All three organisations had 
presented their views in the parliamentary committees (interview Zickute 27.11.02; Kriis 
07.12.02 and Jaunzeme 14.12.02). The CLI had relations to different political parties on a 
very pragmatic basis. Officials from the CLI had been sitting in the meetings of both the 
liberal, the conservative and the social democrat fraction in parliament. Some of the member 
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enterprises, but not the organisation, supported particular candidates to the parliament 
financially (interview Zickute 27.11.01). The LEC did not support any specific political party 
(interview Jaunzeme 14.12.02). Also the EEC sought influence in politics through 
presentations in the parliamentary committees or they tried to influence the commissions near 
the ministries. The EEC did not support any specific party because the organisation was 
dependent on being friend with all of the parties. Still, members of the board of the 
organisation had contributed to political parties on their own (interview Kriis 07.12.02).     
Table 5.1.2: Main employers’ organisations 
 
 Estonian Employers’ 
Confederation  
Latvian Employer’s 
Confederation  
Conf. of Lithuanian 
Industrialists  
Time of foundation November 1991 Mid 1993 June 1989 
Number of member 
companies 
1254 through 30 
branch organisations. 
33 large enterprises 
direct members. 
Altogether 1287 
(2001) 
81 employers’ 
organisations (2001) 
More than 2700 
through 41 branch 
organisations, 8 
regional associations 
and individual 
members (2002) 
Persons employed by 
member companies 
Ca. 125 000  
 
Ca. 300 000  Ca. 140 000  
Percentage of the 
country’s employed 
persons  
23%  37% 12% 
Size of staff (March 
1999) 
8 3  20 
Sources: Various sources31 
 
Table 5.1.2 presents the time of foundation and size of the main employers’ organisations. 
The table shows that the Latvian Employers’ Confederation was the largest organisation with 
                                                 
31
 The data on membership and employment for EEC are from their internal business report (EEC web c, 
05.05.03). The number of employees in member companies of CLI is a November 2002 estimate by CLI legal 
advisor Laura Zickute (e-mail correspondence 21.11.02), while the number of member companies through is 
collected from CLI web, 07.11.02. The data on member companies in LEC and their employees are from an 
internal information sheet from the Secretariat of the National Tripartite Co-operation Council (appendix F, c). 
The data have on number of staff are from interviews co-ordinated by Smith–Sivertsen (2000: 235, table 9.6). 
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81 member organisations, employing altogether 300 000 employees in 2001. There were 817 
600 employees in Latvia in May 2001, excluding employers, self-employed and unpaid 
family workers (Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia 2001: 14, table A1). This means that 
members of the LEC employed approximately 37% of the employees in Latvia. The CLI was 
the oldest of the organisations, established already in June 1989 (CLI web a, 25.03.03).  This 
organisation had about 2700 member enterprises, 41 branch member organisations and 8 
regional member organisations, altogether employing approximately 140 000 persons. There 
were 1 186 500 employees in Lithuania in November 2000, excluding employers and self-
employed and contributing family workers (Statistics Lithuania 2001b: 19, table 2.5). Hence 
CLI members employed approximately 12% of all employees in Lithuania. The Estonian 
Employers’ Confederation (EEC) covered a smaller number of employees than the LEC and 
the CLI, but a larger share of the employees in the country than the CLI. Estonia had 553 000 
employees in 2000, excluding employers, own-account workers and unpaid family workers 
(Statistical office of Estonia 2001 b: 72, table 29). Members of the EEC employed about 23% 
of these. The size of staff is an indication that the CLI had the clearly highest organisational 
capacity with their staff of 20, compared to the EEC with a staff of eight persons and the LEC 
staff of only three persons. The estimates of employment coverage are somewhat uncertain. 
Still, it seems safe to conclude that in all three countries, the shares of employees employed 
by a member of an employers’ organisation in 2001/ 2002 were clearly larger than the shares 
of employees who were members of a trade union in 1999. On the other hand, in March 1999 
the central trade union organisations had altogether larger numbers of staff than the main 
employers’ organisations in all three countries. The difference was largest in Latvia and 
smallest in Lithuania.      
 
The conclusion of the first part of this section is that in 1999 very small proportions of the 
employees in all three countries were members in trade unions. This year, 16% of ordinary 
employees and persons engaged in management were members in trade unions in Latvia, 
while the membership rates in the same group were 12% in Estonia and only 8% in Lithuania. 
The membership rate was a very impressive 84% in Latvia in 1994. The same year the 
membership rates were on 33% in Lithuania and 23% in Estonia. The membership rates from 
1994 are however very difficult to interpret because the countries had only been independent 
from the Soviet Union for three years. Presumably most of the members in trade unions 
gained their membership in Soviet times, when membership rates were extremely high. The 
much higher membership rates in Latvia than in Estonia and Lithuania in 1994 simply means 
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that the demobilisation of employees out of trade unions started later in Latvia. A possible 
explanation of this may be that the successor organisation of the Soviet trade union 
organisation was in a better position to retain the bulk of its Soviet times members in Latvia 
than in Estonia and Lithuania. This will be discussed in the next part of this chapter. 
Concerning employers, the conclusion of this section is that all three countries scored high on 
concentration of employers organisations in 2001/ 2002, measured as rather high coverage 
rates of the economy and the employment of the countries by the largest central employers’ 
organisations.  
 
My conclusion is that Latvia scored high on concentration in the earliest period before the end 
of 1995, while the other countries scored low on this variable both periods. The reason for this 
conclusion is the low membership rates in trade unions in all other cases than Latvia in 1994.  
The scores on concentration of trade unions and employers’ organisations are summed up in 
table 5.1.3. 
Table 5.1.3: Concentration of trade unions and employers’ organisations32 
 
 Estonia 
1994 
Estonia 
1999/ 
2002 
Latvia 
1994 
Latvia 
1999/ 
2001 
Lithuania 
1994 
Lithuania 
1999/  
2002  
Concentration of 
trade unions  
Low Low High Low Low Low 
Concentration of 
employers’ 
organisations 
- High - High - High 
 
The scores for trade unions are based on data from 1994 and 1999 while the scores for 
employers’ organisations are based on data from 2001/ 2002. I consider the earliest data an 
indication of concentration in the period from 1991 to the end of 1995, and the latest data an 
indication of concentration in the period from the beginning of 1996 to the end of 2001. 
                                                 
32
 The scores for trade unions refer to 1994 and 1999 while the scores for employers’ organisations refer to 2001/ 
2002. I consider the earliest data an indication of concentration in the period from 1991 to the beginning of 1996, 
and the latest data an indication of concentration in the period from the beginning of 1996 to 2002. 
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Centralisation of organisations 
 
To measure centralisation of trade union organisations, I have counted the total number of 
central trade union organisations and calculated the percentage of these, being represented in 
tripartite councils and tripartite agreements on state level. Table 5.1.4 presents the results.  
Table 5.1.4: Central trade union organisations in tripartite consultations  
 
 Estonia 
91 - 95 
Estonia  
96 - 01 
Latvia  
91 - 95 
Latvia  
96 -01 
Lithuania  
91 - 95 
Lithuania  
96 - 01 
 
Number 2 2 1 1 
 
4  4 
Represented in 
tripartite councils at 
state level  
100% 100%  100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Represented in 
tripartite 
agreements at state 
level  
50%  100% 100% 
(Only 
bipartite 
agreement) 
 
100% 100%  100% 
 
Table 5.1.4 shows the number of central trade union organisations and the share of them, 
being represented in tripartite councils working at state level and in tripartite agreements 
concluded at state level. I will discuss the history and the functions of the different councils as 
well as the history and contents of the tripartite agreements in the next chapter. The FTUCL 
was the only central trade union organisation in Latvia in the whole period. Estonia has had 
two central trade union organisations since 1992. Still, only the CETU signed the three 
tripartite agreements, which were concluded in the period from 1991 to the end of (see 
appendix B, agreements E2 – E4). After the EPEUA received one seat in the Estonian Council 
of the ILO from 1994, both organisations have been represented in this council (e-mail 
correspondence with Hindov: 18.12.02). Both organisations were included in three of the 
twelve tripartite agreements concluded at state level from January 1996 to the end of 2001 
(see appendix B, agreements E5 – E16). Both organisations have had representatives in the 
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Social and Economic Council, since this council started to meet in 1999. In Lithuania, all the 
four central trade union organisations signed the ‘Agreement on tripartite partnership of 1995’ 
and the ‘Agreement on tripartite cooperation of 1999’ (see appendix B, agreement LI1 – LI2). 
All the four organisations have also had representatives in the Tripartite Council of the 
Republic of Lithuania since the council was established in May 1995. 
 
The conclusion of this section is that Latvia in both periods had the most centralised system of 
trade union organisations. There existed only one central trade union organisation in both 
periods. Estonia had a somewhat less centralised system of trade union organisations in both 
periods. There were two central trade union organisations. Both were represented in tripartite 
agreements and councils at state level in the latest period. In the first period only one of them 
was represented in tripartite agreements, while both were represented in tripartite councils. 
Lithuania in both periods had the least centralised system of trade union organisations. There 
were four central trade union organisations in both periods. All of them signed the tripartite 
agreements of 1995 and 1999 and were founding members of the Tripartite Council of the 
Republic of Lithuania (TCRL). In the beginning of 2002 the number of central trade union 
organisations was reduced to three. All of these were represented in the TCRL.  
 
Centralisation of employers’ organisations 
 
To measure centralisation of employers’ organisations, I have counted the number of central 
organisations represented in tripartite councils and tripartite agreements on state level. Table 
5.1.5 presents the results. 
Table 5.1.5: Number of employer organisations in tripartite agreements and councils 
 
 Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
 91 –95 96 - 01 91 - 95 96 - 01 91 - 95 96 - 01 
Tripartite 
agreements 
1 2 1 
(bipartite) 
1 2 3 
Councils  1 2 1 1 2 2 
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From November 1995 through 1997, the Estonian employers were split between to major 
employers’ organisations - the Confederation of Estonian Industry and Employers (CEIE) and 
the Confederation of Estonian Employers’ Organisations (CEEO) (Kaadu 1999: 155). Both 
the CEIE and the CEEO signed ‘the Agreement on development of participatory democracy 
of 1996’ and’ the Agreement on method of calculating the subsistence level’ of 1997 (see 
appendix B, agreement E5, E8). Both organisations were also members in the Estonian 
Council of the ILO in 1997 (e-mail correspondence with Hindov: 17.12.02). The two 
organisations merged and the established the Confederation of Estonian Employers and 
Industry (CEEI) in 1997 (Kaadu 1999: 155). The CEEI changed name to Estonian Employers’ 
Confederation in the autumn 2001 (interview Kriis 07.12.01). From November 1997 the 
CEEI/ EEC has been representing employers alone in all tripartite agreements concluded at 
state level except in the very broad ‘Agreement of a common action plan for employment for 
the period 2001 – 2004’. Also the Chamber of Commerce and Industry signed this agreement 
in 2000 (see appendix B, agreement E14). The EEC was also the only employers’ 
organisation represented in the Social and Economic Council (SEC) in 2001 (Estonian 
Ministry of Social Affairs web b, 25.04.03).  
 
The LEC was the only organisation representing its members as employers in Latvia in both 
the first and the second period. There existed several business organisations, but these were 
not active in the social dialogue (Blasum 1999: 213). In the Tripartite Consultative Council, 
which may be considered as the highest in the hierarchy of tripartite organs before 1999, the 
presidents of the LEC and the FTUCL as well as the Minister of Welfare were the most 
prominent members. The only state level bipartite agreement concluded between the LEC and 
the FTUCL, was the ‘General Agreement on the Principles of Social Partnership’ of 1996 
(Blasum 1999: 217; interview Jaunzeme 14.12.01). The National Tripartite Co-operation 
Council (NTCC) started to work in 1999. The By-law of the council is a tripartite agreement. 
The first paragraph provided that the LEC, the FTUCL and the government were the founders 
of the council. Section 3, paragraph 6 and 7, provided that the council should exist of seven 
representatives from each of the parties and that the government should appoint its 
representatives by order of the cabinet of ministers. The LEC and the FTUCL should appoint 
the rest of the representatives (see appendix B, agreement LA2). Hence the LEC was the only 
organisation having the mandate to appoint representatives of the employers in the NTCC.  
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In Lithuania, The CLI was the central organisation of employers with the clearly highest 
coverage of the economy in both periods. Also the president of the Lithuanian Businessmen 
Association (LBA) signed the ‘Agreement on tripartite partnership’ of 1995 (see appendix B, 
agreement LI1). The president of CLI, the president of the Lithuanian Businessmen 
Employers’ Confederation (LBEC) and the president of the National Businessmen 
Confederation (NBC) signed the ‘Agreement on tripartite co-operation’ of 1999 (see appendix 
B, agreement LI2). The Tripartite Council of the Republic of Lithuania  (TCRL) was 
established in 1995, according to the tripartite agreement of the same year. The regulations of 
the council, approved in November 1998, provided that national employers organisations and 
national trade union organisations should appoint the representatives of employers and 
employees in the council (see appendix F, other documents e: § 4 – 4.2). The use of plural 
forms here gave all central organisation of employers and employees, which were organised 
on a national basis, the right to appoint representatives to the council. The LBEC, representing 
smaller enterprises, had two representatives in the 2001 TCRL while the CLI had three 
representatives (TCRL web b, 07.11.02). Even though there could be different views between 
the CLI and the LBEC on such an important issue as settlement of the minimum wage, the 
CLI regarded the relationship between the organisations as very good. The organisations were 
partners rather than competitors (interview of Zickute 27.11.02). 
 
Centralisation is measured as hierarchical control, where few central organisations have the 
mandate to negotiate in tripartite consultations and sign tripartite agreements on state level. A 
high degree of centralisation can be interpreted as few central organisations existing, or many 
central organisations existing, but only few of them are included in tripartite arrangements 
with the mandate to negotiate on behalf of the others. This means that Latvia had a centralised 
system of employers’ organisations in both the period from 1991 to the end of 1995 and the 
period from 1996 to the end of 2001. Estonia had a centralised system of employers’ 
organisations in the earliest period. The country had a less centralised system of employers’ 
organisations in the latest period. There were two central employers organisations represented 
in tripartite agreements and councils in 1996 and 1997, while the Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry represented business in addition to the CEEI in a tripartite agreement in 2000. In 
Lithuania, two employers’ organisations were among the founding members of the Tripartite 
Council of the Republic of Lithuania (TCRL) in 1995. Both of them signed the ‘Agreement 
on tripartite partnership’ of the same year. Three organisations signed the Agreement on 
tripartite co-operation of 1999 on behalf of business and the employers. This means that the 
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system of employers’ organisations was more centralised in Latvia in both periods and in 
Estonia than in the first period than in the other cases.  
 
Central employers’ organisations and trade union organisations considered together, I 
conclude that Latvia in both periods scored highest on centralisation of the system of interest 
group organisations, followed by Estonia in the first period. Estonia in the latest period and 
Lithuania in both periods had less centralised systems of interest group organisations. I have 
dichotomised the scores on centralisation of interest group organisations in table 5.1.6. 
 
Table 5.1.6: Centralisation of interest group organisations 
 
Estonia  
91 – 95 
Estonia  
96 – 01 
Latvia  
91 – 95 
Latvia 
96 - 01 
Lithuania 
91 – 95 
Lithuania 
96 – 01 
Lower Lower Higher Higher Lower Lower 
 
The dichotomised conclusion in table 5.1.6 is a simplification, covering up differences within 
each category. The Estonian system of interest group organisations in the first period was 
certainly more centralised than the Lithuanian systems in both periods. Still, Latvia is clearly 
distinguished in both periods from all other cases. Only one central organisation of employers 
and one central trade union organisation have been represented in the state level tripartite 
arrangements in Latvia.      
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5.2: The systems for bargaining between central trade 
union organisations, central employers’ organisations and 
the government 
  
The third of Katzenstein’s characteristics of democratic corporatism is “voluntary and 
informal coordination of conflicting objectives through continuous bargaining between 
interest groups, state bureaucracies and political parties.” (Katzenstein 1985: 32).  I will not 
follow Katzenstein’s definition strictly in my analysis. First I will not focus upon bargaining 
with all political parties, but concentrate on the bargaining between the interest group 
organisations and the government. After all, political parties have formed governments in all 
three countries, at least since the last popular front government stepped down in Latvia in July 
1993. Secondly, I will focus upon formal rather than informal bargaining.  
 
The first part of this chapter deals with tripartite councils, while the second part deals with 
tripartite agreements. I will compare formal tripartite bargaining along three aspects - power, 
continuity and broadness. I will compare power by looking at to what extent the tripartite 
councils were decision-making or only advisory. I will also compare the degree of 
government participation in the councils, as it reflects how close the councils were to the 
executive branch of state politics. I will also compare the different extents of specific 
obligations laid down in the tripartite agreements. I will compare continuity by looking at the 
time periods between each new agreement on adjusting the minimum legal wage, and by 
counting the number of tripartite agreements concluded in each period. Finally, I will compare 
broadness by counting tripartite councils operating at state level. At the end of this chapter, I 
will conclude what countries in what period scored highest on the variable measured as one. I 
will attach most weight to power, second most importance to continuity and least to 
broadness.  Table 5.2.1 on the next page summarises my way of measuring.  
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Table 5.2.1: Measuring the systems for tripartite bargaining at state level 
 
Power       -    Status of the tripartite councils: Decision-making or advisory 
- Degree of government participation in the councils 
- The degree of specific obligations laid down in tripartite agreements 
Continuity - Number of tripartite agreements concluded at state level in each period 
- Time between each new agreement on adjusting the minimum wage 
Broadness - Number of tripartite councils operating at state level 
 
The emergence of tripartite councils 
The Estonian Council of the ILO was established in January 1992, as the first tripartite 
council in post-communist Estonia. This council, which was still working in 2002, was 
established to assist the government and the Ministry of Social Affairs to fulfil the duties 
arising from ILO membership. The advisory council operated at state level and was composed 
of four representatives from the central trade union organisations, four representatives of the 
employers and six representatives of the government. Through this council the social partners 
have been able to give their advisory comments on ILO conventions before they were ratified 
in Riigikogu (EEC web b, 15.10.02; interview Hindov 04.12.01). The advisory Work 
Environment Council was established in 1997. This council included five representatives 
from each of the partners. Its main function was to present the proposals and express the 
opinions of the social partners on the implementation of the work environment policies. The 
foundation of advisory tripartite vocational councils started in 1998, in accordance with the 
Vocational Educational Institutions Act, passed in June the same year. By 2000, vocational 
councils on twelve economic sectors, divided into 66 working groups, had started to work.  
The vocational councils had the function to record the positions and proposals of various 
institutions and to reach agreements for elaborating, implementing and developing the 
workers’ qualification and vocational system. They further synchronised the vocational and 
professional qualification of the workers with the labour market (EEC web b, 15.10.02).  
The Estonian Social and Economic Council started to meet in 1999, as an advisory organ 
under the Ministry of Social Affairs (Ministry of Social Affairs web a, 31.10.02). Still in 
November 2002, it did not have an office on its own (e-mail correspondence with Raul 
Eamets, 19.11.02). The composition of the council was recommended by the Minister of 
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Social affairs and approved by the Prime Minister. From the 1st of January 2001, the General 
Secretary of the Ministry of Social Affairs was Chairman of the council. The EEC and the 
CETU had one vice chairman each. Five representatives of the EEC represented the 
employers. One representative from the CETU, one from the EPEUA, and two representatives 
from the two branch associations, the Telecommunication Workers Union and the Society of 
Economy workers’ Unions, represented the employees. On the government side only one of 
the representatives, an advisor of the Ministry of Finance, came from the ministries. The other 
government appointees were external experts (Ministry of Social affairs web b, 25.04.03). 
Their mandates were very free. This means that the government was hardly participating in 
the SEC. During an interview in December 2001, Raul Eamets, a researcher and labour 
relations expert who was member of the council at the government side, indicated that the 
activities of the council recently had been low because of the very broad spectre of issues 
being discussed. A lot of the members had only been to a few of the meetings the last year, 
because they could not see any significant results of the meetings (interview Raul Eamets 
06.12.01). 
The Council of the Health Insurance Fund was established in 2000. This council, consisting of 
five representatives from each of the partners, was the highest body of the Health Insurance 
Fund. Its mandate was to pass the development plan, the budget and the structure of the 
Health Insurance Fund. It also appointed the chairperson and the members of the managing 
board (EEC web b, 15.10.02). From 1999 tripartite councils have also emerged on the 
regional level.33  
In 1993 the Latvian cabinet of ministers accepted a conception on basic principles and 
necessity of forming a system of tripartite cooperation. Three advisory tripartite councils were 
established on state level in 1993 and 1994. The Tripartite Labour Protection Consultative 
Council (TLPCC) was established in August 1993. This Council consisted of 15 members, 
five representatives from each of the partners. Until 1999 it was advisory in technical 
questions on a wide range of labour safety and labour standards issues. The Tripartite 
Consultative Council of Employers the State and Trade Unions of Latvia (TCCESTUL), 
                                                 
33
 In accordance with a tripartite agreement concluded on state level in 1999, tripartite employment councils 
were established the same year in Tallinn. According to the agreement the councils were advisory, and their 
function was to assist the local employment boards to develop and implement action plans (translation of 
01.09.99 agreement). From 2000, employment councils were being formed at each of the 16 regional 
employment offices, consisting of three representatives from each of the partners (Labour Market Board web a, 
12.11.02; EEC web b, 15.10.02). 
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started to operate in December 1993. It might be considered as the highest organ in the 
hierarchy of tripartite councils until 1999, because the Minister of Welfare and the presidents 
and vice-presidents of the FTUCL and the LEC were members of the council. The council 
dealt with a variety of topics with focus on social and labour issues. In addition, the 
TCCESTUL received controversial cases the other councils could not solve. Cases of 
technical character were transferred in the adverse direction.  According to Blasum, the trade 
union side initiated most of the topics. Minimum wage was amongst the topics agreed upon in 
the council. The council further made recommendations to the government on labour 
legislation. According to Blasum, both employers’ organisation and trade union 
representatives often felt that the state management institutions at the meetings of the council 
did not take them seriously enough. The advisory Tripartite Social Security Council (TSSC) 
held its first meeting in May 1994. This council submitted its proposals to the cabinet of 
ministers and other state management institutions on a wide range of new draft laws, dealing 
with social and health insurance, social security and social taxes (Blasum 1999: 215 – 218; 
see also appendix F, c: 2).   
The Prime Minister, the president of the LEC and the president of the FTUCL signed the by-
law of the National Tripartite Co-operation Council (NTCC) as a tripartite agreement in late 
October 1998. The first section of the by-law mentioned a wide range of functions of the 
council. The council had the mandate to consider draft laws from the cabinet of ministers and 
to submit proposals to the ministries on the state budget and a wide range of social economic 
and labour issues (see appendix B, agreement LA2: § 2). The second section guaranteed the 
council all the necessary information from the state chancellery and the state administration, 
including minutes of the meetings of the cabinet of ministers (ibid: § 5.1, 5.2). The council 
also had the right to request the ministries to suspend the movement of a project to the cabinet 
of ministers for five days until the project had been considered in the council (ibid: § 5.4). 
According to the third section, each partner appointed seven representatives including the 
chairman and his deputy (ibid: § 6). The same section provided for the establishment of sub-
councils (ibid: § 12 – 13). The fourth section provided that a secretariat of the council should 
be established with three full time employees34 (ibid: § 14 – 16).  In the final provisions, it 
was provided that the NTCC was the heir of rights, duties and responsibilities of the 
TCCESTUL, and that the regulations were valid from the 1st January 1999 (ibid: § 37 – 38).  
                                                 
34
 Still, only two employees worked at the secretariat in 2001(Interview Bilzena: 09.11.01). 
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It was however paragraph 26 in the fifth section, which made the NTCC exceptional among 
tripartite councils in the three Baltic countries: “the Council makes decisions by agreement of 
all parties. The decisions are binding to all parties.” (Ibid: § 26). This meant that the 
government was obliged to change the contents of draft law and regulations according to the 
agreements concluded in the NTCC before they were sent to the Saeima for voting.  
Already in January 1999, the Social Security Sub-Council was established. This took over 
many of the functions of the Tripartite Social Security Council. A tripartite agreement, signed 
by the Minister of Welfare, and the presidents of the LEC and the FTUCL, established the by-
law of the Labour Issues Tripartite Co-operation Council in March 2000. This sub-council 
took over the functions of the Tripartite Labour Protection Consultative Council (see 
appendix B, agreement LA3). The Minister of Welfare and the presidents of the two central 
organisations signed the by-law of the Professional Education and Employment Tripartite Co-
operation Sub-council in July 2000 and the by-law of the Health Care Branch Sub-Council in 
March 2001 (see appendix B, agreement LA4, LA5). The division of functions between the 
main council and the sub-councils were the same as it used to be between the TCCESTUL, 
the TLPCC and the TSSC. Controversial cases not agreed upon in the sub-councils were sent 
the main council, while cases of technical characters were transferred in the adverse direction 
(interview Bilzena: 09.11.01).  
One of the striking features of the NTCC was the high positions of the representatives 
meeting on a regular basis. The leader of the cabinet side in the main council was the Minister 
of Welfare. In addition the Minister of Economy and the Minister of Finance were regular 
members. By their sides they had state secretaries from the Ministry of Agriculture, the 
Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Regional Development and 
the Ministry of Education. The president of LEC was leading the employers. The directors of 
five large enterprises as well as the president of the Latvian Commercial Bank Association 
were also members on the employers’ side. The chairman of the FTUCL was leading the trade 
union side. By his side was the vice chairman of the FTUCL as well as the chairmen of five 
branch trade union associations (NTCC Secretariat 2001 b, interview of Bilzena 09.11.01).  
The prime minister had the right to be an observer in the NTCC main council, and he has 
often done so. The prime minister could also introduce topics for discussions in the NTCC 
through the NTCC secretariat. In the autumn of 2001, 68 persons died in Estonia after 
drinking black market liquor consisting of methanol (TBT: 30.01.03). Following this, Prime 
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Minister Berzins ordered the secretariat of NTCC to gather information about alcohol policies 
for future discussions in the tripartite council (Interview Bilzena 09.11.01).      
Vice state secretaries and heads of ministerial departments and divisions represented the 
government in the sub-councils. The chairman and the vice chairman of the FTUCL were 
leading the trade union side in the Social security Sub-council and the Labour Issues Sub-
council. The FTUCL vice chairman was leading the Professional Education and Employment 
Sub-council. In addition, representatives of the trade union associations most concerned in 
addition to a few FTUCL experts represented the trade unions in the sub-councils. Directors 
of individual enterprises and representatives of the associations most concerned, as the 
Hospital Association in the Health Care Branch Sub-Council, represented the employers in 
the different sub-councils (Interview Bilzena: 09.11.01; NTCC Secretariat 2001 c).  
The oldest tripartite council in Lithuania was the State Social Insurance Fund Council (SSIF 
council). It was established in 1991, consisting of five representatives from each side 
(Dovydeniene 2000: 23). The Minister of Social Security and Labour or her direct 
representative was leading the council. Its mandate was amongst others to approve the budget 
of the SSIF, to nominate the director of the SSIF and to adopt resolutions on important issues 
related to the management of the SSIF (Dovydeniene and Casale 1999: 238, Lithuanian 
Ministry of Social Security and Labour 2001: 78). The council was also supervising the 
implementation of the legal acts regulating the state social insurance. Further it could submit 
proposals to the government about amongst others the rate of the insurance contributions. 
Territorial councils of the SSIF have been established from February 1998  (Lithuanian 
Ministry of Social Security and Labour 2001: 71). The Tripartite Committee of the Labour 
Exchange of the Republic was also established in 1991, together with Tripartite Committees 
for local labour exchanges in the cities and regions (Dovydeniene 2000: 23).35  
The Commission on Safety at Work was established in 1994 and reorganised into the 
Commission on Safety and Health at Work in late 2001.  The advisory council had 15 
members, five from each of the parties (Lithuanian Ministry of Social Security and Labour 
                                                 
35
 46 regional tripartite commissions were working at each of the 46 territorial labour exchanges in 2000  
(Lithuanian Ministry of Social Security and Labour 2001: 73).  
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2001: 72, see also Dovydeniene 2000: 23). The permanent commission for tripartite 
consultations on labour standards implementation was established in 1995 (Dovydeniene 
2000: 24). The Council of Experts at the Lithuanian Labour Exchange Training Service was 
established in 1996. This was an advisory council, with the objective to help develop the 
system of vocational training and consulting of the labour market (Lithuanian Ministry of 
Social Security and Labour 2001: 73). The Employment Council was established under the 
Ministry of Social Security and Labour in 1996. This council submitted proposals to the 
ministry on labour market policy and unemployment insurance rates. It further established the 
procedures for the formation and use of the Employment Fund and approved the annual 
estimate and report of this fund. This council consisted of five members from each side 
(Lithuanian Ministry of Social Security and Labour 2001: 72).  
The Compulsory Health Insurance Fund Council was established as an advisory body to the 
Compulsory Health Insurance Fund in 1997. This council had two trade union representatives. 
The same year the advisory Council of the Fund to Fulfil Employees’ Claims Related to 
Labour Relations of Bankrupt Enterprises and Enterprises under Bankruptcy (CFFE) was 
established (Dovydeniene & Casale 1999: 238). In 2001 the Guarantee Fund was established 
to compensate employees in bankrupt companies, and the tripartite Council of the Guarantee 
Fund took over the functions of the CFFE. This council governed the resources of the 
Guarantee Fund, adopted decisions on its allocation and submitted proposals to the 
government regarding the activities of the fund. The advisory Lithuanian Council of 
Vocational Training was founded in 1998 (Lithuanian Ministry of Social Security and Labour 
2001: 72). From 1995 tripartite boards of experts were also established in the largest cities.36 
The Tripartite Council of the Republic of Lithuania (TCRL) was established in accordance 
with a tripartite agreement concluded in May 1995 (see appendix B, agreement LI1) The 
council had its first meeting the same month (TCRL web a, 12.11.02) The Secretariat of 
TCRL was established at the Ministry of Social Security and Labour in 1998 (TCRL web c, 
12.11.02). The tripartite cooperation agreement of 1999 increased the status of the TCRL, 
because the government agreed to submit all draft laws concerning labour, social and 
economic issues to discussion in the TCRL. The government further agreed to record 
conclusions from the TCRL in the explanatory papers following the draft laws to the Seimas 
                                                 
36
 In 1995 advisory Boards of Experts that works under the supervision of the Lithuanian Labour Market 
Training Service in the largest cities were established (Dovydeniene: 23, Dovydeniene & Casale 1999: 238). In 
2000 these services existed in six cities (Lithuanian Ministry of Social Security and Labour 2001: 73). 
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(see appendix B, agreement LI2: § 3.1.2 – 3.1.3). The TCRL established four standing 
commissions for considering social, economic and labour problems in 1999, also this in 
accordance with the 1999 agreement (ibid: § 6). 
The Lithuanian laws did not regulate the activities of the National Tripartite Council until the 
amendments of the Law on Collective Agreements entered into force on 1st January 2002. 
Article 1 dealt with tripartite and bilateral councils, specifically the TCRL. According to the 
law the council shall consist of an equal number of members with equal rights, from the 
central trade union organisations, the employers’ organisations and the government. Further, 
the parties must provide the necessary information to the council related to the issues being 
considered. Finally, the law underscores that the government must assess the opinion of the 
trade unions and employers’ organisations represented in the TCRL when adopting decisions 
or submitting draft laws about urgent labour, social and economic issues to the Seimas (see 
appendix F, e: Article 1). According to the lawyer of the Lithuanian Trade Union Unification 
in 2001, these amendments considerably increased the status of the agreements reached in the 
TCRL (Interview of Pivoras 19.11.01). State secretaries of the Ministry of Social Security and 
Labour, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Economy as 
well as the vice minister of finance represented the government in the TCRL in 2002. The 
presidents or chairmen of the four central trade union organisations represented the trade 
unions. The presidents of the CLI and the LBEC and the director of a Kaunas enterprise 
represented the employers  (TCRL web b, 07.11.02).  
In March 2000, the TCRL and its standing commissions considered a package of proposals 
from the Provisional Labour Market Liberalisation Group - also called the Sunrise 
commission. The central trade union organisations rejected a number of the proposals, 
especially those related to redundancy pay and the procedure for concluding and cancelling 
employment contracts (TCRL web d, 30.10.02).  
In November 2000, a new economically liberal government coalition adopted many of the 
proposals of the sunrise commission to a packet of proposals to liberalise the labour relations. 
The four central trade union organisations reacted unanimously to the proposals by 
threatening nation-wide industrial action. Still these measures, officially aimed at reducing 
unemployment, were included in draft law amendments. In March 2001, the Seimas passed 
the new legislation amending simultaneously the Law on Employment Contracts, the Law on 
Wages, the Law on Holydays and the Law on Trade Unions. Due to these amendments, a new 
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non-compulsory sample labour contract replaced the former principle of a mandatory labour 
contract in the Law on Employment Contracts. Further, the new amendments to this law 
reduced severance pay for dismissed employees significantly.  The trade unions reacted by 
holding protest pickets outside the homes of the Members of Parliament (MPs) from the 
government parties, and more than a hundred trade unionists from all over Lithuania showed 
up as silent witnesses to the plenary debate on the new legislation in the Seimas. Opposition 
Social Democratic coalition MPs who sponsored the action in the parliament, unsuccessfully 
called on the President not to ratify the new law (Woolfson and Beck 2002: 762 - 763). Later 
a discussion started in the TCRL whether the drafts of the law amendments had been 
considered in the council. The trade union representatives were at a point of time threatening 
to boycott future discussion in the council. They never went that far, though  (ibid: 763; 
TCRL web d, 30.10.02). The fact that the labour legislation on such important issues for 
employees was amended without the trade union representatives giving consent to these 
amendments in the TCRL - it was even discussion in the TCRL whether these draft laws had 
been discussed at all - shows the strictly advisory status of this council. This incident clearly 
proved that the government did not need consent from the other two partners in the TCRL 
when formulating draft legislation on issues deeply concerning them. Table 5.2.2 on the next 
page is a chronological presentation of the emergence of tripartite councils at state level. 
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Table 5.2.2: The emergence of tripartite councils at state level  
 
 Estonia Latvia  Lithuania 
 Advisory Making 
binding 
decisions 
Advisory Making 
binding 
decisions 
Advisory Making 
binding 
decisions 
1991     1 1 
1992 1      
1993   2    
1994   1  1  
1995     2   
Operative 
in 1995 
1 0 3 0 4 1 
1996     1 1 
1997 1    1 1 
1998 137    1  
1999 1   1 + 1 sub 
council 
  
2000  1  2 sub 
councils 
  
2001    1 sub 
councils 
  
Operative 
in 2001 
4 1  1 + 4  7 3 
The conclusion of this section is that Lithuania had most tripartite councils at state level by 
the end of 1995. The State Social Insurance Fund Council in Lithuania was also the only 
council being not only advisory but having decision-taking power. This means that in the 
period from 1991 to the end of 1995 Lithuania scored highest on power and broadness of 
bargaining in tripartite councils. Lithuania still had the largest number of tripartite councils at 
state level in the end of 2001. Now also the Employment Council and the Council of the 
Guarantee Fund had decision-taking power in the Employment Fund and the Guarantee Fund. 
                                                 
37
 Vocational councils. By 2000 vocational councils on twelve economic sectors divided into 66 working groups 
had started working. 
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By this time, also Estonia had established a similar tripartite council, namely the Council of 
the State Social Insurance Fund, with decision-taking power in this Fund. Still, I consider the 
structure of tripartite councils at state level in Latvia to be of the clearly most powerful by the 
end of 2001. This evaluation is based on the close ties of the National Tripartite Co-operation 
Council with the government as well as the high interest the government has put in the 
council. But most of all, the NTCC was exceptional in the three countries because the 
agreements concluded there were binding for all of the partners. This means that in that in the 
latest period, after the NTCC started to function in the beginning of 1999, Latvia scored 
highest on power of bargaining in tripartite councils.  
Concluding tripartite agreements at state level 
 
Different sorts of tripartite agreements on state level have been concluded within or outside 
the tripartite councils. These can be classified as; a) general agreements, where each of the 
social partners accepts the other partners as legitimate political players of equal worth and 
agrees to conclude agreements on specific topics in the future, b) agreements stipulating the 
level of the minimum wage, tax free income or unemployment benefits and c) agreements on 
other specific topics, as establishing a new office or council, or framework agreements 
concerning the development in a certain field where each of the partners commits themselves 
to implement certain tasks. The first part of this section is devoted to the legal framework for 
collective agreements. After that I will deal with the different sorts of tripartite agreements in 
the mentioned order.  
 
Legal framework for collective agreements 
 
The government and the Parliament lay the foundations for collective agreements by 
preparing and passing legislation that provides for these agreements. Estonia adopted her 
‘Collective Agreements Act’ in 1993. The act also dealt with tripartite agreements at state 
level between the central organisations of employees and employers and the Government. 
Paragraph 9.3 provided that ‘The parties are required to comply with the terms and conditions 
of a collective agreement during the term of the collective agreement and refrain from calling 
a strike or lock-out in order to amend the terms and conditions provided for in the collective 
agreement’ (see appendix E, Law c: § 3.4 and § 9.3). This meant that collective agreements 
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were binding to the parties by law in Estonia both in the end of the earliest period from 1993 
to the end of 1995 and in the whole latest period from 1996 to the end of 2001.  
 
The Latvian ‘Collective Agreements Act’ adopted in 1991, did not deal with the government 
as party in collective agreements in the same way as the Estonian law. Article 2 of this law 
however provided that administration institutions could sign general agreements with trade 
unions and the organisations of employers. The article further provided that the obligations 
and regulations included in a general agreement were compulsory for the parties (see 
appendix E, Law j: Article 2). The new ‘Labour Law’ in force from July 2002, deals with 
general collective agreements on territory level between central organisations of employees 
and employers. Section 18.3 provides that the agreements are binding on the members of the 
organisations or associations having signed the agreement. Section 18.4 provides that if an 
organisation or association of employers’ that employ more than 60% of the employees in a 
sector signs an agreement, the agreement shall be binding on all employees in the sector (see 
appendix E, Law k: Section 18.3 and 18.4).  This means that collective agreements were 
binding to the parties by law in Latvia in both periods before 1996 and 2002. 
 
Article 5 of the Lithuanian ‘Law on Collective Agreements’ adopted in April 1991 provided 
that ‘agreements shall be binding to its parties as well as to the legal successor of the 
employer’. This law only dealt with collective agreement between representatives of 
employees and employers at enterprise and branch level (see appendix E, Law n). The first 
chapter in the ‘Law on Collective Agreements and Collective Labour Agreements’ as 
amended in April 1996, dealt with collective agreements between the government and the 
organisations of employees and employers. Article 5 provides that disagreements and disputes 
on conclusion or implementation of a collective agreement shall be settled according to the 
procedures established in the ‘Law on the Regulation of Collective Disputes’ (see appendix E 
Law o: Article 1, 5). The last was maintained in Article 3 in The Law On Amending and 
Supplementing Chapter 1 of the Law on Collective Agreements and Employment Contracts, 
which entered into force on the 1st of January 2002 (see appendix E, Law s: Article 3). Out of 
all this we see that in both time periods the national legislation in all three countries treated 
tripartite agreements. 
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Table 5.2.3 summarises when the national legislation on collective agreements was passed in 
each of the countries. 
Table 5.2.3: Legislation on collective agreements 
 
 Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
1991  Collective 
Agreements Act 
Law on Collective Agreements 
1993 Collective 
Agreements Act 
  
1996   Law on Collective Agreements and 
Collective Labour Agreements 
2002  New Labour Law Amendments in the Law on Collective 
Agreements and Collective Labour 
Agreements 
 
General cooperation agreements 
 
It should be a good start for further tripartite arrangements that the partners officially accept 
each other as legitimate political players and declare their intentions for future co-operation. 
The Estonian government and the Confederation of Estonian Trade Unions (CETU) did this 
already in February 1991, by signing the ‘Framework Agreement on Social Guarantees for 
1991’. The intention of the agreement, which was laid out on the top of the document, was to 
secure the inhabitants in Estonia social guarantees and to subdue social tensions during the 
transition to market economy. The agreement contained eight paragraphs. In the first 
paragraph the CETU and the government declared their intentions to exchange information 
and hold consultations at least four times a year about social policy questions, as well as 
initiatives in ‘questions concerning legislation’ (see appendix B, agreement E1: § 1.1). The 
latter might be interpreted as an intention to include the CETU in the process of making draft 
laws. In the second paragraph, the government promised to work out and publish means to 
subdue the effects of the social-economical crisis in Estonia. These means included, 
stipulation of minimum subsistence level and adjustment of this no later than February 1991 
according to the cost-of-living index. Further minimum rates for pensions, social support and 
scholarships as well as minimum wages had to be stipulated and adjusted according to the 
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cost-of-living index. The government also promised to initiate compensation for the decrease 
in living standard of the inhabitants in case costs of living increased by more than 10 per cent. 
The government further promised to award employees who lost their employment as a 
consequence of reorganisation or liquidation of enterprises and who had not found 
employment corresponding to their qualifications by three months, re-education scholarships 
for up to three months. The government guaranteed six months unemployment benefits to 
persons having accomplished re-education courses if the employment market could still not 
provide jobs for them. Further the government agreed to award trade unions economical 
support from the social budget and to cover necessary material recourses to arrange camps for 
children and for sanatoria treatment of children. The government guaranteed to award 
exemption from taxation for expenses of employers to educational, cultural, medical, and 
sport and training arrangements for employees. Further the government guaranteed employees 
at last three weeks holyday a year and agreed to initiate negotiations with the CETU in April 
the same year on extending the minimum holyday. In the final sub-paragraphs the government 
undertook to work out laws regulating working life, the health system, social insurance and 
pensions (ibid: §2.1 - 2.14).  
 
In the third paragraph the CETU undertook amongst others to guarantee the government 
‘domestic peace’ with regards to all topics included in the agreement, to initiate processes for 
conclusions of agreements on all levels and to go into dialogue with the government before 
taking use of extreme means in conflict situations. The CETU further agreed to work out the 
statutes of an insurance fund for the unemployed and a system for payment of unemployment 
insurance (ibid: § 3.1 – 3.10). The agreement was declared to be valid from the 1st of January 
to the 31st of December1991 (ibid: § 7).  
 
The Confederation of Estonian Industry (CEI) signed a tripartite agreement on state level half 
a year after it was established in November 1991. The ‘Framework agreement on Social 
Guarantees for 1992’ was also a declaration of social partnership where the parties 
acknowledged each other as partners of equal worth in bipartite and tripartite negotiations. 
The partners declared that the intention of the agreement was to strengthen the development 
of the Estonian economy and at the same time provide social and economical protection for 
all of the inhabitants in Estonia (see appendix B, agreement E1). The social partners amongst 
others agreed to initiate negotiations about stipulation of wages and tax-free income every 
month, within five days after the Statistical Office had published the costs-of-living index 
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(ibid: § 1). The partners further recognised the rights of employees in budgetary institutions to 
collective bargaining, especially regarding wages (ibid: § 2). They agreed to initiate payment 
of wages every week from April because of the radical rise in costs-of-living (ibid: § 3). They 
agreed to present a draft law on implementing 40 hours workweek to the Supreme Council 
(ibid: § 4). They further agreed to follow the ILO principle that the government, the 
employers and the employees together worked out draft laws regulating labour relationships 
(ibid: 5).  
 
In the tripartite ‘Agreement on major questions concerning social guarantees’ signed in April 
1993, the social partners amongst others agreed to initiate consultations on expert level about 
the contents and structure of next year’s agreement on income policy and to negotiate about 
the level of minimum wage (see appendix B, agreement E2: § 1, 2). The partners further 
agreed that it was necessary to work out a principle plan about social taxes and fees and the 
distribution of these between employees and employers. The partners also agreed to work out 
a draft law on social insurances, including pensions, health insurance, unemployment 
insurance and insurance for occupational accidents and diseases (ibid: § 3 a, b). Furthermore, 
the social partners agreed that it was necessary to inform the employers’ and employees’ 
organisations about assets put out for privatisation and the terms related to these, especially 
those regarding employment (ibid: § 5).  In addition, the partners agreed that it was necessary 
to establish labour dispute courts. The representatives of the trade unions should prepare a 
draft for this reform within October 1993 (ibid: § 6). Finally, and in continuity with the 1992 
agreement, the partners agreed to work out of laws regulating labour relations and social 
questions in common, and to present proposals to amendments or supplements of existing 
laws (ibid: § 7). The final point underscored the possibility of the government not to follow up 
proposals of the other two parties. The government was to inform the organisations of 
employees and employers in cases when their proposals regarding labour relations and social 
questions were not followed up (ibid: § 8). These two tripartite and the one bipartite 
agreement laid out the common ground for tripartite cooperation at state level in Estonia. 
 
The agreement of 1998 establishing the by-law of the National Tripartite Co-operation 
Council (NTCC) was the first binding tripartite agreement at state level in Latvia (interview 
Bilzena: 09.11.02; see also appendix B, agreement LA1). Nevertheless, the government 
started to meet with the central organisations of employers and employees at a regular basis 
when the Tripartite Labour Protection Consultative Council (TLPCC) and the Tripartite 
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Consultative Council of Employers, the State and Trade Unions of Latvia (TCCESTU) started 
to work in 1993 (Blasum 1999: 215). This can be regarded as the beginning of the state level 
system of tripartite partnership in Latvia. In mid-1996, the Latvian Employers Confederation 
(LEC) and the Free Trade Union Confederation of Latvia (FTUCL) signed a general 
agreement on ‘Principles of Social Partnership’ (Blasum 1999: 221). According to the 
General Director of LEC in 2001 Ieva Jaunzeme, this agreement contained principles, which 
were later included in the Employers Organisations Act of 1999. In the agreement the LEC 
and the FTUCL agreed to have consultations about minimum wage and indexation of this 
each time after the Central Statistical Bureau published the quarterly report on economical 
development. They further declared that employers should respect trade unions, sign 
collective agreements with them and provide concrete information to employees. Further the 
associations of employers should conclude agreements with the trade union associations. The 
bottom of the agreement stated that it was valid until a new agreement was signed (interview 
with Jaunzeme 14.12.01). Yet, no more such agreements had been signed by December 2001. 
FTUCL had proposed to sign a new agreement including minimum wage. According to 
Jaunzeme, the LEC rejected this proposal because a lot of the trade union members received 
their salaries from the state budget. The state budget could not afford a rise in minimum wage, 
because it was still difficult to fulfil the obligations connected to the minimum wage increase 
of 1999 (ibid). 
 
According to the web site of the Secretariat of the National Tripartite Council in Lithuania, 
the trade union organisations were the most active proponents of implementing tripartite co-
operation. In a common resolution the 4th of February 1993, they demanded that a general 
agreement with the government should be signed within the 10th of March the same year. The 
trade union organisations further threatened to ‘take measure of exerting pressure on the 
Government’ in case it failed to give a positive answer before the 10th of February (TCRL 
web c, 12.11.02).  A meeting between the representatives of the trade union organisations and 
President Algirdas Brazauskas followed on the 6th of February. On the 26th of February, Prime 
Minister Bronislavas Lubys, from the Democratic Labour Party, and the representatives of six 
trade union associations signed an agreement. In the agreement the Government and the trade 
union associations approved the ILO principles of tripartite co-operation. On the 15th of April 
the representatives of the trade union organisations met with Prime Minister Adolfas 
Sletevicius, and they agreed to co-operate on a regular basis. Further they discussed to 
establish a commission considering economic and social-economic problems. Prime Minister 
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Bronislavas Lubys signed the agreement with the trade union organisations on behalf of the 
government in February 1993. In November the same year, he was meeting with 
representatives of the Lithuanian Trade Union Centre (LTU Centre), as president of the 
Confederation of Lithuanian Industrialists (CLI). The presidents of the CLI and the LTUC 
signed a joint statement, declaring the necessity to start bilateral co-operation between the 
trade unions and the employers’ organisations and to initiate tripartite cooperation to avoid 
strikes and social conflicts (ibid).  
 
The government, the four central trade union organisations and the two employers’ 
organisations, the CLI and the LBA, concluded the ‘Agreement on Tripartite partnership’ in 
May 1995. Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius and the presidents or chairmen of the different 
organisations signed the document. The aim of the agreement as formulated on the top of the 
document, was to co-ordinate the interests of the parties to solve social economic and labour 
problems in a more efficient way and to improve the social concord. For this purpose, the 
partners agreed to solve social, economic and labour problems on tripartite basis, to co-
operate in implementing social economic and labour policies and to annually sign tripartite 
agreements on solving social and economic and labour problems (see appendix B, agreement 
LI1: § 1 – 3). As a consequence of this the Tripartite Council of the Republic of Lithuania 
(TCRL) had its first meeting already on the 30th of May 1995 (TCRL web c, 12.11.02).  
 
On the other hand, the partners failed to sign other tripartite agreements until the ‘Agreement 
on Tripartite Co-operation’ of February 1999. The 1999 agreement included the same four 
central trade union organisations, having signed the 1995 agreement. The National 
Businessmen Confederation (NBC), the Lithuanian Businessmen Employers’ Confederation 
(LBEC) and the CLI represented the employers this time. Prime Minister Gediminas 
Vagnorius from the conservative Homeland Union signed the agreement on behalf of the 
government. The aim of the agreement was to continue the development of the tripartite co-
operation initiated by the 1995 agreement (see appendix B, agreement LI2). Some obligations 
were also laid down. The government agreed to provide the parties with information on draft 
laws concerning labour, social and economic issues and to submit them for discussion in the 
TCRL (ibid: § 3.1.1). The advisory status of this council was strengthened in another point 
where the government agreed to record discussion conclusions from the TCRL in the 
explanatory papers to the draft laws submitted to the Seimas (ibid: § 3.1.3). The central 
organisations of employers and trade unions undertook the obligation not to initiate any 
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collective disputes or other actions on issues, where the government had fulfilled the 
obligations it had engaged to in tripartite agreements (ibid: § 3.2). The social partners further 
agreed to develop the structure of the tripartite co-operation both on state level by establishing 
commissions under the TCRL, and in the counties and municipalities (ibid: § 6). They also 
agreed to cooperate in making preparations for the membership in the EU and to encourage 
the organisations of employees and employers to conclude collective agreements (ibid: § 7, 
8). Not at least they agreed to sign a tripartite agreement on the 1st of December every year 
including minimum hourly and monthly wage rates, the level of tax-free income and other 
urgent issues in the labour, social and economic fields (ibid: § 4).  
 
By October 2002 the social partners had still not concluded any of the annual tripartite 
agreements they had agreed to conclude in 1999. In October 2000 the four trade union 
organisations and the two employers organisations agreed to propose to the government to 
increase the level of tax-free income from 214 Litas to 320 Litas from the 1st of January 2001 
(Lithuanian Ministry of Social Security and Labour 2001: 57). The next section deals with 
agreements about the level of minimum wage, tax-free income and unemployment benefits. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Agreements on the level of minimum wage, tax-free income and unemployment benefits 
 
Agreements about the minimum legal wage have been prioritised by trade unions in all three 
countries (Interview Taliga 01.11.01, Pivoras 19.11.01, Jaunzeme 14.12.01). According to the 
Law on Wages ratified by the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania in September 
1991, the state should set the minimum hourly and monthly wage. These minimum rates had 
the force of law and were valid to all employers and employees in the country (see appendix 
E, Law l: Article 2). The Wages Law of the Republic of Lithuania ratified by Seimas in 
March 1999, maintained this principle (Ministry of Social Security and Labour 2000: 57; see 
also appendix E, Law m: Article 2). The Estonian Wages Act entering into force in March 
1994, provided that the government established the minimum wage rates and that wages 
below these rates were illegal (see appendix E, Law a: § 2.7) Article 84 in the Latvian wage 
law, which was valid from before independence until June 2002, established minimum 
monthly wage rates valid for all employees and employers in Latvia (Ministry of Welfare 
2001: 14). According to the new Labour Law, the Government shall determine the minimum 
monthly salary within the scope of normal working time as well as minimum hourly wage 
rates. Wages below these rates are illegal (interview of Ieva Jaunzeme 14.12.01; see also 
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appendix E, Law g: Section 61: § 1-2). This means that the minimum legal wage rates were 
valid for all employers and employees in all three countries in both the time periods before 
1996 and 2002, and not only for members in the trade unions and employers’ organisations.  
 
In Estonia the minimum wage was included already in the Framework Agreement on Social 
Guarantees between the CETU and the government of 1991. In this agreement, the 
government undertook to adjust the subsistence level on 125 Roubles a month from the 1st of 
January 1990 according to the cost-of-living index (see appendix B, agreement E1: § 2.2). At 
the same time the government set the minimum wage for employees with higher education 
and corresponding work to 300 Roubles a month, and for employees with an education level 
junior college (US) or lower, to 200 Roubles a month (ibid: § 2.6). The government further 
guaranteed at least three weeks holyday a year (ibid: § 2.10). In the Framework Agreement on 
Social Guarantees of 1992, the social partners agreed to initiate bargaining about wages and 
the level of tax-free income every month, within five days after the Statistical Office of 
Estonia had published the cost-of-living index (see appendix B, agreement E2: § 1). The need 
for frequent bargaining should be understood in the context of the very high inflation.  
 
The tripartite ‘Agreement on major questions concerning social guarantees of 1993’ 
maintained the commitments to bargain about minimum wage and to take the rise of prises as 
well as the economical situation of the country into consideration when stipulating the 
minimum wage. The social partners agreed to conclude a national agreement on wages in 
1994  (see appendix B, agreement E3: § 1, 2). Still, no agreement on adjusting the minimum 
wage was concluded in 1994. The reason was that the CETU withdrew from the negotiations 
because the government had not fulfilled an earlier agreement to increase the unemployment 
benefits. Instead the CETU and the CEIE concluded a bilateral agreement on minimum wage, 
valid for the employees in the enterprises of the members of CEIE (Eamets and Philips 1998: 
52). From 1995 to 2001 the social partners concluded agreements on adjusting the minimum 
legal rates of wages per hour and per month for full-time posts annually (see appendix B, 
agreement E4, E6, E9, E10, E12, E13, E15). In the agreement of 2001 the social partners 
stipulated the minimum rates, valid from the 1st of January 2002 (see appendix B, agreement 
E15: § 1). In addition, they agreed to establish the method for stipulating minimum wage for 
the period 2003 – 2008, according to the principles laid down in an agreement between the 
CETU and the CEEI of August 2001 (ibid: § 2). Here the CETU and the CEEI had agreed that 
the minimum wage should constitute 40% of the average wage by 2008 (interview Kriis 
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07.12.01). This means that from 2003 to 2008 the legal minimum wage rates will be settled 
without involvement from the government, according to already established principles. The 
rates will still have the force of law and be valid for all employees and employers in the 
country. This means that Estonia is changing from tripartite to bipartite basis of stipulating 
minimum wage. 
 
The level of tax-free income and unemployment benefits have been stipulated in tripartite 
agreements in Estonia. In ‘The agreement on adjusting minimum wage and unemployment 
benefits’ of 1995, unemployment benefits were set to 240 EEK a month from the 1st of 
January 1995 (see appendix B, agreement E4: Enclosure § 2). This amounted to 35% of the 
monthly minimum wage rate for full time posts. Later the government raised the 
unemployment benefit, and in 2002 it was on 400 EEK a month. This amounted to 28% of the 
minimum subsistence level of first quarter 2002 (Estonian Ministry of social Affairs web c, 
21.10.02). The ‘Agreement on minimum wage and tax-free minimum’ of 1998 was the first 
agreement about the level of tax-free income. Here the government agreed to set 800 EEK a 
month as the limit for tax-free income (see appendix B, agreement E10: § 4). The tax-free 
income amounted to 64 per cent of the 1999 minimum wage rate for full time posts per 
month. In the ‘Agreement on minimum wage and tax-free income’ of 1999, the social 
partners declared as a common goal to raise the limit of tax-free income to the same as the 
amount of the minimum wage (see appendix B, agreement E12: § 3a). The government 
undertook to propose to Riigikogu to set the limit for tax-free income to 9600 EEK a year or 
800 EEK a month from the 1st of January 2000 (ibid: § 3b). This amounted to 57 per cent of 
the 2000 minimum wage rates for full time posts. In the same agreement the government 
committed itself to include a limit for tax-free income on 12 000 EEK a year (1000 EEK a 
month) in the draft of the state budget for 2001 (ibid: § 3c). The government further declared 
its intention to connect the limit of tax-free income to number of children of the families (ibid: 
§ 3c). In 2001, the trade union organisations were still trying to work out an agreement to 
raise the level of tax-free income in 2002, but the government wanted to delay this until 2003 
because the local governments with very tight budgets (Interview Taliga 01.11.01).  
 
In Latvia, the Tripartite Consultative Council of Employers, the State and Trade Unions 
(TCCESTU) had the practice of setting the legal minimum wage level before 1999 (Blasum 
1999: 216). As mentioned, the FTUCL and the LEC agreed to hold quarterly consultations 
about indexation of the minimum wage rates in 1996. Still in December 2001, the FTUCL and 
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the LEC had not held any of these meetings. In 1999 the LEC and the FTUCL concluded a 
bipartite agreement, which raised the minimum wage from 50 to 60 Lats a months for 
employees in full-time posts. This agreement was only valid for employers and employees 
represented by the two organisations until the new Labour Law was in force from June 2002. 
At this time, the new rates achieved legal status and became valid for all employees and 
employers in Latvia (interview Jaunzeme 14.12.02).   
 
The Lithuanian government set the minimum monthly rate for full time posts to 70 Roubles in 
January 1991. This rate was adjusted several times a year until the government stipulated it to 
430 Litas a month in June 1998, after the social partners had agreed about this in the TCRL 
(Statistics Lithuania 2001 a: 16, table 1.4; interview Petrylaite & Guobaite 29.11.01). In the 
‘Agreement on Tripartite Co-operation’ of 1999, the social partners agreed to sign a tripartite 
agreement every year on minimum wage rates, the level of tax-free income and other urgent 
labour, social and economic issues (see appendix B, agreement LI2: § 4).  Still in October 
2002, the partners had not succeeded to conclude any of these agreements. In 1999 the 
unfavourable economic situation and constraints of the state budget following the Russian 
financial crisis of 1998 stood in the way of raising the minimum wage (Ministry of Social 
Security and Labour 2001: 57). In 2001 the trade union side proposed in the TCRL to raise 
the minimum wage to 450 Litas, but the proposal was rejected. Especially the business 
organisation representing smaller and medium size enterprises were against a rise in the 
minimum wage, stating that the consequence would be a need to reduce the number of 
employees  (ibid: 57; Interview Zickute 27.11.01). Instead the four central trade union 
organisations and the two central employers organisations signed a bipartite agreement in 
October 2000, where they agreed to propose to the Government to increase the level of tax-
free income from 214 Litas to 320 Litas per month from 1 January 2001. Still the government 
only raised the tax-free minimum to 250 Litas per month. The Government will raise this 
amount to 290 Litas a month from January 2003  (Ministry of Social Security and Labour 
2001: 57; ibid web c, 17.10.02; interview Pivoras, 19.11.01 and Zickute, 27.11.01).  
 
Out of all this we can conclude that the process of concluding tripartite agreements on state 
level about the rates of the minimum legal wage since 1995 has been far more continuous in 
Estonia than in Latvia and Lithuania. The Estonian agreements have also included the level of 
the tax-free income and the unemployment benefits. 
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Table 5.2.4 presents the legal minimum rates per month for full time posts (40 hours per 
week) in each of the countries.    
Table 5.2.4: Minimum monthly gross wages for full time posts  
 
Year Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
 In 
current 
US$38 
% of 
minimum 
subsistence 
level (first 
quarter) 
% of 
average 
monthly 
gross 
salaries 
In 
current 
US$ 
% of 
minimum 
subsistence 
level (first 
quarter) 
% of 
average 
monthly 
gross 
salaries 
In 
current 
US$ 
% of 
minimum 
subsistence 
level (first 
quarter) 
% of 
average 
monthly 
gross 
salaries39 
1991 (200 
Roubles) 
      70% 22% 
1992        105% 29% 
1993    19 33% 27%  106% 22% 
1994    39 43% 31% 13 109% 16% 
1995    53 44% 31% 21 142% 20% 
1996 57   64 48% 36% 53 233% 33% 
1997 61 84%  24% 65 48% 32% 75 300% 44% 
1998 78 95% 27% 71 51% 32% 108 358% 47% 
1999 85 104% 28% 85 60% 36% 108 344% 42% 
2000 83 117% 29% 82 59% 33% 108 344% 41% 
2001 92 123% 29% 80 58% 30%  108 344% 43% 
2002 111 131% 32% 97 67%  37%  117 344% 39%  
 
Sources: Various40     
                                                 
38
 All calculations to US$ are based on the average currency rates of each year (see IMF web, 28.04.03).   
 
39
 The percentage is calculated from average gross wages and salaries in public sector in 1991, 1992 and 1993. 
After that it is calculated from average gross wages and salaries of the whole economy. The 1991 and 2002 
values refer April and the first quarter. The other values refer to January. 
 
40
 Sources: Estonian minimum wage rates: Agreement E1, E4, E6, E9, E10, E12, E13 and E15 (see appendix).  
Estonian minimum subsistence level and average monthly gross salaries 1997 – 2002: Statistical Office of 
Estonia 2001d: 4, 2002a: 4 and 2002b: 3. Latvian minimum wage rates, and as percentage of minimum 
subsistence level and average monthly gross salary 1993 - 2000: Ministry of Welfare 2001: 14, table 3.3. Latvian 
minimum wage rates 2001 - 2002: Interview with Jaunzeme 14.12.01.  Latvian minimum subsistence level 2001 
– 2002: Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia web a, 04.05.03. Latvian average monthly gross salaries 2001 – 
2002:  Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia web b, 04.05.03. Lithuanian minimum wage rates 1991 - 2000:  
Statistics Lithuania 2001a: 16, table 1.4. As a percentage of average monthly gross salaries 1991 - 2000: Ibid: 
17, table 1.6. Minimum subsistence level 1991 –2000: Ibid: 14, table 1.1. Minimum subsistence level 2001 – 
2002: Ministry of Social Security and Labour web a, 04.05.03. Minimum wage rates 2001 – 2002: Ibid. Average 
monthly gross salaries 2002: Statistics Lithuania web a, 04.05.03. Average monthly gross salaries 2001: 
Statistics Lithuania web b, 11.04.03.  
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As mentioned, the social partners in Estonia concluded tripartite agreements on adjustments 
of minimum legal wage every year from 1995 to 2001.  In contrast, the social partners in 
Lithuania had still in 2002 not succeeded to raise the minimum legal wage rates, latest 
stipulated in 1998. Hence the minimum legal wage rates had remained unchanged on 430 
Litas per month since 1999. Table 5.2.4 shows that in spite of this, the monthly minimum 
wage in Estonia for 2002 was far smaller measured as a share of the national subsistence 
minimum (131%) than was the monthly minimum wage rates in Lithuania (344%) the same 
year. This shows that many agreements do not necessarily mean better conditions for 
employees. Latvia had the clearly lowest minimum wage rates measured as a share of the 
national subsistence minimum. There these rates increased from an amount on 51% of the 
subsistence minimum in 1998 to 67% of the subsistence minimum in 2002. Also in 1997, 
minimum wage measured as a share of the national subsistence minimum, was lowest in 
Latvia (48 %), second in Estonia (84%) and clearly highest in Lithuania (300 %).   
 
In Estonia the legal minimum wage was 1400 EEK a month for full time posts in 2000. 11% 
of all full time male employees and 12% of all full time female employees had a salary 
between 1001 and 1500 EEK. No other 500 EEK wage interval covered a larger share of both 
male and female employees than this interval (Statistical Office of Estonia 2001a: 14 - 15, 
table 2.2 and 18 - 19, table 2.4).  When the minimum wage was raised to 1600 EEK from the 
1st of January 2001, this should affect all of the employees in this wage groups, unless the law 
was broken.  In Latvia the wage system in public sector is connected to the minimum wage 
rates. Because of this the government and the employers have been against raising the 
minimum wage in the discussions in the National Tripartite Co-operation Council. According 
to the General Director of the LEC, constraints of the state budget made it difficult even to 
fulfil the wage obligations connected to the minimum wage of rates of 1999 (interview 
Jaunzeme 14.12.01). According to a survey of the Central Statistical Bureau in October 2000, 
78 700 employees or 13% of the employees in Latvia had a monthly average gross salary 
equal to the amount of the minimum monthly salary on 50 Lats. 69 600 of these worked in the 
private sector (Ministry of Welfare of the Republic of Latvia 2001a: 15). The raise in 
minimum wage to 60 Lat from June 2002 should affect all of these, unless the law was 
broken. The minimum wage rates have been closer to the average gross wages in Lithuania 
than in Latvia and Estonia. Therefore I expect that increase of minimum wage affected at least 
as many, and probably more, employees in Lithuania than in Estonia and Latvia. 
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Other agreements 
 
As mentioned, the ‘Agreement on tripartite partnership’ of 1995 established the Tripartite 
Council of the Republic of Lithuania (TCRL). The ‘Agreement on tripartite co-operation’ of 
1999 amongst others dealt with the mandate and advisory status of this council. I have also 
mentioned that the by-laws of the Latvian National Tripartite Co-operation Council (NTCC) 
and its sub-councils in Latvia were signed as tripartite agreements. The Estonian ‘Agreement 
on Development of Participatory Democracy’ of 1996 can be compared to the Lithuanian 
agreement of 1999. The Lithuanian social partners agreed to discuss draft laws on social, 
economic and labour issues in the TCRL upon the initiative of one of the partners, and that 
the comments of the council should follow the draft law to the Seimas in the explanatory 
letter (see appendix B, agreement LI2: § 3.1.3). The Estonian social partners amongst others 
agreed that the government should present draft laws concerning labour and social questions 
to the central organisations of employees and employers, for them to present their proposals 
and remarks. These remarks should be included in the explanatory letter following the draft 
law to Riigikogu (see appendix B, agreement E5: § 1.1 - 1.2). The partners further agreed to 
establish a council for tripartite consultations (ibid: § 3). This point was fulfilled by the 
foundation of the Social and Economic Council in 1999. Finally a tripartite workgroup should 
compare the legislation of the ILO and the Council of Europe and the norms of the EU 
regarding democracy and social partnership at enterprise level (ibid: § 4). 
 
In June 1997 the Estonian social partners concluded a tripartite agreement on establishing a 
guarantee fund covering payment of salaries, holyday remuneration and mandatory health 
insurance in case of employer’s insolvency (see appendix B, agreement E7: § 1). The same 
month, the social partners agreed upon the method of calculating the subsistence minimum 
and the composition of the subsistence minimum bag of goods per person per month (see 
appendix B, agreement E8). This was an important measure because social aid was calculated 
with basis in the subsistence minimum level. From 1997 the Statistical Office of Estonia 
published the level of subsistence minimum each quarter. The Estonian social partners agreed 
to establish tripartite employment councils connected to the 16 regional employment offices 
in August 1999 (see appendix B, agreement E11). The employment councils were being 
formed at each of the 16 regional employment offices from 2000, consisting of three 
representatives from each of the partners. An EU Phare program of the period 2001 –2003, 
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supported the training of the members of the councils financially (see appendix F, b: 3 and 8; 
Estonian Labour Market Board web, 12.11.01).  
 
The social partners in Estonia concluded a tripartite agreement on the procedures of 
appointing the public conciliator in October 2001 (see appendix B, agreement E16). The 
public conciliator and his office had existed at the Ministry of Social Affairs since 1995. 
According to the agreement the public conciliator was to be appointed on the basis of an 
agreement between the Ministry of Social Affairs, the CETU, the EPEUA and the CEEI (ibid: 
§ 1). The agreement further provided that the central organisations of employees and 
employers should nominate their candidates for every second three years period (ibid: § 2).  
 
‘The Agreement to speed up the work to set the level of qualifications of employment seekers 
in accordance with the requirements of the employment market for the period 2001 – 2004’ of 
December 2000, was the most extensive tripartite agreement on state level concluded in 
Estonia by the end of 2001. The Ministers of Education, Commerce and Social Affairs, the 
chairman of CETU, the general directors of the CEEI and the Estonian Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry  (ECCI) signed the agreement. The partners stated that the main aim 
of the agreement was to ensure that the labour force in Estonia was highly qualified and 
competitive in an open employment market (see appendix B, agreement E14). Out of this it is 
attempting to conclude that the social partners were preparing themselves to meet the 
requirements of a future accession to the EU and the common market. That the social partners 
unite forces in a small country to better compete and defend their interests in an international 
market, suits perfect to the idea of Katzenstein about why small countries with open 
economies tend to establish corporative arrangements. The agreement included several 
obligations for the partners, amongst others related to the development of a national 
qualification system for employees, ensuring sufficient capacity at educational institutions, 
vocational training and re-education, developing regional training centres and creating a youth 
friendly labour market (ibid: Enclosure). Appendix B is a table summarising all the 
agreements in each of the countries by the year they were concluded.  
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Conclusion 
 
To conclude what combination of country and period scored highest on system of tripartite 
bargaining at state level, I will attach most weight to power, second most importance to 
continuity and least weight to broadness.   
 
Power 
 
The first part of this chapter showed that Lithuania had most tripartite councils operating at 
state level in the end of 1995. Latvia came second, while Estonia at that time had only one 
tripartite council. Lithuania was also the only country with tripartite councils with decision-
making power at that time. The State Social Insurance Fund Council (SSIFC), which was 
established in 1991, was the highest body of the SSIF. This means that Lithuania had a more 
powerful system of tripartite councils than Latvia and Estonia by the end of 1995. The 
situation had changed by the end of 2001. Lithuania had still most tripartite councils in 
number. On the other side, the Latvian National Tripartite Co-operation Council and its four 
sub-councils in Latvia was unique in the three countries, because the decisions made in this 
council were binding to all of the parties including the government, according to the by-law. 
The comparable councils in Lithuania and Estonia, the Tripartite Council of the Republic of 
Lithuania (TCRL) and the Social and Economic Council (SEC) were only advisory. The 
radical liberalisation of main parts of the labour legislation in 2001 without approval from the 
partners in the TCRL, clearly disclosed the advisory character of this council. The fact that a 
lot of members in the Social and Economic Council of Estonia in 2001 had quitted going to 
the meetings because they could not see any significant results of them, is an indication of 
impotence of this council. The fact that three ministers were regular members of the Latvian 
NTCC main council, and that the Prime Minister several times attended the meetings as an 
observant, underscores the uniqueness of this council. In contrast, the Estonian SEC had only 
one representative from the ministries in 2001, in addition to the general secretary of the 
Ministry of Social Affairs who was chairman. This was an advisor of the Ministry of Finance. 
The other government appointees were external experts, and their mandate was very free 
(Interview Raul Eamets 06.12.01). So the government was not really meeting in this council, 
which did not even have an own secretariat. Out of this it is my judgement that Latvia had a 
more powerful system of tripartite councils than Estonia and Lithuania, after the Latvian 
NTCC started to meet in the beginning of 1999. 
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The Estonian social partners had committed themselves to far more specific obligations 
through tripartite agreements than their Latvian and Lithuanian counterparts. This means that 
Estonia had the most powerful state level tripartite bargaining through written agreements in 
both periods. It is difficult to compare the total power of tripartite bargaining at state level 
between the countries because the Estonian social partners channelled the most important 
bargaining through tripartite agreements, while in Latvia most power was vested in the 
National Tripartite Co-operation Council and its sub-councils. Because of the unique position 
of the Latvian NTCC and the clearly more specific obligations laid down in tripartite 
agreements in the latest period in Estonia than in the other countries in any of the periods, I 
have come to the following conclusion: Estonia in the latest period from the beginning of 
1996 to the end of 2001 and Latvia in the latest period, after the NTCC started to work in the 
beginning of 1999, had a more powerful system of tripartite bargaining at state level than the 
rest of the combinations of countries and time periods.   
 
Continuity 
 
Far more plentiful and obligatory tripartite agreements were concluded in Estonia than in 
Latvia and Lithuania in both the periods before 1996 and 2002. Especially in the early period 
Estonia distinguished herself from Latvia and Lithuania. The social partners in Latvia had still 
not concluded any tripartite agreements on state level by the end of 1995. The Lithuanian 
social partners had concluded only one tripartite agreement on state level by the same time. In 
contrast, the social partners in Estonia had concluded three tripartite agreements on state level 
by the end of 1995, in addition to the bipartite agreement between the government and the 
CETU of February 1991. These included specific obligations to the different partners. The 
social partners in Estonia concluded 12 tripartite agreements on state level from the beginning 
of 1996 to the end of 2001. In the same period the social partners in Latvia concluded three 
and the social partners in Lithuania concluded one tripartite agreement at state level. Estonia 
also distinguished herself with regards to state level bargaining about the minimum legal 
wage. The social partners in Estonia concluded an agreement on adjusting the minimum wage 
every year from 1995 to 2001.  In 2001 the three partners agreed to take a bipartite agreement 
from the same year between the EEC and the CETU as basis for establishing the principles for 
adjusting the minimum wage on a bipartite basis in the period 2003 – 2008. While the social 
partners in Estonia had settled the principles for adjusting the minimum wage until 2008, the 
state level bargaining about minimum wage had been much more disrupted in Latvia and 
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Lithuania. In 2002 the Lithuanian social partners had still not managed to reach agreements 
on adjustment of minimum wage, even though they had agreed to do so annually in the co-
operation agreement of 1999. Consequently the minimum legal wage in Lithuania had 
remained unchanged since 1998. In Latvia in 2002 the FTUCL and the LEC had still not 
started the quarterly consultations about indexation of minimum wage that they agreed to 
initiate in the bipartite ‘Agreement on the Principles of Social Partnership’ of 1996. This 
means that Estonia scored highest on continuity of tripartite bargaining in both time periods.  
 
Broadness 
 
Lithuania had five tripartite councils operating at state level in the end of 1995, while the 
number of such councils was three in Latvia and one in Estonia. In the end of 2001 Lithuania 
had ten tripartite councils at state level, compared to one main council with four sub-councils 
in Latvia and five councils in Estonia. This indicates that Lithuania had the broadest system of 
tripartite councils at state level in both time periods. 
 
Because Estonia in the whole latest period and Latvia from 1999 scored highest on power, 
and Estonia in both periods scored highest on continuity - I have come to the following 
conclusion. Estonia and Latvia scored higher on the variable measuring the system of 
tripartite bargaining on state level than Lithuania by the end of 2001. Still one should not 
forget that Lithuania had the largest number of tripartite councils operating on state level in 
both periods. The conclusion is summarised in table 5.2.5:  
Table 5.2.5: Power, continuity and broadness of tripartite bargaining at state level 
 
 Estonia 
1991 - 95 
Estonia 
1996 - 01 
Latvia  
1991- 95  
Latvia 
1996 -01 
Lithuania 
1991 - 95 
Lithuania 
1996 -01 
Power Lower Higher Lower Higher Lower Lower 
Continuity  Higher Higher Lower Lower Lower Lower 
Broadness Lower Lower Lower Lower Higher Higher 
Total  Lower Higher Lower Higher Lower Lower 
 
The Latvian total score refers to the time after the NTCC started to work in the beginning of 
1999. 
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5.3: Conclusion: An attempt to compare the levels of 
democratic corporatism 
 
Here is my attempt to compare the level of democratic corporatism out of this chapter’s 
elaboration of the four components of this concept. I have divided the countries in the two 
periods into a dichotomy between relatively high and relatively low level of democratic 
corporatism. I have given the third variable, of power, continuity and broadness of tripartite 
bargaining at state level through tripartite agreements and councils, most weight in the 
comparison. I consider this variable as a direct measure of the strength of the structures of 
corporatist arrangements at state level. I view democratic corporatism as a phenomenon, 
which does not necessarily rely upon broad membership in trade unions. It can also start as 
elite co-operation on state level. Because of this, I have given membership rates in trade 
unions and coverage of employers’ organisations only secondary importance in defining 
democratic corporatism. The same applies to centralisation of the systems of interest group 
organisations. It is far from obvious that corporatist arrangements are weaker, where the 
number of central organisations is high. The situation in a number of Western European 
countries, where corporatist arrangements function well with several central trade union 
organisations, indicates this. Table 5.3.1 sums up the final results of the comparison:  
Table 5.3.1: Level of democratic corporatism 
 
Estonia  
1991 - 95 
Estonia  
1996 - 01 
Latvia  
1991- 95  
Latvia  
1996 -01 
Lithuania 
1991 - 95 
Lithuania 
1996 -01 
Lower Higher Lower  Higher Lower Lower 
 
My comparison is strictly internal and dichotomous. The conclusion is: Estonia and Latvia 
were closer to a democratic corporatist model in the latest period than all the other cases. The 
timing of the latest period is a bit misleading for Latvia. The country did not have a higher 
level of democratic corporatism until the National Tripartite Co-operation Council started to 
work in the beginning of 1999. 
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6: Factors that may have influenced the development of 
corporatist arrangements at state level 
 
Chapter 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 deals with factors that may have influenced the development of 
corporatist arrangements at state level in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In chapter 6.1, I will 
treat the variable, ‘openness of economy’. According to Katzenstein, openness of economy 
was a very important explanatory factor to the origin and development of democratic 
corporatism in small Western European countries.  
 
The four variables examined in chapter 6.2 are characteristics of the government part in 
tripartite corporative arrangements. Here I will consider the existence of bloc politics 
combined with shifts of all government parties simultaneously, time in government of the two 
longest staying government parties and percentage of time of social democratic or socialist 
parties in government. This part of the chapter includes a historical elaboration of the 
development of cleavages between political parties, as well as of the government formations 
and government shifts in the three countries. In chapter 6.3 I will consider the variable of 
pressure from the international organisations the ILO and the EU on the development of 
labour legislation and corporatist arrangements in the three countries. 
 
6.1: Openness of economy  
 
According to Katzenstein, open economies and dependence on trade and foreign investments 
had serious implications for small Western European countries. Countries with open 
economies were forced to adapt to economical changes imposed to them by changes in the 
world economy. Because of this they needed to form strategies to live with these changes and 
to compensate for negative impact. To do this they needed consent and cooperation from the 
different economical sectors and the workers and employers. This developed into democratic 
corporatism (Katzenstein 1985: 87 - 88). In this section, I will measure the openness of the 
economies of the three countries in 1993 and 1995 in the first period and 1996, 2000 and 2001 
in the latest period. This will make it possible to consider whether different degrees of 
openness of the economy may explain the different levels of democratic corporatism.   
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I have measured openness of economy as the value of trade in proportion to the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP). Table 6.1.1 presents the results.   
   
Table 6.1.1: Openness of economy 
 
 Value of trade in goods as a proportion of GDP in 2000 (per cent)  
Year Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
1993  21 17  27 
1995 104 91 108 
1996 122 73 100 
2000 150 82 71 
2001 140 73 92 
 
Sources: The World Bank41  
 
Table 6.1.1 gives the sum of merchandise exports and imports, measured in current US 
Dollars, divided by the value of GDP in US Dollars. The table shows that Estonia had the 
clearly most open economy in 1996, 2000 and 2001, with the value of trade in goods that 
amounting to 122%, 150% and 140% of GDP. I have set the limit value of an open economy 
to trade in goods constituting more than 100% of GDP. This means that Estonia in 2001, 
2000, 1996 and 1995, and Lithuania in 1995 had open economies. The other combinations of 
countries and year did not have open economies.  This shows that only Estonia had an open 
economy in the latest period from 1996 to the end of 2001. Lithuania and Estonia had open 
economies in the end of the earliest period from 1991 to the end of 1995. 
 
                                                 
41
 Sources: Data for 1996, 2000 and 2001: The World Bank Group web a, b and c, 07.05.03. Data for 1995: 
World Bank 1997: 15 –16, table 1.3. Data for 1993: World Bank 1995: 166 –167, table 3 and 186 –187, table 13. 
Data for 1993 are based on own calculations to proportion of GDP values.   
 101
6.2: Governments   
 
This chapter deals with the third party in tripartite social dialogue - the government. First, I 
will set up my four hypothesises about the effect of government characteristics on corporatist 
arrangements. Then, I will elaborate cleavages between political parties. After all, political 
parties form the governments in all three countries. The elaboration of political cleavages will 
be a summary, and at best a synthesis, of the political cleavages that other authors have 
identified. After this, I will analyse the government characteristics during two time periods. 
The first period lasts from new governments took over after the latest popular front supported 
governments resigned, in 1992 in Estonia and Lithuania and in 1993 in Latvia, to the 31st of 
December 1995. I expect government characteristics in this period to have an effect on the 
corporatist arrangements in the period before 1996. The second period will be the whole 
period from the latest popular front supported governments resigned in 1992 and 1993 to the 
31st of December 2001. I expect government characteristics in this period to have influence on 
the corporatist arrangements in the period from 1996 to the end of 2001. In the end of the 
chapter, I have presented the values on the three government related variables of all three 
countries in both the periods in a simple table.  
 
I will also write some words about the government shift in January 2002 in Estonia and the 
shift of government that followed after the elections for the Latvian Saeima in October 2002. 
Even though these events occurred after the periods of my research of tripartite arrangements, 
they do also tell something about the character of the politics before the end of 2001. I will 
however only employ these later events as descriptions, and I will not include them when I 
calculate the scores of the cases on the measurable government related variables.  
 
Analysing 36 democracies worldwide, Arend Lijphart found a strong correlation between 
interest group pluralism and the frequency of minimal winning one-party governments 
(Lijphart 1999: 244). I expect high frequency of one-party majority government to be 
unfavourable to democratic corporatism, if replacements of the government party occur. The 
reason for this is that it may lead to a situation where a government totally alters the 
corporative arrangements initiated by the previous government, while the former government 
parties cannot do anything about this because they are in minority in opposition and generally 
excluded from power. Replacements of a coalition government with another coalition or one- 
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party government, which is ideologically distant from the former government parties, can also 
lead to this situation.  
 
Therefore I put forward the hypothesis that existence of bloc politics combined with radical 
shifts of governments has negative effect on the level of democratic corporatism. Bloc politics 
means that a clear-cut left-right political cleavage combines with institutionalised government 
alliances, which do not encompass both left and right parties. Coalition governments between 
the same parties are likely to be repeated, while coalition governments between parties on 
opposite sides of the left–right cleavage are not likely to appear at all. Radical shifts of 
governments mean replacement of all government parties, when all the parties in the old 
government are on the different side of the main political cleavages than the parties in the new 
government. 
             
I will also include another similar variable, which is the living time of the longest living 
government party. I define long living time in government as longer than an election period of 
four years. This means that all three countries must have low score on this variable in the 
period before 1996, because of the short time lap since the last popular front supported 
governments resigned in 1992 or 1993. 
 
The bottom-up approach considers democratic corporatism as a product of mobilisation of the 
working class through strong socialist parties and labour movements. Therefore this chapter 
also deals with the length of the periods of social democratic or socialist parties in 
government. Hence it will be possible to consider whether differences in presence of social 
democrat or socialist parties in government can explain the different levels of democratic 
corporatism between the countries in the periods before 1996 and 2002. To compare the 
length of the periods of social democratic or socialist parties in government, I will calculate 
the percentage of time such parties have been in government in each of the periods in each of 
the countries. A country will be assigned the factor of long time in government of social 
democrat or socialist parties in a period if social democratic or/ and socialist parties have been 
in government in 50% or more of the days in the whole period.   
 
In this way, I will test three hypothesises related to governments in the comparative design in 
chapter 7. The first is that existence of bloc politics combined with radical shifts of 
governments explains low level of democratic corporatism. The second is that long living 
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time of at least one government party explains high level of democratic corporatism. The final 
hypothesis is that long time of social democratic or socialist parties in government explain 
high level of democratic corporatism. The two first hypothesises are to some extent 
overlapping. High frequency of radical government shifts rule out the possibility of having 
parties staying long in government. 
 
The development of party cleavages 
 
Sartori has noted that social interest in democratic societies do not automatically align 
themselves into perfect cleavage structures. Such interests need to be translated into stable 
partisan attachment by politicising and organising voters (Sartori 1969: 89) This process 
needs time and is dependent on the skills of the political elites. Therefore parties in 
transitional democracies do not match as easily with distinct societal cleavages as those in 
established democracies (Pettai and Kreuzer 1999: 165). Studying the period from regaining 
independence to 1998, Pettai and Kreuzer found that the party systems in the three countries 
were still only weakly consolidated (ibid: 159). A high degree of candidate turnover reflected 
generally weak party organisations, where candidate recruitment was weakly institutionalised 
and wide open to entrepreneurial newcomers (ibid: 160 – 162).   Large number of parties 
competing in the elections and numerous electoral blocs indicated fragmented party systems 
(162 – 165).  
 
Nevertheless, several authors have identified emerging party cleavages in the three countries. 
In this section I will present some of these. First, I will present the model of political 
cleavages, which Pettai and Kreuzer developed in 1999 to describe the party systems in all the 
three countries. Then I will consider whether Pettai and Kreuzers model can illuminate 
Steen’s findings on party members self placement on the left – right scale in elite surveys 
conducted in 1993 – 94. After this I will present the individual models of political cleavages, 
identified by Lagerspetz and Vogt, Smith-Sivertsen and Zeruolis in Berglund, Hellên and 
Aarebrot (1998). I will complement these works by including data on parliamentary elections 
until 2003. Finally, I will attempt to draw some kind of synthesis from all these works to 
identify some similarities and differences of political cleavages between the three countries. 
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Pettai and Kreuzer found that two primary42 party cleavages had emerged in all three 
countries.  The first cleavage centred on the pace and extent of the market reforms. On this 
cleavage parties advocating comprehensive and immediate market reforms opposed parties, 
arguing for more gradual and limited economical changes and for greater attentions to their 
social costs. The second major cleavage placed more nationalistic and conservative social 
views against more liberal and secular ones. In Estonia and Latvia, the second cleavage was 
dominant in the first elections, and the question about citizenship was essential. The Estonian 
National Independence Party and the Latvian For Fatherland and Freedom mobilised against a 
liberal citizenship law. In the next elections the cleavage on economic policies emerged. By 
1997 a party system, structured around three poles, had emerged in Estonia, encompassing 
liberal market reformers, nationalist market reformers and cosmopolitan moderate market 
reformers. By the same time a party system including these poles and supplemented by an 
ethnic minority pole had emerged in Latvia. In the second election for Seimas in Lithuania in 
1996 the main difference was between conservative and nationalist versus cosmopolitan 
views. The Homeland Union and the Christian Democrats stressed a return to more 
conservative social values and the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party and the Social 
Democratic Party were more secular and progressive. According to Pettai and Kreuzer, the 
parties had much more similar views on economic policies. Most politicians favoured a 
somewhat cautious approach to market reforms (Pettai and Kreuzer 1999: 165 -171).   
 
Writing in 1996, Arter concluded that three issue cleavages could be identified between the 
parties in the campaigns for the 1995 elections; the market against the state, countryside 
against the towns and the Russian speaking against the Estonian speaking population (Arter 
1996: 232).   Writing in 1998 Mikko Lagerspetz and Henry Vogt identified the ethnic 
cleavage between indigenous Estonians and Russian speakers as the most important cleavage 
in the Estonian society (Lagerspetz and Vogt 1998: 72). Due to the language requirements for 
voting in parliamentary elections, only small interest parties for the Russian minority existed. 
Thus the ethnic cleavage did not manifest itself in the party system, and the only major 
cleavage that was reflected in the party system was between the ‘old guard’ and ‘young 
professionals’ (ibid: 71). Lagerspetz and Vogt observed a large degree of consensus between 
                                                 
42
 They also identified two secondary cleavages. The first centred around differences between urban and rural 
interests, while the second was based upon a split between old times, communist era politicians and newer 
guards of political entrepreneurs (ibid: 166).   
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the political parties about important questions of economic policy, as the fixed exchange rate 
of the Estonian Kroon, the need to keep the budget balanced and the political orientation 
towards the west (ibid: 75). The authors explained the absence of opposition against radical 
market reforms and political orientation towards the west by two causes. First, the potential 
opposition, existing of new unemployed in the Soviet period core industrial area in the 
northeast, were mainly Russian speaking non-citizens without right to vote in parliamentary 
elections. Second, one could apply the concept ‘extraordinary politics’ introduced by the 
Polish economist Balczerowich in 1993. According to his argument, great changes in the 
history of a country create a reserve of political capital at the disposal of government in 
charge. In the view of Lagerspetz and Vogt, Estonia was still in a stadium of extraordinary 
politics because of a perceived threat from Russia. For the sake of securing national 
independence and existence as a people, Estonians focused on cultural identity policies, while 
giving the governments a free hand to implement radical economic reform policies (ibid: 76 – 
77).  
 
Smith–Sivertsen argued that Latvia around 1997 had developed four basic political cleavages 
(Smith–Sivertsen 1998: 89). The independence cleavage sorted out the Equal Rights 
Movement and the Socialist Party as the successor parties of the anti- independence forces. 
Still in 2002 most parties were reluctant to cooperate with those parties. The other minority 
friendly party, the Harmony Party, was situated on the pro-independence side of the cleavage 
(ibid: 94 – 95). The ethnic inclusion/ exclusion cleavage was developed after October 1991, 
when immigrants from the Soviet period were legally defined as non-citizens. The cleavage 
was maintained when the first citizenship law was adopted in July 1994, with restrictive 
possibilities of obtaining citizenship through naturalisation (ibid: 95, Södergren 2000: 292). 
This cleavage united the minority friendly Harmony Party, the Equal Right’s Movement, the 
Russian Party and the Socialist Party, which from 1998 constituted the electoral alliance For 
Human Rights in a United Latvia (FHRUL) on the inclusion side. These parties especially 
opposed the nationalist For the Fatherland and Freedom and the Latvian National 
Independence Party (Latvia’s National Conservative Party from 1995), which merged into the 
For Fatherland and Freedom Union in 1997 (Bottolfs 2000: 96, Smith– Sivertsen 1998: 99). 
Latvia’s Way and some other parties were situated in between these poles (Smith – Sivertsen 
1998: 95). Comparing a 1993 opinion poll of party preference in the upcoming parliamentary 
elections with the Baltic Data House exit poll survey of the 1995 elections to Saeima, Smith–
Sivertsen however found that the minority cleavage was of declining importance. The ethnic 
 106
Latvians support to the parties on the nationalist pole had declined between the elections, and 
at the same time the support of Russian speakers to Latvian parties had increased (ibid: 101 – 
102). 
 
31% of the total population in Latvia lived in rural areas in 1995. The exit-poll survey data, 
which Smith–Sivertsen applied, suggested that an urban – rural political cleavage had 
developed by the time of the 1995 parliamentary elections. The electoral coalition of the 
Farmer’s Union and the Christian Democrats, as well as the Latvian Unity Party and the 
People’s Movement for Latvia had all majorities of their voters in rural constituencies. On the 
other side the minority friendly parties and the Latvian nationalist parties pulled 
disproportional large share of their votes from Riga and other urban constituencies. Latvia’s 
Way and the Democratic Party – Saimnieks were situated in the middle with a mix between 
urban and small town/ rural support (ibid 103 – 104). Finally, Smith–Sivertsen identified an 
emerging political cleavage between the disadvantaged strata versus the managing and 
occupational elites. The exit poll data from 1995 indicated that persons with low income were 
over-represented amongst the voters of the Harmony Party, the People’s Movement for Latvia 
(Siegerist Party), the Unity Party and the Farmer’s Union – Christian Democratic alliance. On 
the other side, voters who were better off preferred Latvia’s Way and For the Fatherland and 
Freedom.  
 
Smith–Sivertsen observed that the socio-economic cleavage was developing fast in elections 
to the city council of Riga. In the 1994 local elections, a majority of the voters opted for 
nationalist and minority friendly parties. In the 1997 elections parties focusing on socio-
economic issues pulled half of the votes, and the social democrats took the lead with 18.7% of 
the votes. At the same time the support for nationalist parties had declined sharply.  In the 
March 2001 local elections, three years after Smith-Sivertsen’s article, the Social Democratic 
Worker’s Party (SDWP) came out as the winner in Riga with 23% of the votes. For Human 
Right’s in a United Latvia (FHRUL) came out second, pulling 21% of the votes. Later the 
same month the mayor candidate of SDWP Gundars Bojars won the mayoral elections of the 
council, with support of the candidates from the FHRUL and the smaller Welfare Party and 
Labour Party. (TBT: 29.03.01 and 15.03.01). On the other side the success in Riga did not 
help the social democrats in the parliamentary elections in October 2002, the year after I 
ended my elaboration of tripartite arrangements at state level. Obtaining only 4% of the votes, 
SDWP lost all their 14 seats. In this election the newly established economically liberal and 
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anti corruption biased New Era Party turned out as the most popular, with 24% of the votes 
(PEE web b, 07.01.03). Out of this it seems like Smith-Sivertsen was right in pointing at 
ethnicity and the questions of state and nation building as cleavages of declining importance. 
Local election results for Riga’s city council indicated that a socio-economic cleavage is 
emerging where the nationality cleavage is declining. The 2002 elections for Saeima however 
suggested that this was so far not happening at the national level. Here it seemed like a 
cleavage between old parties in power and newcomers with an anti-corruption platform had 
been mobilising voters for the benefit of the newcomers.    
  
Writing in 1998, Zeruolis concluded that a two-bloc party system had developed in Lithuania. 
In a survey where 205 party members were asked to place the five main parties on a left – 
right scale, the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party (LSDP) and the Lithuanian Democratic 
Labour Party (LDLP) ended up on the left side while the Homeland Union (HU) and the 
Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party (LCDP) distinguished themselves on the right side. 
The Centre Union (CU) also ended up on the right side of the scale, but to the left of LCDP 
and HU (Zeruolis 1998: 129). By asking representatives of the five main parliamentary parties 
to specify whether 13 statement best suited ‘left wing’ or ‘right wing’ parties, Zeruolis found 
four statements, which most representatives in all the parties agreed to place on the left or 
right side on the scale. There was a cross-party agreement that ‘support of an increasing share 
of private capital in the economy’, ‘support of the idea that state regulation and economic 
redistribution curtail individual liberties and is inefficient’ and ‘orientation towards the West’ 
were characteristics of the right wing parties. There was the same agreement that ‘orientation 
towards the East’ was characteristic for the left wing parties. On the other side both the 
representatives of the right wing and the left wing parties claimed that their parties, and not 
the opposite wing parties, represented the interests of the poorest, the pensioners, the 
agricultural interests and the interests of the working class (ibid: 131, table 5.3).  
 
Table 6.2.1 on the next page refers to attitudes towards compromising with political 
opponents amongst Members of Parliament (MPs) and leaders of political parties/ 
movements. I have chosen these groups because they constitute the basis of governments and 
bloc politics.  
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Table 6.2.1: Attitudes of the MPs towards compromising with political opponents 93 - 94 
 
Totally and somewhat agrees with the statement: ‘To compromise with our political 
opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own interests’  
 Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
Members of Parliament 19% 20% 41% 
Leaders of political parties/ movements 14% 23% 42% 
 
Source: Steen 1997: 200, selected from table 11.2 
 
The data in table 6.2.1 are from interviews with MPs during the spring 1993 in Latvia, the late 
autumn 1993 in Lithuania and the spring 1994 in Estonia. The table reflects the answers of 61 
of the 101 members of the 1992-elected Estonian Riigikogu, 118 of the 175 members of the 
1990 elected Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia and 122 of the 141 members of the 
1992 elected Lithuanian Seimas (Steen 1997: 20, 200). The number of leaders of political 
parties and movements who responded were 29 in Estonia, 27 in Latvia and 30 in Lithuania. 
The large proportions represented mean that the answers should be very representative for all 
the MPs and the leaders of political parties and movements in each of the countries. The table 
shows that much larger shares of the MPs and the leaders of political parties and movements 
in Lithuania than in Latvia and Estonia were sceptical to compromises with political 
opponents. I consider this as a clear indication of bloc politics in Lithuania. The responses 
indicate that a larger share of the MPs and the leaders of political parties and movements in 
Lithuania had a bloc-politics mentality.  According to this mentality, it is harmful to one’s 
own interests to co-operate with political opponents in the other blocs. In Latvia and 
especially in Estonia, much smaller shares of the MPs and the leaders of political parties and 
movements were critical towards compromising with political opponents. My conclusion is 
that the attitudes of the political elites indicate a much clearer political cleavage in Lithuania 
than in Latvia and Estonia. This means that Lithuania had bloc politics if government 
formation reflected this cleavage in the form that government coalitions between parties on 
both side of the political cleavage did not appear.    
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Summing up the information about political cleavages, it seems like Lithuania had a clearer 
cut left – right divide between political parties than Estonia and Latvia. This meant that the 
parties in Lithuania were opposed to the same parties on a number of issues. This might lead 
to the situation where a party may find its allies only out of a small selection of ideological 
neighbours, while other parties are usually considered not to be possible partners. Steen’s data 
showed that clearly larger proportions of the MPs and leaders of political parties in Lithuania 
than in Latvia and Estonia were critical towards compromising with political opponents. 
Lithuania distinguished herself from Estonia and Latvia because the successor party of the 
Communist Party successfully managed to transform itself into a leftist party, which even 
won a majority of the seats in the 1992 elected Seimas. In Estonia and Latvia voters 
marginalized the successor parties of the communist parties.  
 
The result of this may be that the two major parties on the right and the left side in Lithuania 
have been forming blocs of ideologically close parties, which have been cooperating in 
government formation.  I expect that such blocs have not developed in Latvia and Estonia 
because of the lack leftist parties large enough to form and carry leftist blocs. Therefore I 
expect to find that Lithuanian government coalitions have only existed between some 
ideologically neighbouring parties and not between ideologically opposite parties. In Estonia 
and Latvia, I expect to find a wide variety of government coalitions that may have been 
stretching over the whole spectre from left to right, however defined. 
 
This leads us into an elaboration of government formations in the three countries. Since the 
Popular Front supported governments were very broad and supported of all pro-independence 
forces, I will focus mainly on the time after the last of these governments resigned.  The 
purpose of the following section is twofold. The first function is to work out the values on the 
three government related variables.  The second function is to discover differences and 
nuances, which can only be discovered through a historical elaboration, and in this way 
complement and shade the somewhat rigidly constructed table of government related 
characteristics presented at the end of this chapter. I have collected most of the data on parties 
in government from the Zarates’ Political Collections on European Governments; a well-
established database on the Internet. The data on parliamentary elections is mostly collected 
from the reliable Parties and Collections in Europe database on Europe on the Internet.  
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Estonia 
 
The electoral system for Riigikogu since 1992 involves distribution of individual, regional 
and national mandates. Citizens over 18 years of age are eligible to vote. In this way the large 
number of mainly Russian speaking non-citizens are excluded from voting. Norbalt survey 
data show that in 1994 only 23% of ethnic Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians living in 
Estonia had Estonian citizenship and thereby the right to vote in parliamentary elections 
(Norbalt 1 survey 1994).  In 1999 the proportion of Estonian citizens in the same group had 
increased to 36% (Norbalt survey 1999). The allocation of seats is rather proportional, but the 
electoral threshold on 5 percent for the regional and national distribution has been favouring 
the largest parties. In the 1992 and 1995 elections, parties could form electoral unions, but this 
was not legal in the 1999 elections (Svege and Daatland 2000: 57 – 58). The relatively high 
level of proportionality between distribution of votes and seats may have contributed to that 
no single party or electoral union have ever won more than 41 of the 101 seats in Riigikogu. 
The alliance between the Centre Party and the Coalition Party and Rural Union obtained this 
number of seats in the 1995 elections.  
 
Minister of Industry Jaak Tamm resigned from the government lead by the Popular Front 
leader Edgar Savisaar in the autumn 1991, because of Savisaar’s reluctance to deregulate 
prices and what he and other regarded as the Prime Minister’s old command style approach to 
the economy. After his resignation, Tamm was amongst the founders of the Estonian 
Coalition Party (ECP), which drew large support from state managers. Following the fuel 
crisis leading to the introduction of rationing in January 1992, the Savisaar cabinet had to 
resign. Former Minister of Transport and supporter of the ECP, Tiit Vähi took over the post of 
Prime Minister. The government from January to October 1992 consisted of former ECP 
members who had resigned their party membership to have free hands in dealing with the 
Riigikogu. This virtual ECP government took radical political steps by liberalising prices, 
abolishing export controls, introducing the Estonian Kroon, starting privatisation and 
introducing a visa system with Russia (Arter 1996: 181 – 182).   
 
Following the parliamentary elections in October 1992, the ECP supported government was 
replaced by a government coalition of five parties. This coalition was stretching from the 
nationalist Estonian National Independence Party and the National Coalition Party Pro Patria 
(Pro Patria) to the social democrat Moderates. Pro Patria was a wide electoral alliance 
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consisting of five parties. The alliance included two Christian parties, which stressed the need 
for a minimum wage and social protection during the transition process, a group of orthodox, 
Catholics and old believers, which wanted separation of church and state, the radical right 
wing Conservative People’s Party (CPP) and the free marketer the Republican Coalition Party 
(RCP). Mart Laar from Pro Patria was Prime Minister until September 1994. Even though 
Laar was member of the Estonian Christian Democratic Union (ECDU), the principal 
influences on the Pro Patria program came from the free marketers in the RCP. In November 
1994 the delegates of the CPP and the RCP left the Pro Patria alliance together with two 
Christian democrats, to form the nationalist and free marketer nine seat strong Riigikogu 
faction, the Right-wingers. This new party was included in the government (Arter 1996: 163, 
165, 169 - 170). Andres Tarand from the Moderates was Prime Minister from November 1994 
to April 1995 (Arter 1996: 228).  
 
According to Arter, the Reform Party (RP), Pro Patria and the Moderates (!) were the most 
market friendly parties in the campaigns for the 1995 elections. Siim Kallas, governor of the 
Bank of Estonia and former leader of the Confederation of Estonian Trade Unions (CETU), 
established the Reform Party in 1994 (Arter 1996: 230). The RP aimed in stages to abolish 
income tax, and took a firm stance in support of property reform and privatisation of flats. 
The RP was also against increase in pensions in the short term. The Savisaar led Centre Party, 
which was the successor party of what was still the Popular Front in 1992, and the electoral 
alliance the Coalition Party and the Country People’s Party (the Coalition) were more state 
friendly parties, campaigning on reducing unemployment, raising the pensions and protecting 
the agriculture. The small Justice alliance, including the successor party of the Communist 
Party of the Estonian Socialist Republic, was the only party favouring replacing the flat rate 
income tax with a system of progressive taxation. The CP leader Savisaar was in favour of 
applying the progressive principle only to persons with low income. The Justice alliance 
failed to pass the 5% threshold to enter Parliament. The Coalition and the Moderates were 
divided in the countryside – town cleavage and the CP placed itself in the centre on this 
cleavage, where the RP and Pro Patria was on the town pole opposite to six small rural parties   
(ibid: 232 – 237).  
 
The government parties fared very badly in the parliamentary elections of March 1995. The 
economic liberal and nationalist Pro Patria and the Estonian National Independence Party 
(ENIP) had 22 and 10 seats in the 101 members Riigikogu from the 1992 elections and were 
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the largest and third largest parties in the government. Running together in the 1995 elections, 
they won only 8% of the votes, giving them 8 seats. The trade union movement formed part of 
the Moderates’ electoral alliance (Arter 1996: 229). The Moderates lost half of the 12 seats 
they had from the 1992 elections. The elections resulted in a radical shift of government, 
where all the government parties were replaced. The clear winners of the March 1995 
elections were the parties having emphasized state responsibility for the losers of the 
economic reforms. Especially the Coalition Party and Rural Union (CPRU) did well and won 
32% of votes and 41 of the seats in the Riigikogu (Nørgaard and Johannsen 1999: 76). After 
the elections, the CPRU formed government together with the Centre Party. Together they 
had 57 of the 101 seats in the Riigikogu.  Soon after Savisaar was accused of secretly taping 
conversations with other politicians during government negotiations. These accusations 
forced the CP out of the government already in November 1995 (Nørgaard and Johannsen 
1999: 75). This paved the way for a new coalition government between the Coalition Party 
and Rural Union and the Reform Party. These parties were on the different poles in the state – 
market cleavage and had also showed that they had clearly different positions in the 
countryside – town cleavage in the election campaigns. The new majority government entered 
office in November 1995. Tiit Vähi from the Coalition Party and Rural Union continued as 
Prime Minister.  
 
The Reform Party had to leave the government in November 1996. The Coalition Party and 
Rural Union was alone in a minority government with Tiit Vähi as Prime Minister from the 1st 
of December 1996 to the end of February 1997. From March 1997 to March 1999, they were 
in a majority government together with the Progress Party, a break away party from the 
Centre Party. Three months before the parliamentary elections in March 1999, the Moderates, 
Pro Patria and the Reform Party announced their intention to form government together if 
they won a majority of the seats in the Riigikogu. The Centre Party had campaigned for the 
votes of the losers of the economical reforms. Their main point was to introduce a progressive 
income tax instead of the current flat tax of 26 percent. The CP leader Savisaar was however 
dubbed as authoritarian by many, and other political parties expressed wariness or refused to 
cooperate with him. The Moderates were by far no exception. Their vice chairman Eiki 
Nestor was quoted: "The Centre Party is for people who want to be led. Most voters were led 
in Soviet times. Why do we think that they have changed so much?" (TBT: 11.03.99). The 
Moderates won 17 seats and Pro Patria and the Reform Party won 18 seats each, and they 
formed a majority government from March 1999, with 53 of the 101 seats in Riigikogu. Mart 
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Laar from Pro Patria was appointed to Prime Minister. Yet the Centre Party had turned out as 
the clearly most popular in the elections. 23.4% of the votes gave them 28 seats, 12 more than 
they had from the 1995 Riigikogu. The Moderates acquired five posts in the new cabinet. 
These were the ministers of foreign affairs, economy, social affairs, population and 
agriculture (TBT: 01.04.99).  
 
The next shift of government parties occurred in January 2002, right after I ended my 
elaboration of tripartite arrangements at state level. The Reform Party and the Centre Party 
united their forces and carried out a vote of no confidence against the Pro Patria mayor Tonis 
Palts in the Tallinn City Council in December 2001. The city was governed by a mirror 
coalition of the government parties.  Following this, Savisaar took over the post as mayor 
(TBT 20.12.01). After that Prime Minister Mart Laar resigned, complaining that the decision 
of the RP to bring the CP to power in the capital had destroyed the ability of the coalition to 
work together (TBT: 10.01.02). In January 2002 the RP and the CP made a new coalition 
agreement, making Siim Kallas from the RP Prime Minister in a cabinet with eight CP 
ministers and five RP ministers. In this agreement between the leftists and the free marketers, 
the government promised to raise monthly pensions by 200 EEK (ca. 13 US$ 01.12.02) and to 
introduce free meals in the secondary schools. Recognising the differences between the two 
parties in taxation policy43, the partners agreed to freeze taxation policy issues till the 2003 
parliamentary elections and not support any initiatives of other parties to change the taxation 
legislation (TBT 24.01.02 a, Estonian Government web, 28.04.03).  Adding the 28 seats of the 
CP to the 18 seats of the RP, the government parties had a minority of the 101 seats in the 
Riigikogu. 
The conclusions of this section with regards to my hypothesises are the following: 
Government formation in Estonia has not been characterised by bloc politics, defined as the 
existence of a clear cut left–right cleavage and institutionalised government coalitions within 
selections of ideologically neighbouring parties.  Eight different party combinations with all 
together seven different parties have formed government, including only one three months’ 
lasting one-party government.  Most government coalitions have included parties on both 
sides of both the market-friendly versus state-friendly and countryside versus – town 
cleavages. Still no parties mobilizing mainly on ethnic minority issues have been in 
                                                 
43
 The CP program was favouring the implementation of progressive income tax while the RP program stated the 
intent to reduce the current flat rate income tax from 26 to 20 per cent (TBT 24.01.02, a). 
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government. On the other hand, in the period between the elections in 1995 and 1999 the 
Coalition Party and Rural Union (CPRU) and the Centre Party, the CPRU alone and the 
CPRU and the Progress Party (PP) governed Estonia. All these parties, except the PP, were 
placed on the more state-friendly and in the centre or towards the countryside on the two main 
cleavages.44 Between November 1995 and November 1996, theCPRU governed in coalition 
with the economically rightist Reform Party.  
Estonia experienced replacement of all government parties simultaneously after the 1995 and 
the 1999 elections to Riigikogu. The broad four party coalition stretching from the Estonian 
National Independence Party to the Moderates was replaced by a coalition between the CP 
and the CPRU in 1995. An ideologically wide three party government, comprising the 
Moderates together with the economically rightist Pro Patria and Reform Party, replaced the 
coalition between the CPRU and the Progress Party in 1999. These government shifts were 
however not radical in the form that all the parties in the outgoing government were on the 
different side of the main political cleavage than all the parties in the new government. 
The social democratic party, the Moderates, was in government 76% of the days between the 
19th of October 1992 and the 1st of January 1996 and in 56% of the days in the whole period 
from the 21st of October 1992 to the 31st of December 2001. Even though the Moderates all 
the time were in coalitions with economical rightist parties, the party was in a position where 
it should be possible to look after the relationship between the government and the trade union 
movement and in that way to contribute to the development of democratic corporatism. No 
party survived in government longer than four years in any of the periods because all 
government parties were replaced after the parliamentary elections in 1995 and 1999.  
All this means that Estonia shared two of the three characteristics expected to have positive 
effect on the level of democratic corporatism in both the periods before 1996 and 2002. 
Estonia was not marked by bloc politics combined with radical shifts of governments, and the 
social democratic party had long time in government. On the other hand no party survived in 
government for longer than an election period on four years.     
                                                 
44
 The parliamentary elections of 2003 brought a coalition of economically rightist parties to government. The 
Riigikogu approved a government between the Res Publica, which was registered as a political party in 
December 2001, the Reform Party and the agriculture-friendly People’s Union in April, with Juhan Parts from 
the Res Publica as Prime Minister. One of the core points in the coalition agreement was a tax reform reducing 
the income tax by 2% annually until the level of 20% by 2006. The coalition had won a majority of 60 of the 101 
seats in Riigikogu. This situation, with the leftist Centre Party with most votes from the elections in opposition, 
may be an indication of some form of bloc politics developing in Estonia in the time after my analysis (TBT 
22.11.01, a, 20.03.03, 03.04.03, 10.04.03).    
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Latvia 
The Latvian Election Law is an amended version of the 1922 law. Citizens over 18 years of 
age are eligible to vote. In this way the large share of mainly Russian speaking non-citizens 
are excluded from voting. Norbalt survey data show that 32% of ethnic Russians, Ukrainians 
and Belarusians living in Latvia had Latvian citizenship in 1994 (Norbalt 1 survey 1994).  In 
1999 the proportion of Latvian citizens in the same group had increased to 36% (Norbalt 2 
survey 1999). Voters elect the 100 members Saeima on a proportional basis on party 
candidate or electoral coalition candidate lists in five multi-seat constituencies. The electoral 
threshold to enter the Parliament was raised from 4 percent in 1992 to 5 percent in 1995, 1998 
and 2002. Different from in Estonia, Electoral unions have been legal in all elections. The 
rather high degree of proportionality between the percentage votes attracted and the 
percentage of seats allocated, may have contributed to that no party or electoral union has 
ever won more than the 26 of the 100 seats in the Saeima alone. The New Era Party achieved 
this number of seats in the 2002 elections to the Saeima.  
Latvia has experienced replacements of government parties frequently since Ivars Godmanis’ 
Popular Front backed government resigned in July 1993. The elections for Saeima in 1993 
brought a coalition of Latvia’s Way (LW) and the Latvian Farmers Union (LFU) to 
government from July 1993. Valdis Birkavs from LW was Prime Minister. This was a 
minority coalition with 48 seats in the 100 members Saeima. LW placed itself to the right for 
the centre in economical politics (Nørgaard and Johannsen 1999: 84). The LFU originated in 
the agrarian faction in the Popular Front, but was also a heir-taker of an interwar party (ibid: 
79). This coalition lasted until July 1994 when the LFU left the government. The Union of 
Economists (UE) replaced the LFU from September. The UE had broken out of the minority 
friendly Harmony for Latvia – Revival of the Economy (HLRE) (later For Harmony in a 
United Latvia), complaining that HLRE over-emphasized social justice at the expense of 
economic development (Bottolfs 2000: 92).   Maris Gailis from LW became Prime Minister in 
the new government.  
The result of the 1995 elections to the Saeima was a very broad six party government 
coalition, with the Democratic Party - Master (DPM) and LW as the biggest parties with 18 
and 17 seats. The DPM had addressed the declining living standards in the election campaigns 
and suggested that experts should form a new government program (Nørgaard and Johannsen 
1999: 81). The government also included the right wing nationalist parties the Latvian 
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National Independence Party (LNIP) and For the Fatherland and Freedom (FFF), which 
merged in June 1997. Finally it included the LFU and the left populist Latvian Unity Party 
(LUP), which was leaded by former Gorbachev adviser Kauls. He stated that he would 
transform the economy in the same manner that he had been running a collective farm. This 
party mainly attracted votes from economically dissatisfied groups in rural areas (Bottolfs 
2000: 94).  The LFU left the government already in February 1996. Altogether the six 
government parties had 73 of the 100 seats in the Saeima, including the six seats of the LFU 
(Nørgaard and Johannsen 1999: 82, table 3.3). From February 1997, the LFU in alliance with 
the Latvian Christian Democratic Union (LCDU) was back in the government, which for the 
rest consisted of the same parties. FFF and the LNIP merged into the Fatherland and Freedom 
Union (FFU) in June 1997. Guntar Krasts from this party took over the post as Prime Minister 
in August 1997. In April 1998, six month before the upcoming parliamentary elections, the 
Latvian Green Party replaced the DPM in the government.  
Former Prime Minister Andris Skele established the People’s Party (PP) in the spring of 1998  
(Nørgaard and Johannsen 1999: 83). This economically liberal party became the biggest party 
in the Saeima after the 1998 elections. 21.2% of the votes gave them 24 of the 100 seats 
(Nørgaard and Johannsen 1999: 82, table 3.3, 83). The same year the New Party (NP) was 
established left of the centre. The first government after the elections was a very wide 
coalition between LW, the FFU, the NP and the Social Democratic Alliance – stretching from 
the right wing to the left wing on economical issues. LW was again largest of the government 
parties and had the Prime Minister, Vilis Kristopans. The government had a clear majority 
with 60 of the 100 seats in the Saeima.  When the People’s Party entered the government in 
July 1999, Andris Skele became Prime Minister for the third time. The new coalition of the 
PP, LW and the FFU had a majority with 61 seats in the Saeima. Skele resigned from the post 
as Prime Minister and the PP withdrew from the government in April 2000. This happened 
after the coalition parties LW and the FFU had expressed that they did not longer support 
Skele because he had dismissed the FFU Minister of Economy, Vladimirs Makarovs (TBT 
13.04.00). After this Andris Berzins from Latvia’s Way became Prime Minister, and the 
newly established New Party entered the government (TBT: 11.05.00, a). This four party 
coalition governed Latvia with a solid majority of 70 of the 100 seats in the Parliament, until 
the elections for the Saeima in October 2002. 
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The 2002 elections for the Saeima occurred the year after I ended my elaboration of tripartite 
arrangements. Still, what happened in the prelude and the aftermath of this election do tell 
something about Latvian politics also before the end of 2001. The President of the Central 
Bank since 1991, Einars Repse, announced his intentions to form a new centre right political 
party in August 2001. At the same time he blamed the currently governing parties of behaving 
cowardly and for that corruption had grown to a catastrophic level. 45 Repse claimed that his 
new party would bring in new people without prior political experience (TBT 23.08.01). In 
December Repse resigned from his post in the Bank to form the New Era Party (NEP), aiming 
at obtaining no less than a majority of the seats in the Saeima (TBT: 08.11.01). The NEP 
campaigned for the October 2002 elections with a strong anti-corruption bias and promised 
not to go into a coalition with the parties currently in power  (TBT 26.09.02). The party won 
24% of the votes in the October 2002 parliamentary elections.  
Another newly established anti-corruption biased party, Latvia’s First Party, won 9.6% of the 
votes and 10 seats, in an alliance with the Christian Democratic Union. Both Latvia’s Way 
(LW) and the Fatherland and Freedom Union (FFU) fared very badly. LW even fell short by 
0.1% to obtain the 5% of the votes required to enter parliament, while the FFU obtained 5.4% 
of the votes and 7 seats. Also the Social Democratic Workers’ Party fell out of the Saeima, 
attracting only 4% of the votes. The People’s Party lost three of their 24 seats from 1998, after 
16.7% of voters had opted for them. For Human Right’s in a United Latvia ended up as 
second largest in the Saeima. 18.9% of the votes gave them 24 seats. An alliance between the 
Farmers’ Union and the Green Party fared well, winning 9.5% of the votes and 12 seats. After 
Repse took over as Prime Minister for the new government in November he staid quite true to 
his promise of keeping the old parties away from the government. Of the incumbent parties 
only the FFU was granted two seats in the new cabinet. The new cabinet was formed as a 
coalition between the New Era Party, Latvia’s first Party, the Greens and Farmers Union and 
the Fatherland and Freedom Union (TBT: 14.11.02, a). The government parties had a majority 
in the Saeima with 55 of the 100 seats. Prime Minister Repse promised not to jeopardize the 
progress towards membership in the NATO and the EU as well as to continue the business-
friendly policies of the former government. The change, which Repse stressed, was to 
                                                 
45
 Repse was not without a point. According to the corruption perception index for 2002 of Transparency 
International, Latvians generally perceived that there was much corruption in the country. On the ranking Latvia 
took a 52nd place, by far trailing Lithuania on the 36th place and Estonia on the 29th place (Transparency 
International web, 09.01.03). Former governments had also been blackened by various accusations about 
everything from corruption connected to privatisation projects to the paedophilia investigations of the PP Prime 
Minister Skele and LW Justice Minister Birkavs in 2000 (TBT: 02.03.00 b). 
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introduce a more transparent and accountable government and to crack down on corruption 
(TBT 10.10.02 and 14.11.02, b). This means that the government shift was less a shift along 
ideologically defined lines, than a shift towards new persons claiming to be more willing and 
able to crack down on corruption.  
The conclusion is that very broad coalition governments stretching from the right wing to left 
of the centre have been normal. The government parties have usually had clear majorities of 
the seats in the Saeima, though Latvia had minority governments from July 1993 to December 
1995. Replacements of government parties have been frequent between the elections. These 
have normally only affected one or two of the coalition parties at the time. Elections have 
never enforced replacement of all government parties. Latvia’s Way remained in government 
after the 1995 election, despite of the falling support from 32.4% to 14.6% of the votes from 
the 1993 to the 1995 parliamentary elections. First in November 2002, LW had to resign from 
government after the party had failed to obtain the 5% of votes required to enter parliament in 
the October elections. The response of the government parties to declined support in 
parliamentary elections has been increasing the numbers of parties in the government rather 
than resigning. After the 1995 elections the number of parties in government increased from 
two to six, while only the junior partner - the Union of Economists - resigned. The 1995 
election made the newly established Democratic Party – Master (DPM) the largest party in 
parliament. This party lost all their seats in the 1998 election.  After the 1998 election, the 
newly established People’s Party (PP) was the largest party in the Saeima. The newly 
established New Era Party (NEP) became largest in Parliament after the 2002 election. All 
these new parties entered government.  
I expected bloc politics combined with radical government shifts to have negative effect on 
the level of democratic corporatism. For Human Rights in a United Latvia (FHRUL) and the 
Social Democratic Workers Party (SDWP) are recognised as the leftist parties in Latvia. The 
SDWP has only been represented in the Saeima between 1998 and 2002 with 14 
representatives. The party was four months in government in 1999, in a four party coalition 
with economically rightist parties. This party has been too small to constitute a bloc on its 
own. The minority friendly Harmony Party has been far better represented in parliament. 
After the party joint forces with the Equal Right’s Movement, the Russian Party and the 
Socialist Party in the alliance For Human Rights in a United Latvia (FHRUL), the alliance 
won 16 seats in the 1998 Saeima and 24 seats in the 2002 Saeima. This alliance has however 
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never been in government, because no other parties are willing to go into a government 
coalition with them. The reason may be that only the Harmony Party in this alliance succeeds 
from the pro-independence forces in the early 1990s, while the other three parties are viewed 
as successors of the anti-independence forces. All this shows that government formation in 
Latvia has not been characterised by bloc politics.  
 
LW has been a member of all governments from the Popular Front government resigned in 
July 1993 to after the parliamentary election in October 2002. FFU (FFF until June 1997) has 
been in all governments since 1995. Wide multi-party governments have been the normal. All 
this shows that government shifts in Latvia have been characterized by continuity of parties 
rather than radical change.  
 
The conclusion is that Latvia in the period before 2002 had two of the characteristics expected 
to be favourable to democratic corporatism. The country did not have bloc politics combined 
with radical shifts of governments and Latvia’s Way had survived for more than eight years in 
government while For The Fatherland and Freedom/ the Fatherland and Freedom Union had 
been in government for more than six years by the end of 2001. In the period before 1996, 
Latvia only shared the former of these characteristics because only three years had passed 
since the last Popular Front supported government resigned. In none of the periods did 
socialist or social democratic parties have long time in government. 
 
Lithuania 
 
The electoral system in Lithuania may have consequences for government formation distinct 
from Latvia and Estonia. The system since the 1992 elections is a mix between majority 
elections in single-mandate constituencies and proportional elections in a nation wide 
constituency. Citizens more than 18 years old are eligible to vote. The threshold to enter the 
Seimas in the nationwide constituency was raised from 4% of the votes in 1992 to 5% for 
individual parties and 7% for electoral alliances in 1996. It was changed back to a flat 4% 
threshold before the 2000 elections (UCSD Social Sciences & Humanities Library web, 
13.01.03). Electoral unions between parties have been legal in all the elections. The system of 
seat distribution has been less proportional than in Estonia and Latvia. In 1992 the Lithuanian 
Democratic Labour Party (LDLP) was rewarded with a majority of 73 of the 141 seats in the 
Seimas, even though they only obtained 42.6% of the votes. The Homeland Union obtained a 
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majority with 70 of the 137 seats in the 1996 Seimas, after winning only 29.8% of the votes. 
In the 2000 elections the Centre Union and the New Union, which formed the government 
after the elections, were rewarded with 43.2% of the seats, after they had won 36.9% of the 
votes. The disproportional high representation of the largest parties in the Seimas in 
proportion to their shares of the votes has made it easier for single parties or party alliances to 
form majority governments in Lithuania, compared to Latvia and Estonia. What happened in 
Lithuania in 1992 and 1996 when single parties won the majorities of the seats in parliament; 
has never happened in post-communist Estonia and Latvia (Electionworld web, 11.02.02).     
 
The four first Lithuanian governments since the declaration of independence on the 11th of 
March 1990 were broad coalitions between the Popular Front (Sajûdis), the Lithuanian 
Christian Democratic Party (LCDP) and until January 1991, The Lithuanian Democratic 
Labour Party (LDLP). The LDLP was the successor party of the Communist Party, which had 
separated itself from the Soviet organisation in December 1989 (Vardys and Sedaitis 1997: 
152). The LDLP won a landslide victory and obtained a majority with 73 of the 141 seats in 
the 1992 elected Seimas. Sajûdis ended up with only 28 seats (Parties and Election in Europe 
(PEE) web a, b and c, 07.05.03). This paved the way for four years of one party majority 
government of the successor party of the Communist Party. The party hastened to assure the 
Lithuanian people and the world that it was no longer communist. It claimed to have a social 
democratic profile, and that it would continue policies to strengthen Lithuania’s full 
independence and not reverse the free market reforms (ibid: 198). In government the LDLP 
granted the Confederation of Free Trade Unions most of the facilities that belonged to the 
former Lithuanian branch of the USSR’s All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (Vardys 
and Sedaitis 1997: 211).  
 
Two of the largest commercial banks in Lithuania had to stop their plans to merge because 
they were accused of insolvency in December 1995.  The top executives were temporarily 
arrested and the funds were frozen, while hundreds of investors lost their funds. In February 
1996 it was discovered that the LDLP Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius was also an 
investor, but had transferred his own account before closing down the bank  (Vardys and 
Sedaitis 1997: 221). Following this Slezevicius was charged with fraud, falsifying documents 
and abuse of office. After four years of trials, the case was finally dropped in April 2000 
(TBT 22.11.01, b). Following this, the LDLP fared very badly In the November 1996 
elections to the Seimas. Only 9.5% of the votes gave them 12 seats in the 137 seats assembly. 
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On the other side, the successor party of Sajûdis, the conservative Homeland Union (HU), 
increased their support from the 1992 elections. 29.8% of the votes were enough to give them 
a majority in the Seimas with 70 of the 137 seats (PEE web c, 07.05.03). This paved the way 
for four years with a coalition government consisting of the Homeland Union, the Lithuanian 
Christian Democratic Party (LCDP) and the Lithuanian Centre Union (LCU). The 16 seats of 
the LCDP and the 14 seats of the LCU added to the 70 HU seats, gave the government parties 
a very solid majority with 100 of the 137 seats in the Seimas (ibid).   
 
According to a lawyer of the Lithuanian Trade Union Unification, the HU was against the 
trade union movement, and the work in the Tripartite Council of the Republic of Lithuania 
(TCRL) almost stopped (interview Pivoras 19.11.01).  Still, the number of annual meetings in 
the councils increased from five in 1995 to seven in 1999 and 2000. Further the Secretariat 
and office of the council was established in 1998 (TCRL web d, e, 04.11.02), and the HU 
Prime Minister Gediminas Vagnorius signed the second tripartite cooperation agreement on 
state level on behalf of the government in 1999 (see appendix B, agreement LI1). In March 
2000 members of the Lithuanian Workers Union (LWU) rallied against the economical and 
social policies of the HU government in Vilnius, claiming that the government was toadying 
to the World Bank and foreign interests at the expense of social guarantees in Lithuania. The 
Russian financial crisis in 1998 had severe repercussions in Lithuania, and the sugar plant in 
Marijampoles was not the only enterprise facing difficulties.46 In September 1998 The Baltic 
Times reported about difficult times in southern towns where enterprises had to lay of large 
numbers of employees every day (TBT 24.09.98).   
 
Some changes occurred in the party landscape the year preceding the elections for Seimas in 
2000. HU Prime Minister Rolandas Paksas refused to sign a deal with the American company 
U.S. Williams on the privatisation in the Lithuanian oil sector in the late 1999. This was 
against the will of the HU leader Vytautas Landsbergis. Following this, Paksas resigned from 
the post of Prime Minister and joined the tiny Liberal Union (LU), which had one seat in the 
1996 elected Seimas. Leaded by Paksas, who had been acrobatic flight champion of the 
                                                 
46
 Since 1999 there had been a dispute between an alignment of local farmers and trade unions against the 
Danish company Danisco Sugar about the destiny of the sugar refinery in Marijampoles - a town in the 
southwestern part of the country. Danisco Sugar, the holder of the majority stakes in the three other sugar 
refineries in Lithuania, wanted to liquidate this heavily indebted plant. In spite of the pressure from Danisco, the 
government contributed to save the plant when it in 1999 agreed to postpone payment of tax debts for seven 
years, after the local fertilizer producer Arvi took over the plant. Danisco reacted by trying the rescue plan in 
court and threatened to postpone large investments. Danisco lost the trial and the rescue plan was approved  
(TBT 22.07.99, 23.09.99, 07.10.99, 14.10.99 and 09.03.00). 
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Soviet Union two times, the LU did very well on opinion polls in 2000 (TBT 12.10.00). The 
LU was in favour of more radical economic reforms than the Homeland Union to minimize 
the influence of the state in the economy. In May the LU sponsored an anti-tax march to the 
Parliament building, where the LU MPs gave a speech slamming the conservative government 
for trying to increase taxes for the social security system and proposing to gradually abolish 
corporate taxes (TBT 25.05.00).  Before the upcoming elections, the Liberal Union, the social 
liberal New Union, the Centre Union and the Modern Christian Democratic Union agreed to 
cooperate closely after the elections. They proclaimed themselves as a coalition of liberal 
forces and an alternative to the right and left, which had ruled the country throughout the last 
ten years (TBT 17.08.00).  
 
Two social democratic parties had competed in the 1992 and 1996 parliamentary elections. 
Former political prisoners, Sakalas and Andriukaitis, established the Lithuanian Social 
Democratic Party (LSDP) in 1989 (TBT 21.02.02). The LSDP won eight seats in the 1992 
Seimas and 12 seats in the 1996 Seimas. The party was in opposition in both periods 
(Nørgaard and Johannsen 1999: 90, table 3.4). In April 2000 the LDLP and the LSDP 
announced that they would compete on a common list in the upcoming parliamentary 
elections. Former President Brazauskas declared that he was supporting this coalition (TBT 
11.05.00, b). Before the elections the New Democracy Party (the former Women’s Party) and 
the Russian’s Union joined the Social Democratic Coalition (SDC). Brazauskas promised to 
take the post of Prime Minister if the Coalition won the election.  (TBT: 17.08.00).  
 
Having governed Lithuania in the tough economical times following the Russian financial 
crisis in 1998, the Homeland Union did very badly in the October 2000 parliamentary 
elections. 8.6% of the votes left them with only 9 seats in the Seimas. The Liberal Union (LU) 
won 17.3% of the votes and 34 seats while the New Union (NU) won 19.6% of the votes and 
29 seats. The Social Democratic Coalition won 31.1% of the votes and 51 seats in the new 
Seimas. Supported by the Polish Electoral Action and a couple of independent MPs, the LU 
and the NU established a minority government with Paksas as Prime Minister. In government 
from October 2000 to July 2001, these parties submitted draft law amendments, which the 
Seimas passed in March 2001, liberalising simultaneously the Law on Employment Contracts, 
the Law on Wages, the Law on Holydays and the Law on Trade Unions. These amendments 
abolished the principle of a mandatory labour contract and reduced severance pay for 
dismissed employees. The trade unions and opposition Social Democratic Coalition MPs 
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protested by arranging pickets and a silent witness campaign in the Seimas (Woolfson and 
Beck 2002: 762). There were clear ideological differences between the social liberalists in the 
NU and the free marketers in the LU. The coalition dissolved in June 2001 when all the NU 
ministers resigned from the government (TBT 21.06.01).  
 
The Lithuanian Social Democratic Party and the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party merged 
and formed the Social Democratic Party in January 2001 (TBT 21.02.02). After two weeks of 
LU one-party government, the NU agreed to form government with the now united Social 
Democratic Party. These two parties and the New Democracy Party signed a declaration on 
preserving the continuation of Lithuania’s foreign policy towards accession to the NATO and 
the EU and seeking to achieve a socially oriented market economy. The leader of the Peasant 
Party promised the four votes of his party for Brazauskas’ candidacy for Prime Minister in the 
upcoming vote in the Seimas. In the beginning of July the Parliament approved Brazauskas as 
Prime Minister (TBT 28.06.01 and 05.07.01). Later the same month Brazauskas presented the 
program of his government where he assured that the government was committed to continue 
the integration with the NATO and the EU. The program was far more rightist than the 2000 
election campaign program of the social democrats. The government would not introduce 
progressive taxation, which had been one of the main campaign issues. The party had 
campaigned to reserve 51% of shares in strategic companies for state ownership. Now this 
aim was reduced to 34%. On the other side the government promised to lobby for larger 
transfers to the agricultural sector and to raise the threshold for taxable income. This threshold 
was raised from 214 to 250 Lita (63 US $)47 per month from 2002.48 The program was 
marked by the idea to carefully and with much consideration strive for greater social justice 
without raising taxes or harming business (TBT: 05.07.01 and 19.07.01) The reaction in the 
July 10 editorial of the newspaper Lietuvos Rytas was expressive: ”Why do we need to change 
government if the policy remains the same?” (quoted in TBT 19.07.01). The new government 
had a majority with 80 of the 141 seats in the Seimas from the 2000 election (PEE web c, 
07.05.03). Not everybody in the party was happy with the right turn. From January 2002 
disagreement within the Social Democratic Party came out in the open. A left wing in the 
                                                 
47
 The value in US $ is calculated from the currency rate at the end of 2001 (see IMF web, 28.04.03)  
 
48
 This was 70 Litas less than the central employers’ organisations and central trade union organisations had 
agreed to propose to the government in October 2000 (Ministry of Social Security and Labour 2001: 57). 
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party consisting of deputy chairman Andriukaitis and his former LSDP members was 
visible.49 
 
My first hypothesis was that bloc politics combined with radical shifts of governments had 
negative effect on the development of democratic corporatist arrangements at state level. 
Between 1992 and 1996 a social democratic Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party (LDLP) 
government was in power while the conservative Homeland Union (HU) and Lithuanian 
Christian Democratic Party (LCDP) were the largest parties in opposition. The two latter were 
joined by the Centre Union to establish a government with solid majority in the Seimas after 
the 1996 elections. This government lasted until the 2000 elections, which brought a new 
coalition between the New Union (NU) and the Liberal Union (LU) to government. They 
claimed to be an alternative to the left and the right, which had governed the country for so 
long. This government did however not last more than one year before the NU found its 
coalition partners too liberal and went into a government coalition with the now united 
Lithuanian Social Democratic Party (LSDP). All this shows that all governments have been 
between parties defining themselves as being close to each other on the left–right cleavage. 
No governments have included parties from both the left and the right wing of this cleavage. 
Two of the three government party replacements, defined as at least one new party being 
brought into the government, have been radical replacements of all the parties simultaneously.  
The first was a shift from left wing to right wing when the LDLP had to give the office to the 
HU, LCDP and CU coalition after the 1996 elections. The second was a shift from this 
coalition to the liberal centre coalition of the NU and the LU following the 2000 election. This 
means that government formations in Lithuania have been characterised by bloc politics 
combined with radical shifts of governments in both the period before 1996 and the period 
before 2002. 
 
The second hypothesis was that long living time of some government parties have had a 
positive effect on the development of democratic corporatist arrangements at state level. 
                                                 
 
49
 The Social Democrat faction in the Seimas called for a transition period before legalising sales of farmlands to 
foreigners in the EU–accession talks, while Brazauskas was not in favour of reopen EU talks on this topic (TBT 
21.02.02, b). In July the government decided to ask the EU for a seven years transition period (TBT 24.01.02, b). 
Brazauskas also stood against the left wing in the party on restitution issues where Andriukaitis and his followers 
defending the interests of the tenants, promoted the idea to compensate pre-war real estates owners with cash 
rather than return houses to their former owners (TBT 31.01.02).   
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Neither in the period before 1996 nor in the period before 2002 did any party survive in 
government for longer than an election period of four years. The final hypothesis was that 
long periods of social democratic or socialist parties in government have had a positive effect 
on the development of democratic corporatist arrangements at state level. The LDLP was in 
government in 100% of the days from the last Sajûdis supported government resigned in 
November 1992 to the end of 1995, and the LDLP/ the SDP was in government 50% of the 
days in the entire period from December 1992 to the 31st of December 2001. This means that 
social democrat parties had long time in government in both the period before 1996 and the 
period before 2002.  
 
Table 6.2.2 sums up the placement of the three countries in the period from 1991 to the end of 
1995 and the whole period from 1991 to the end of 2001 with regards to bloc politics and 
radical shifts of governments. The table shows that only Lithuania in the end of 2001 had 
gone through the combination of bloc politics and radical shifts of governments, which is 
expected to be unfavourable to a high degree of democratic corporatism.      
 
Table 6.2.2: Politics and government shifts 
 
   Bloc politics        Not bloc politics     
 
Radical shifts 
of governments 
 
No radical shifts 
Of governments  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lithuania 2001  
 
Lithuania 1995 Estonia 1995 
Estonia 2001 
Latvia 1995 
Latvia 2001 
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Table 6.2.3 summarises the government related variables for the three countries.  
Table 6.2.3: Government characteristics 
 
Estonia  
1991 - 95 
Estonia  
1996 - 01 
Latvia 
1991 - 95  
Latvia  
1996 - 01 
Lithuania 
1991 - 95 
Lithuania 
1996 - 01 
Bloc politics combined with radical shifts of government 
No No No No No Yes 
Living time of longest living government party 
1 year, 10 
months 
 3 years, 11 
months 
 
2 years, 5 
months 
8 years, 5 
months50 
 3 years, 1 
month 
3 years and 10 
months 
 
Percentage days of socialist and social democrat parties in government 
76% 56% 0% 5% 100% 50% 
 
The elaboration of Estonian governments that table 6.2.3 is based upon, starts after the 
formally no-party Vähi government resigned and a four party coalition government took over 
on the 21st of October 1992. The starting point of the analysis of Latvian governments is after 
the resignation of the Popular Front supported government of Ivars Godmanis, and a coalition 
government between Latvia’s Way and Latvian Farmers’ Union took over on the 8th of July 
1993. Lithuanian governments are analysed from the LDLP took over the government office 
on the 2nd of December 1992 after the last Sajûdis supported government had resigned.     
 
                                                 
50
 This was the whole period since the last Popular Front backed government resigned. 
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6.3: International organisations  
 
This chapter is devoted to an exploration of the pressure that the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) and the European Union (EU) has brought to bear on labour policies and 
the systems of tripartite bargaining at state level in the three countries. The first part of the 
chapter deals with the ILO, while the last part is devoted to the European Union. In the 
concluding table 6.3 the three countries in the two periods are divided into cases experiencing 
relatively strong and relatively weak pressure from international organisations.         
 
The International Labour Organisation 
 
All the three pre-war republics were members of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
from 1921, two years after the organisation was established. Estonia ratified 21 ILO 
Conventions from 1922 to 1938. Latvia ratified 17 ILO Conventions from 1924 to 1929, 
while Lithuania ratified seven Conventions from 1931 to 1934 (ILO web, 07.05.02; TCRL 
web a, 12.11.02). Lithuania and Latvia regained their membership in 1991, while Estonia 
regained her membership in ILO in 1992 (Dovydeniene & Casale 1999: 233; ILO web, 
07.05.03). The Conventions ratified by the pre-war Republics remained in force after 
membership was resumed. 44 Conventions in Latvia, 34 in Lithuania and 31 in Estonia were 
in force in 2002 (ILO web, 07.05.03). The ILO reckons eight Conventions as fundamental, 
including two on forced labour, two on freedom of association, two on discrimination and two 
on child labour. By December 2002 Lithuania had ratified seven, Estonia had ratified six and 
Latvia had ratified five and of these (ILO web, 07.05.03). Latvia ratified Convention 87 on 
‘Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise’ and Convention 98 on 
‘Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining’ in January 1992. Estonia and Lithuania ratified 
these conventions in March and September 1994. According to Convention 87, workers and 
employers shall have the right to establish and to join organisations of their own choosing and 
without previous authorisation. Convention 98 prohibits discrimination of employees and job 
appliers as a consequence of trade union membership.  
  
Paragraph 29 in the Estonian Constitution of 1992 established the Freedom to belong to 
unions and organisations of employees and employers. According to the same paragraph, the 
law shall provide the conditions and procedure for the exercise of the right to strike (see 
appendix E, Law f: §29). § 108 in the Latvian Constitution of 1993 provided that employed 
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persons have the right to a collective labour agreement, and the right to strike and that the 
state shall protect the freedom of trade unions (see appendix E, Law j: § 29). Article 50 and 
51 of the Lithuanian Constitution of 1992 provided that trade unions shall be freely 
established and shall function independently and that employees shall have the right to strike, 
in cases where this right is not restricted by law (see appendix E, Law r: Article 50, 51).  
 
This means that the freedom of association was established in the constitutions of the 
countries before they ratified the relevant ILO conventions. ILO Convention 144 of 1976 
deals with tripartite consultations to implement international labour standards. Each country 
ratifying this convention undertakes to have procedures ensuring effective consultations 
between representatives of the government, of employers and of workers (see appendix E, 
ILO Convention b: Article 2.1). All three countries ratified this convention in 1994. This 
convention bound the countries to establish procedures that ensured effective consultations 
between the representatives of the government and of employers and employees on questions, 
conventions and recommendations from the ILO (ibid: Article 2.1. and 5.1 a – e). In the three 
Baltic countries this meant consultations through tripartite councils. At that time the tripartite 
Estonian Council of the ILO had already existed in two years. In Latvia ILO activities were 
included in the three existing state level advisory tripartite councils established in 1993 and in 
1994. The Tripartite Council of the Republic of Lithuania (TCRL), which was established in 
May 1995, dealt with ILO activities (TCRL web c, 12.11.02).  
 
Latvia ratified ILO’s Minimum Wage Fixing Convention of 1970 (No. 131) in March 1993. 
Lithuania ratified this convention in September 1994. Article 2, paragraph 1 of this 
convention provides that the countries shall establish minimum wage rates with the force of 
law and that failure to apply them shall be met with penalty or other sanctions (see appendix 
E, ILO Convention a: Article 2, § 1). Legal minimum wage rates existed in Lithuania and 
Latvia already before the ratification of the ILO conventions and were established by the 
Wages Act of 1994 in Estonia (see appendix E, Law a, g, l). Chapter 5.2 deals with minimum 
wage.   
 
Out of all this we see that the ILO have played a role in forming the labour legislation in the 
three countries in the form that ILO conventions have been ratified and taken up in the 
national legislation. The ratification of ILO Convention 144 bound the countries to establish 
procedures for effective tripartite consultations. This legitimised the already existing tripartite 
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structures, gave an impetus for increasing the efficiency of these and made it to a duty to 
maintain procedures ensuring effective tripartite consultations. In addition, conventions and 
recommendations were made subject for tripartite consultations and in this way generated 
corporatist arrangements on their own. Nevertheless, the Estonian and Lithuanian 
constitutions of 1992 provided for the right to freely establish and join interest group 
organisations before the ratification of the relevant ILO conventions. 
 
The European Union 
 
The EU offered the three Baltic countries trade and cooperation agreements already in 
September 1991. These agreements came into force in the beginning of 1993 (Nørgaard and 
Johannsen 1999: 168). The three countries signed free trade agreements with the EU in July 
1994, which were implemented from the beginning of 1995 (ibid: 169). In June 1995 the three 
countries signed Europe Agreements. These agreements between the EU and its member 
states and the applicant countries did however not come into force until the 1st of February 
1998, because they had to be ratified by each of the member countries (ibid 169 – 170, 199, 
EU web a, 29.04.03). The Europe Agreements incorporated the free trade agreements. In 
addition they established a political dialogue with regular bilateral meetings. The agreements 
called for harmonisation of Baltic legislation with EU rules. The Europe Agreements included 
a promise of eventual membership in the EU, provided that each country was able to meet the 
preconditions for membership, the so-called Copenhagen criteria (ibid: 170, Commission of 
the European Communities October 2002a: 19). These criterias were: Stable institutions in the 
form of democracy, rule of law and human and minority rights, a functioning market 
economy, capacity to cope with competitive pressure within the EU and ability to adopt the 
EU rules and norms (the acquis communautaire)   (ibid: 170, 199). All three countries applied 
for membership in late 1995 (ibid: 200). Still, the EU Commission recommended only 
Estonia for first round of accession negotiation in July 1997. The reason given by the 
Commission was that only Estonia appeared as a functioning market economy, able to make 
the progress necessary to cope with the competitive pressures and market forces within the 
Union in the medium term time horizon on approximately five years (ibid: 172 – 173). In 
October 1999 the Commission recommended Latvia and Lithuania for the second round of 
membership negotiations. The Commission recommended closing the negotiations with all 
three countries together with the Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta, Poland, the Slovak 
Republic and Slovenia in October 2002  (for the press release from the Commission on the 9th 
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of October, see EU web c, 03.05.03). Following Ireland’s ratification of the Nice Treaty, the 
EU was ready to include the new member countries (TBT 24.10.02, 29.04.03). The three 
countries signed the Treaty of Accession in Athens on the 16th of April 2003 (for a full text 
version of the Treaty, see EU web b, 03.05.03). Provided that the voters embrace membership 
in the referenda, all three will be members of the EU from the 1st of May 2004.  
 
It should be possible to discover influence from the EU on the development of labour law and 
corporatist arrangements by three sorts of indications. The first kind of indication is that 
corporatist arrangements and labour laws are introduced or amended after the EU 
Commission has called for such measures through its annual reports on progress towards 
accession. The second kind of indication is when the social partners states in agreements that 
the measures they have agreed to take will be in accordance with recommendations or 
directives from the EU. The third sort of indication is when the EU economically supports 
projects aimed to strengthen the corporatist arrangements. 
 
The 13th chapter of the acquis for EU accession dealt with social policy and employment. The 
legal acquis covered health and safety at work, labour law and working conditions, equal 
opportunities for men and women, and social security co-ordination for migrant workers. 
Further the Protocol on social policy called for consultation of the social partners and 
measures to facilitate the social dialogue (The Commission of the European Communities 
1997 a: 85, b: 84, c: 78). The EU Commission published its first ‘opinion on the each of the 
countries applications for membership’ reports in 1997. Here the Commission acknowledged 
all three countries for having a social dialogue that worked well on tripartite level, while it 
pointed out that bipartite negotiations in Latvia and Lithuania should be improved. The 
Commission pointed out that Estonia and Latvia needed to introduce new laws and amend 
existing laws on collective redundancies and the protection of employees in case of 
insolvency of the employer. The Commission recognised Lithuania for preparing a draft law 
to protect the interests of employees in case of employers’ insolvency. The Commission 
concluded that it should be possible for all three countries to comply with the obligation of the 
EU in a medium term time horizon on approximately five years. The precondition was that 
the countries carried out improvements on the mentioned areas and further developed the 
structures to ensure the effective implementation of the legislation (ibid 1997 a: 85 - 87, b:  85 
- 86, c: 7, 79 - 81).  
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Following this Estonia set up a fund to support employees in companies under bankruptcy 
proceedings in 1998.51 In its 2001 report the Commission acknowledged Estonia for covering 
provisions on collective redundancies and insolvency of the employer in ‘The Unemployment 
Insurance Act’ of June 2001 (ibid 2001 a: 59). The Commission criticised Latvia because the 
Labour Law was not compliant with EU norms in the accession reports in 1997, 1998 and 
2000 (ibid 1997b: 84, 1998b: 35, 2000b: 61). In 2002 the Commission acknowledged that the 
new labour law, which was in force from June 2002, together with the ‘Law on the Protection 
of Employees in the Event of Insolvency of their Employer’ adopted in December 2001, 
transposed the majority of the labour law acquis. The same report also recognised the new 
Insolvency Administration, which had started to operate in February 2002 to implement the 
law on protection of employees in case of employers’ insolvency (ibid 2002b: 83).   
As regards social dialogue the Commission called for measures to be taken to improve the 
number and contents of collective agreements at the sector and bipartite level in all three 
countries (ibid 1999 c: 45, 2000 a: 59 - 60, 2000b: 63, 2000 c: 62 - 63, 2001 a: 61, 2001 b: 72, 
2001 c: 70). In the accession reports the EU Commission acknowledged the establishment of 
the Social and Economic Council in Estonia in 1998, the National Tripartite Co-operation 
Council in Latvia in 1999 (ibid 1999a: 43, 1999b: 46). The Commission also recognised the 
conclusion of the tripartite cooperation agreement in Lithuania in 1999 and the establishment 
of the National Labour Council for Public Employees in Estonia in March 2002 as important 
steps of progress (ibid 99c: 44, 02a: 76). All three countries had closed the 13th chapter of the 
acquis by the time the Commission issued the regular reports on accession in October 2002 
(ibid: 02a: 79, 02b: 87, 02 c: 86).  
The second kind of indication of influence from the EU is when the social partners states in 
agreements that the measures they have agreed to take will be in accordance with 
recommendations or directives from the EU. In June 1997, the Estonian Government and the 
central organisations of trade unions and employers concluded a tripartite agreement to 
establish a guarantee fund to pay employees outstanding accounts in case of employers’ 
insolvency from 1998. The written agreement emphasized that the implementation would be 
in accordance with the norms of the European Council and the EU directives (see appendix B, 
agreement E7: §1). The tripartite agreement on developing participatory democracy of 
                                                 
51
 This was also in accordance with a tripartite agreement of 1996 (translation of December 1996 agreement). 
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December 1996 also stated the purpose to be in accordance with ILO, European Council and 
EU norms (see appendix B, agreement E5).  
The third sort of indication of influence from the EU is when the EU economically supports 
projects aimed at strengthening the corporatist arrangements. The EU has a Phare fund for 
pre-accession financial support for institution building and acquis related investments52. Phare 
funding went amongst others to projects aimed at improving the social dialogue between the 
government and bureaucracy and trade unions and employers at state, regional, local and 
enterprise level. Lithuania was allocated 80 million Euros, Latvia 47 million Euros and 
Estonia 40 million Euros in Phare support in 2002 (The EU Phare web, 22.02.03; Nørgaard 
and Johannsen 1999: 179). The national program of Latvia for 2001 included a project with 
the title ‘Promotion of Bipartite Social Dialogue’ and the overall objective of strengthening 
the autonomous social dialogue between employer and trade union organisations in order to 
complement the existing tripartite structures and facilitate the implementation of the social 
acquis.  The program had a total budget on 1.35 million Euro and should be implemented in 
2002 – 2003 in partnership with the Ministry of Welfare, the Secretariat of the National 
Tripartite Co-operation Council, the Latvian Employers’ Confederation and the Free Trade 
Union Confederation of Latvia (The EU web d, 09.05.03) The national program for Estonia of 
2001 included a project with the title ‘Promotion of Social Dialogue on the Employers’ and 
Workers’ Organisations Level’. The overall objective was to improve economic performance 
through encouraging partnership between the social partners on branch and enterprise level. 
The project had a total budget of 473 000 Euro and should be implemented between May 
2001 and May 2003, in cooperation with the Confederation of Estonian Trade Unions 
(CETU), the Estonian Employees’ Unions Association (EEUA) and the Estonian Employers 
Confederation (EEC) (EU web e, 09.05.03).  
Out of all this we see that international organisations have brought their influence to bear on 
the development of labour law and corporatist arrangements in all the three countries. The 
pressure from international organisations was stronger in all three countries in the period 
before 2002 than in the period before 1996, because in the later period all three countries went 
through the accession process to the EU53. In both periods membership in the ILO influenced 
                                                 
52
 Phare is short for Poland and Hungary: Assistance in Restructuring Economies. 
53
 Also writers concerned with other Eastern European applicant countries have remarked the impact of EU on 
institutionalising social dialogue. Writing about tripartism in Bulgaria, Elena A. Iankova used the term  “hard” 
Europanization of tripartism, describing direct institutional transfer from EU level to the applicant countries 
(Iankova 2002: 221 – 222).     
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the national systems. The countries regained their membership in the ILO approximately at 
the same time. Even though Estonia was taken up as a candidate country to the EU two years 
before Latvia and Lithuania, the dialogue between the countries and the EU and the process of 
harmonising legislation and policies started approximately at the same time, following the 
Europe agreements. This means that the pressure from international organisations should have 
been rather similar between the three countries in each of the periods. The conclusion I 
summed up in table 6.3 on the next page.  
Table 6.3.1: Pressure from international organisations  
 
Estonia  
1991 - 95 
Latvia  
1996 -01 
Lithuania  
1991 - 95 
Estonia  
1996 -01 
Latvia  
1991 - 95 
Lithuania  
1996 -01 
Weaker Weaker Weaker Stronger Stronger Stronger 
 
Table 6.3.1 shows that all three countries experienced strong pressure from international 
organisations to develop corporatist arrangements in the later period, while this pressure was 
weaker in the earlier period.  
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7: Identifying the explanatory factors; Comparative and 
Historical Analysis 
 
In chapter 5, I found that Estonia and Latvia were closer to a democratic corporatist model in 
the latest period than they were in the earliest period and than Lithuania was in both periods. 
In this chapter I will attempt to single out some explanatory factors to these differences. As 
laid out in Chapter 4, I will first employ the Method of Agreement to identify crucial 
similarities between Latvia and Estonia in the period from 1996 to the end of 2001. In the 
second step, I will only compare the countries in the latest period, when many of the factors 
expected to affect the level of democratic corporatism were similar between the countries. 
Here I will employ a combination of the Method of Agreement and the Indirect Method of 
Difference to identify some crucial differences between Estonia and Latvia on one side and 
Lithuania on the other side. In this way I will single out the variables, which are similar 
between Latvia and Estonia and different in Lithuania. These variables are likely to explain 
the higher level of democratic corporatism in Estonia and Latvia in the latest time period.      
 
The variables are dichotomised and treated in a Method of Agreement design in table 7.1 on 
the next page.   
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Table 7.1: Comparative table with relative scores; the Method of Agreement 
 
Independent 
variables 
Estonia    
1991-
1995 
Estonia 
1996-
2001 
 Latvia       
1991- 
1995 
Latvia 
1996-
2001 
Lithuania 
1991- 
1995 
Lithuania 
1996- 
2001 
Open economy54 Yes Yes   No No Yes No 
Bloc politics 
combined with radical 
shifts of governments 
(92/ 93 – 01) 
No No   No No No55 Yes 
Parties staying longer 
than 4 years in 
government since last 
PF government56 (92/ 
93 – 01) 
No No No Yes No No 
Social democratic and 
socialist parties long 
time in government 
(92/ 93 – 01) 
Yes Yes No No Yes  Yes 
High pressure from 
international 
organisations 
No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Longer time to 
develop democratic 
corporate structures  
(91 – 01) 
No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Dependent variable: 
Relatively high 
level of democratic 
corporatism at state 
level 
No Yes No Yes No No 
  
Notice that the three government related variables for the latest period in table 7.1 refer to the 
entire period from the last popular front supported governments resigned in 1992/ 1993 to the 
end of 2001. The reason for this is that the corporate systems in the latest period are 
continuation of the systems the earliest period. Hence I expect government characteristics in 
both periods to influence the level of democratic corporatism in the latest period. The 
government characteristics only reveal themselves over time. Staying-time of government 
parties for more than four years can for example not be identified in a period of less than four 
years. On the contrary, the variables of open economy and pressure from international 
                                                 
54
 Trade in goods amounts to more than 100% of GDP. 
55
 The radical shift between Popular Front (Sajûdis) and LDLP is not included. 
56
 All countries are given no on this variable in 1996 because of the short time lap since last Popular Front 
supported government resigned. 
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organisations need shorter time to be measured and each of the countries have different values 
on these between the time periods. Therefore I consider openness of economy and pressure 
from international organisations exclusively in the latest period as factors, which may explain 
the level of democratic corporatism in the same period. The variable of time to develop 
democratic corporate structures for the latest period refers to the entire period from regaining 
independence in 1991 to the end of 2001, because this variable is a measure of time since 
Soviet totalitarianism. 
 
The Method of Agreement design shows that both the cases with a relatively high level of 
democratic corporatism also had high pressure from international organisations, longer time 
to develop corporatist structures and absence of bloc politics combined with radical shifts of 
governments. Two of these variables divide between the two time periods. In the latest period 
between 6 and 11 years had already passed since the countries regained their independence 
from the Soviet Union. Accordingly they had had some time to develop democratic 
corporatist structures. Since 1995 all three countries were applicants for accession to the EU. 
This meant that pressure from the EU Commission to develop democratic corporatist 
structures was strongest in the latest period from the beginning of 1996 to the end of 2001. 
The other similarity between Estonia and Latvia in the latest period was that government 
formation in neither of the countries had been marked by the combination of bloc politics and 
radical shifts of governments. This analysis identifies the factors connected to the latest time 
period, being that longer time to develop democratic corporatist structures had passed and the 
pressure from international organisations was high, as explanatory to a relatively high level of 
democratic corporatism.  In addition, the analysis identifies absence of the combination of 
bloc politics and radical shifts of governments as explanatory to this outcome.  
 
The second comparative analysis is a combination of the Method of Agreement and the 
Indirect Method of Difference in a most similar design. That’s why I have compared the 
systems in the period from 1996 to the end of 2001. In this period the countries shared many 
of the factors expected to influence the level of democratic corporatism, but still this level was 
unequal. This means that Latvia and Estonia are contrasted to Lithuania. The comparison is 
illustrated in table 7.2 on the next page. 
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Table 7.2: The Method of Agreement between Estonia and Latvia combined with the 
Indirect Method of Difference against Lithuania.   
 
Independent variables Estonia   
1996 - 2001 
Latvia  
1996 - 2001 
Lithuania  
1996 - 2001 
Open economy Yes  No  No 
Bloc politics combined with radical shifts of 
governments (91 – 01) 
No No Yes 
Parties living longer than 4 years in 
government since last PF government (91 –
01) 
No  Yes  No 
Social democratic or socialist parties more 
than one year in government (91 – 01) 
Yes  No  Yes 
High pressure from international 
organisations 
Yes Yes Yes 
Longer time to develop democratic corporate 
structures (91 – 01) 
Yes Yes Yes 
Dependent variable: 
Relatively high level of democratic 
corporatism operating at state level 
Yes Yes No 
 
Also in table 7.2 the three government related variables refer to the time from the last popular 
front supported government resigned in 1992/ 1993. The variable of time to develop 
democratic corporate structures refers to the entire period from 1991 to the end of 2001. The 
variables of openness of economy and pressure from international organisations refer 
exclusively to the period from 1996 to the end of 2001. The table shows that Lithuania from 
1996 to the end of 2001 differed from Estonia on two of the six independent variables, and 
from Latvia on three of the six independent variables. This means that in a pair wise 
comparison between Lithuania and Estonia, both the more open economy and the absence of 
‘bloc politics combined with radical shifts of governments’ in Estonia would come out as 
likely explanations to the higher level of democratic corporatism there. A pair wise 
comparison between Lithuania and Latvia would sort out the absence of ‘bloc politics 
combined with radical shifts of governments’, ‘parties with long living time in government’ 
and short time of social democratic or socialist parties in government as the likely explanatory 
variables to the higher level of democratic corporatism in Latvia. But if the less open 
economy in Lithuania than in Estonia contributed to create a lower level of democratic 
corporatism in Lithuania, one could ask about why the less open economy in Latvia did not 
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appear with the same result. The same type of question could be asked about the variables that 
distinguished Latvia from both other countries.  
 
The logic of this analysis only accepts factors, which are similar between the cases with a 
relatively high level of democratic corporatism, but are different in the case with a relatively 
low level of democratic corporatism, as explanatory. In this way I remain with only one 
variable likely to explain the lower level of democratic corporatism in Lithuania than in 
Estonia and Latvia in the latest period. The characteristic, dividing Lithuania from Latvia and 
Estonia, was that Lithuania in the period since the last Popular Front supported government 
resigned in late November 1992 had bloc politics, which was combined with radical shifts of 
governments from 199657. My analysis suggests that this characteristic can explain the 
difference in level of democratic corporatism between Lithuania and Latvia and Estonia in the 
period from the beginning of 1996 to the end of 200158.    
 
In this way the Method of Agreement analysis illustrated in table 7.1 has singled out a 
combination of three characteristics as explanatory to a relatively high level of democratic 
corporatism, when both time periods are regarded. These are: Absence of ‘bloc politics 
combined with radical shifts of governments’ combined with the 2001 related characteristics 
of  ‘longer time to develop democratic corporatist structures’ and ‘high pressure from 
international organisations’. The analysis illustrated in table 7.2 suggests that the existence of 
‘bloc politics combined with radical shifts of governments’ is the reason that Lithuania had a 
relatively low level while Estonia and Latvia had a relatively high level of democratic 
corporatism in the latest time period.      
 
Boolean minimisation, as presented in chapter 4, is a method of detecting combinatorial 
causal relationships by the logic known from experimental designs. In this method a variable 
can only be eliminated if all other variables have equal values in two or more cases. In my 
analysis there are six independent variables and six cases when both points of time are 
considered in table 7.1. Only two of these cases had the output of relatively high level of 
                                                 
57
 Lithuania had bloc politics, in the form of a “left-wing” government, constituted of the successor party of the 
Communist Party the LDLP, from November 1992 to November 1996. The first replacement of government 
parties, after the replacement of the last popular front supported government in late November 1992, happened in 
late November 1996. This was a radical shift, where the LDLP was replaced with a conservative coalition 
government leaded by the successor party of the Popular Front – the Homeland Union. 
58
 In the case of Latvia, this really means the time after the National Tripartite Co-operation Council started to 
work in the beginning of 1999.   
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democratic corporatism on the dependent variables. Attempting to find the variables that 
distinguished these two cases from the other cases, I soon learned that Boolean minimisation 
could not help me. The reason was that too many independent variables differed between 
these cases, and this made it impossible to eliminate variables by logic applied in Boolean 
minimisation. What I did in the comparison between Lithuania and Estonia and Latvia in the 
period from 1996 to the end of 2001 was actually to eliminate all three variables with 
different values in Estonia and Latvia. In this way I broke with the principle of Boolean 
minimisation, which is that a variable can only be eliminated if all other variables have equal 
values in two or more cases. My analysis had only two cases with high level of democratic 
corporatism, and this made it very unlikely that these two cases differed only in one 
independent variable. That’s why I was far more lenient than I could have been if I had 
followed the strict logics applied in Boolean minimisation. My comparison was simply 
strained by too few cases and too many variables for that. Thus I took a risk of excluding 
variables that should not have been excluded. Therefore my conclusion cannot rest simply on 
the comparative schemes presented in this chapter. It also needs to be supported by the 
historical elaboration laid out in the preceding chapters.  
 
The following section is a very brief summing up of some of the historical elaboration of 
corporatist arrangements and the mainly government related factors expected to influence 
them. This will be followed by a consideration of how government characteristics may have 
influenced corporatist arrangements. I will also refer to the answers of the persons 
interviewed, who were engaged in tripartite bargaining at state level in each of the countries, 
to why the bargaining on specific occasions has been halting. First it must be established how 
the longer time since regaining independence and the higher pressure from international 
organisations combined with absence of ‘bloc politics combined with radical shifts of 
governments’ may have contributed to a higher level of democratic corporatism. Second it 
must be established how bloc politics from 1992, which was combined with radical shifts of 
governments from 1996 may have caused the lower level of democratic corporatism in 
Lithuania than in Estonia and Latvia in the period from 1996 to the end of 2001.      
 
How these factors may have influenced the level of democratic corporatism 
 
The finding that both cases with a relative high level of democratic corporatism were from the 
last time period was hardly surprising. To make an obvious point, the systems in the latest 
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period were continuations of the systems in the earliest period. This means that the 
development in Estonia and Latvia was towards a higher level of democratic corporatism. 
This seemed to be the development also in Lithuania, in spite of my assessment that the 
country was further from a model of democratic corporatism than Estonia and Latvia in the 
latest period. Still, I would like to remind that both tripartite agreements at state level in 
Lithuania were concluded after May 1995 and that Lithuania in both periods had a clearly 
larger number of tripartite councils operating at state level than Estonia and Latvia. Chapter 
6.3 dealt with the pressure from international organisations to develop corporatist 
arrangements. It seems very likely that the pressure from the EU has contributed to develop 
tripartite structures in the three countries, during the time since the Commission published its 
first opinion on the membership applications in 1997. Financial support from the Phare fund 
of the EU to the ‘Promotion of Bipartite Social Dialogue’ national project in Latvia in 2001 
and the Estonian national program ‘Promotion of Social Dialogue on the on the Employers’ 
and Workers’ Organisations Level’ of the same year, should have had an even more direct 
impact. The following sections are devoted to the more difficult question of how ‘bloc politics 
combined with radical shifts of governments’ may have had a negative impact on the 
development of corporatist arrangements at state level in Lithuania.       
 
The first part of chapter 5.1 dealt with the second component of democratic corporatism, 
which was a concentrated system of interest groups. This was measured as high membership 
rates of employees in trade unions and high coverage rates of employers’ organisations in the 
economies. I considered that Latvia had the most and Lithuania the least concentrated system 
of interest groups by the end of 2001, mainly because membership rates in trade unions and 
coverage rates of employers’ organisations of employment were highest in Latvia and lowest 
in Lithuania. One should however notice that the membership rates in trade unions of ordinary 
employees and persons engaged lower, middle and higher management decreased radically 
between 1994 and 1999. The decrease was from 84% to 16% in Latvia, from 33% to 8% in 
Lithuania and from 23% to 12% in Estonia. In 1999, Latvia did not only have the highest 
membership rates in trade unions. The decline of membership rates since 1994 had also been 
most radical there. This means that if membership rates continued to decline most rapidly in 
Latvia, one could not take for granted that the membership rates were still highest in Latvia by 
the end of 2001. I have chosen not to consider the trade union membership rates in 
relationship with bloc politics combined with radical shifts of governments, because the three 
countries were more similar than different with regards to this de-unionisation process. The 
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higher membership rates in Latvia in 1999 than in her southern and northern neighbour seem 
most likely to reflect the membership rates in 1994 and that membership rates started to 
decline later in Latvia than in Estonia and Lithuania. Still I will repeat the argument from 
chapter 3.2 that the strong position of the successor organisation of the Soviet trade union 
organisation and the fact that it did not split might have contributed to the later decrease in 
membership rates in trade unions in Latvia. This also means that splitting of the central trade 
union organisation either along political or occupational lines may have contributed to faster 
decline in membership rates. Bloc politics was again a likely cause to the splitting along 
political lines in Lithuania. 
 
The second part of chapter 5.1 dealt with the third component of democratic corporatism. This 
was high centralisation of interest groups, meaning hierarchical control where few central 
organisations were taking part in the bargaining on state level as the only organisations 
existing or with mandate to negotiate on behalf of other organisations. This chapter showed 
that Latvia had the most centralised system of trade union organisations, because the FTUCL 
was the only existing central trade union organisation in the whole period. Estonia had the 
second most centralised system of trade union organisations with two central organisations 
from 1992. The larger CETU represented mainly blue-collar employees while the smaller 
EPEUA represented mainly white-collar employees. Both were represented in the most 
important tripartite councils operating at state level, but in most tripartite agreements at state 
level only the CETU was represented. Lithuania had the clearly least centralised system of 
trade union organisations with four central organisations until 2002. The two organisations the 
LTUU and the LTUC, which had a relationship with the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party, 
merged in the beginning of 2002 to form the LTU Confederation. From that time, there were 
two other organisations. The small Lithuanian Labour Federation (LLF) worked after a 
Christian social doctrine. The Lithuanian Workers Union had historical ties to the Popular 
Front (Sajûdis).   
 
This means that both two parties, which constituted the historical origin of the left – right 
cleavage, namely the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party (LDLP), which was the successor 
party of the Communist Party, and Sajûdis, had their sympathetic trade union organisations. 
In addition, the conservative Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party might find support in the 
Christian central trade union organisation, the LLF. It is however important to notice that 
even though the LWU had historical ties to Sajûdis, the organisation had not been supportive 
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to its successor party, the conservative Homeland Union. On the contrary the LWU was 
putting up political protests against the conservative government in 2000. Further, the 
secretary general of the LLF reported that they had no close relations to any political party in 
2002, even though they cooperated best with Christian organisations (e-mail correspondence 
with Rekesiene 19.11.02). Still, it seems likely that the clearer differences between the leftist 
and rightist parties building on the historical cleavage between the LDLP and Sajûdis, has 
been a direct cause to the more divided structure of central trade union organisations in 
Lithuania.  
 
The Secretariat of the Tripartite Council of the Republic of Lithuania (TCRL) concluded that 
the works of the council was insufficiently efficient in 1999 amongst others because of “the 
absence of an uniform opinion amongst the representatives of the trade unions” (TCRL web 
e, 04.11.02). This indicated that the less centralised system of trade union organisations in 
Lithuania may have caused a less continuous process and less efficient system of corporatist 
bargaining at state level than in Estonia and Latvia. This would be interaction between the 
different components of the dependent variable of democratic corporatism.        
 
Chapter 5.2 was devoted to the fourth and most important part of democratic corporatism. 
This was the development of a system of bargaining between central trade union 
organisations, central employers’ organisations and the government. In November 2001 I 
asked the lawyer of the Lithuanian Trade Union Unification why he thought no tripartite 
agreements on minimum wage had been concluded in Lithuania after 1998, even though the 
social partners agreed to do so annually in 1999. He answered that the takeover of 
government of the in his eyes trade union hostile conservative parties after the 1996 elections 
had disrupted the social dialogue (interview Pivoras 19.11.01). Answering the same question, 
the head of the Business Social Policy Department in the Confederation of Lithuanian 
Industrialists, mentioned unsteadiness of governments as an explanation. On top of having 
problems to agree between themselves, the trade union organisations and employers’ 
organisations had to start the negotiations with one government, continue with another 
government and in the end agree with a third government (interview Zickute. 27.11.01). 
When asked about how frequent shifts of governments had affected the Tripartite Council of 
the Republic of Lithuania (TCRL), two chief specialists at the Ministry of Social Security and 
Labour expressed that every government pursued different issues and different ideas in the 
tripartite council. They mentioned the liberalisation of labour relations accomplished by the 
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Liberal Union and New Union government in 2000, followed by a move towards a more 
‘social’ direction after the social democrats entered the government in 2001 as an example of 
this (interview Daiva Petrylaite and Ramune Guobaite 29.11.01).  
 
These comments from centrally placed persons indicated that the situation in Lithuania in 
2000 and 2001, with three governments having different placements on the ideological left – 
right cleavage in less than one year, resulted in low continuity in the works of the TCRL. That 
a representative of the social democratic trade union organisation considered the conservative 
government as not interested in maintaining the social dialogue at state level, is hardly 
surprising. Still it suggests that radical shifts of governments from the left side to the right 
side on the political cleavage may have a disrupting effect on the development of corporatist 
arrangements on state level and on the relationship between the central organisations of 
employers and employees and the government. In this way bloc politics combined with 
radical shifts of governments may have had an unfavourable effect on corporatist bargaining 
and the development of the system for such bargaining on state level.      
 
The conclusion is that the historical analysis and the answers from the persons interviewed 
who were involved in tripartite bargaining at state level, give support to the findings of the 
comparative analysis.  The combination of bloc politics and radical shifts of governments can 
explain that Estonia and Latvia were somewhat closer than Lithuania to the model of 
democratic corporatism in the latest time period. Radical shifts of governments from one side 
to the other on the left – right cleavage may have disrupted the social dialogue between the 
government and the central organisations of employers and employees as well as the work of 
the governments in developing the system for corporatist bargaining at state level and 
building relationships with the interest group organisations. Further the clearer divide between 
leftist and rightist political parties has been directly reflected in a more divided system of 
central trade union organisations in Lithuania.  
 
On the other hand interaction between the different components, which constitute the concept 
of democratic corporatism, is also likely to have occurred. One reason is that the more divided 
system of central trade union organisations in Lithuania may have made it more difficult to 
reach tripartite compromises at state level and thereby to have a continuous and prosperous 
social dialogue.           
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8: Conclusions  
 
Especially in Estonia and Latvia the systems were closer to the democratic corporatist model 
in the end of 2001 than in the end of 1995. By employing the Method of Agreement, I found 
that longer time to develop democratic corporatist structures as well as stronger pressure from 
international organisations affiliated to the accession process to the EU, distinguished the 
countries in the latest period from the earliest period. Therefore it is likely that the pressure 
from the EU since the Commission published its first opinion on each of the countries 
applications for membership in 1997, as well as the financial support from the EU Phare fund 
have had a positive impact on the development of arrangements for social dialogue between 
the organisations of employers and employees and the governments or governmental 
institutions. The longer time since Soviet totalitarianism to develop democratic corporatist 
structures should be another reason for the higher level of democratic corporatism in the latest 
period.  
 
My assessment was that Estonia and Latvia were somewhat closer to the democratic 
corporatist model than Lithuania in the latest period. In the final step of the comparison I 
contrasted Lithuania with Estonia and Latvia in the period from 1996 to the end of 2001. Here 
I looked for reasons why Lithuania was further away from the model of democratic 
corporatism than Estonia in the whole period and Latvia from the beginning of 1999, while 
sharing many of the factors expected to be favourable to democratic corporatism. I found that 
bloc politics from the last Popular Front supported governments resigned in 1992, combined 
with radical shifts of governments after 1996, distinguished Lithuania from Estonia and 
Latvia. Therefore this characteristic was likely to be explanatory to the higher degree of 
democratic corporatism in Estonia and Latvia than in Lithuania in the latest period. Also the 
historical elaboration and the answers from interviewees who were involved in tripartite 
bargaining at state level, supported to this hypothesis.  
 
One of my introductory assumptions was that corporatist arrangements were less exposed to 
setbacks if the continuity of government parties was high. I compared continuity of 
government parties by the longest duration of government parties in each country. The 
comparative analysis indicated that in a pair wise comparison between Latvia and Lithuania in 
the latest period, the long duration of two government parties in Latvia by the end of 2001, 
might have contributed to the higher level of democratic corporatism in Latvia than in 
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Lithuania. On the other hand, not only Lithuania, but also Estonia had low duration of 
government parties until the end of the latest period. Therefore duration of government parties 
could not explain the differences between the cases. Still, the government continuity 
perspective was also included in the hypothesis that occurrence of bloc politics combined with 
radical shifts of governments could explain low level of democratic corporatism at state level. 
Frequent occurrence of radical shifts of governments, where all government parties are 
replaced, prohibits long duration of government parties. Bloc politics combined with radical 
shifts of governments further implies radical breaks between governments, because they 
belong to the different sides of the main political cleavage. In this way the explanatory factor, 
of bloc politics combined with radical shifts of government, is not restricted to imply low 
continuity of government parties, but it also includes radical shifts of government 
orientations.  
 
My assumption that openness of economy could explain the different levels of democratic 
corporatism between the countries was not supported by the comparative analysis. Only 
Estonia had an open economy in the period from 1996 to the end of 2001, measured as a value 
of trade in goods annually contributing to more than 100% of the GDP. Still, Estonia and 
Latvia distinguished themselves from Lithuania by a higher level of democratic corporatism 
operating at state level in this period. This means that Katzenstein’s argument that the open 
economies of the small Western European countries forced these countries to become more 
corporatist than larger democracies, cannot explain the difference in development between 
Latvia and Lithuania. On the other hand, the stated purpose of the extensive ‘Agreement to 
speed up the work to set the level of qualifications of employment seekers in accordance with 
the requirements of the employment market for the period 2001 – 2004’, concluded in Estonia 
in December 2000, was to secure that the Estonian workforce was highly compatible in the 
open international employment market (see appendix B, agreement E14). This agreement 
reminds me about Katzenstein’s argument that governments in small countries with open 
economies join forces with the organisations of employees and employers to form strategies 
to make the best of possible out of the impacts of the international markets. This shows that 
the open economy of Estonia should have contributed to the conclusion of this tripartite 
agreement.        
 
My finding that Lithuania was furthest away from the model of democratic corporatism in the 
period before 2002 was contrary to the expectations related to the assumption that socialist 
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and social democratic parties were the initiators and guardians of democratic corporatist 
arrangements. The Lithuanian Communist Party transformed itself to a social democratic 
party. In contrast to their Latvian and Estonian counterparts, this party was successful in 
elections and was alone in government from December 1992 to November 1996. On the 
contrary, there have been no left wing governments in Estonia and Latvia. To the defence of 
the thesis about the role of socialist or social democrat parties in developing corporatist 
arrangements, it should be mentioned that the Lithuanian social democrats were in opposition 
from November 1996 to October 2000.   
 
In the first chapter I laid out some possible negative implications from a lack of development 
of corporatist arrangements. Seen in association with these, the conclusion that the 
development in at least Estonia and Latvia has been towards the model of democratic 
corporatism, gives reason to some optimism. On the other side it is important to notice that 
implementation of tripartite agreements on state level does not necessarily lead to better 
conditions for employees. The clearly higher minimum wage rates in proportion to the 
national minimum subsistence level in Lithuania than in Estonia and Latvia since 1996 is a 
reminder of this. Even though the social partners in Estonia concluded state level tripartite 
agreements about raising the national minimum wage rates annually since 1995, this wage did 
not amount to more than 131% of the national subsistence minimum in 2002. On the contrary, 
the minimum wage in Lithuania amounted to 344% of the national subsistence minimum in 
2002, despite the fact the social partners had failed to raise the minimum wage rates since 
1998. This finding suggests that Slomp’s description of the Western and Southern European 
experience, where trade unions have been granted a place at the table with the government as 
well as legitimacy as political players in compensation for wage restraint, can describe also 
the Estonian case. 
 
This may indicate that the trade unions have been the weakest part in the tripartite bargaining, 
which goes along with the very low membership rates. In 1999 the membership rates in trade 
unions amongst ordinary employees and persons engaged in lower, middle and higher 
management were only 8% in Lithuania, 12% in Estonia and 16% in Latvia. From the point of 
view of the trade unions, the development may seem somewhat contradictory: The 
membership rates in trade unions declined sharply in all three countries, and especially in 
Latvia, from 1994 to 1999. During the same period tripartite arrangements at state level 
developed considerably, especially in Latvia and Estonia. This leads us to a question about 
 147
how real these corporate structures are. Are they only scenery put up to implement the 
requirements from the EU about social dialogue, or do the trade union organisations and 
employers’ organisations have real power in state policies through tripartite arrangements? 
There is not necessarily a contradiction between these two positions. One may implement the 
EU requirements and exercise real tripartite social dialogue at the same time. This thesis has 
mainly focused upon discovering the structures for state level tripartite negotiations. More 
research is necessary to evaluate the functioning of these arrangements. Even though I cannot 
make a general evaluation, this thesis has shown that decisions made on a tripartite basis do 
affect a substantial number of employees and employers in the three countries. Especially the 
settlement of minimum wage through tripartite agreements is important to mention here.  
 
I have argued that the government may well be the initiator of democratic corporatism in a 
phase when the trade union organisations and the employers’ organisations are still weak. The 
Estonian and Latvian situation that membership in trade unions are declining at the same time 
as the trade union organisations are increasing their participation in state policy-making and 
are getting more involved in dialogue with the government, may be described as the 
government lending legitimacy to trade unions through partnership in agreements. This has 
been the happening in Estonia since the first year of independence. The government and the 
Confederation of Estonian Trade Unions (CETU) signed ‘The Framework Agreement on 
Social Guarantees for 1991’ already in February 1991, six months before the final declaration 
of independence. In this perspective, the tripartite agreement on stipulation of minimum wage 
of 2001 is important. Here it was agreed that the government should withdraw, and the 
minimum wage rates from 2003 to 2008 should be settled according to the principles of a 
bipartite agreement between the CETU and the EEC. The future will show if this means that 
Estonia has passed the stage of government dominated democratic corporatism in favour of a 
model where the government is weaker and the interest group organisations are stronger. Such 
a development towards arrangements where the government acts not as a direct participant, 
but as arbitrator and mediator relative to employers and employees, would be towards the 
Scandinavian model. One can asks if the steps of Estonia in this direction means that Estonia 
is on a different path than Latvia and Lithuania, or if the two latter also will follow in the 
same direction.   
 
The institutional framework for tripartite negotiation at state level has become most potential 
powerful and filled with most continuous bargaining in Estonia and in Latvia after the 
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National Tripartite Co-operation Council started to work in the beginning of 1999. Also in 
Lithuania some progress has been made since the end of 1995 in developing the institutional 
framework for tripartite negotiation at state level. The establishment of the secretariat of the 
Tripartite Council of the Republic of Lithuania in 1998 and the conclusion of the ‘Agreement 
on tripartite cooperation’ in 1999 are examples of such progress. Provided that especially the 
trade union side grows in membership and strength, the institutional framework developed by 
the end of 2001 can facilitate improvement of interest group representation in state policy-
making in all of the three countries in the future. This would mean a development towards the 
models of democratic corporatism, in Katzenstein’s terms, or societal corporatism, in the 
terms of Schmitter. 
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Appendix A: Abbreviations 
 
 
CEEI: The Confederation of Estonian Employers 
and Industry  
CEEO: The Confederation of Estonian Employers’ 
Organisations  
CEI: The Confederation of Estonian Industry  
CEIE: The Confederation of Estonian Industry and 
Employers  
CETU: The Confederation of Estonian Trade 
Unions 
CFFE: The Council of the Fund to Fulfil 
Employees’ Claims Related to Labour Relations of 
Bankrupt Enterprises and Enterprises under 
Bankruptcy 
CFTU: The Confederation of Free Trade Unions  
CIS: The Commonwealth of Independent States 
CLBE: The Confederation of Lithuanian Business 
Employers  
CLI: The Lithuanian Confederation of Industrialists 
CP: The Centre Party 
CPP: The Conservative People’s Party 
CPRU: The Coalition Party and Rural Union 
CPSU: The Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
CU: The Centre Union 
DPM: The Democratic Party – Master 
EACE: The Estonian Association of Construction 
Entrepreneurs 
ECCI: The Estonian Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry 
ECDU: The Estonian Christian Democratic Union 
ECP: The Estonian Coalition Party 
EEC: The Estonian Employers’ Confederation  
ENIP: The Estonian National Independence Party 
EPEUA: The Estonian Professional Employees’ 
Union Association 
ETUC:  The European Trade Union Confederation 
EU: The European Union 
FFF: For the Fatherland and Freedom 
FFU: The Fatherland and Freedom Union 
FHRUL: For Human Rights in a United Latvia 
FTUCL: The Free Trade Union Confederation of 
Latvia 
GATT: The General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade 
HLRE: Harmony for Latvia – Revival of the 
Economy  
HU: The Homeland Union 
ICFTU: The International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions 
ILO: The International Labour Organisation 
IOE: The International Organisations of Employers 
LBA: The Lithuanian Businessmen Association 
LBEC: The Lithuanian Businessmen Employers’ 
Confederation 
LCCI: The Latvian Chamber of Commerce an 
Industry 
LCDP: The Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party 
LCDU: The Latvian Christian Democratic Union 
LCU: The Lithuanian Centre Union 
LDLP: The Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party  
LEC: The Latvian Employers Confederation 
LFU: The Latvian Farmers Union 
LLF: The Lithuanian Labour Federation 
LNIP: The Latvian National Independence Party 
LSDP: The Lithuanian Social Democratic Party 
LTU Centre: The Lithuanian Trade Union Centre  
LTUC: Lithuanian Trade Union Confederation 
LTUU: The Lithuanian Trade Union Unification 
LU: The Liberal Union 
LUP: The Latvian Unity Party 
LW: Latvia’s Way 
LWU: The Lithuanian Workers Union 
NATO: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NBC: The National Businessmen Confederation  
NEP: The New Era Party 
NP: The New Party 
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NTCC: The National Tripartite Co-operation 
Council 
NU: The New Union 
PP: The People’s Party 
PP: The Progress Party 
RCP: The Republican Coalition Party 
RP: The Reform Party 
SDC: The Social Democratic Coalition 
SDP: The Social Democratic Party 
SDWP: The Social Democratic Workers Party 
SEC: The Social and Economic Council  
SSIF: The State Social Insurance Fund 
TBT: The Baltic Times 
TCCESTUL: The Tripartite Consultative Council 
of Employers the State and Trade Unions of Latvia 
TCRL: The Tripartite Council of the Republic of 
Lithuania 
The Coalition: The Coalition Party and the Country 
People’s Party 
TLPCC: The Tripartite Labour Protection 
Consultative Council 
TSSC: The Tripartite Social Security Council 
TULSSR: The Trade Unions of the Latvian Soviet 
Socialist Republic  
UE: The Union of Economists 
UNDP: The United Nations Development Program’ 
UNICE: The Union of Industrial and Employers’ 
Confederations of Europe 
USSR: The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
WCL: The World Confederation of Labour  
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Appendix B: Chronological table of state level agreements 
 
 Estonia *a Latvia Lithuania *b 
1991 E1 *C 
“Framework agreement on social 
guarantees for 1991” (bipartite between 
the CETU and the government) 
12.02.1991, Tallinn. 
  
1992 E2 
“Framework agreement on social 
guarantees for 1992” 
07.04.1992, Tallinn 
  
1993 E3 
“Agreement on major questions 
concerning social guarantees for 1993”  
28.03.1993, Tallinn 
  
1994    
1995 E4 
“Agreement on adjustment of minimum 
wage and unemployment benefits” 
28.12.1995, Tallinn 
 LI1 
“Agreement On tripartite 
partnership Between the 
Government of the Republic of 
Lithuania, Organisations of 
Trade Unions and Employers”  
05.05.1995, Vilnius 
1996 E5 
“Agreement on development of 
participatory democracy”  
20.12.1996, Tallinn 
 
E6 
“Agreement on adjustment of minimum 
wage” 
20.12.1996, Tallinn 
LA1 
“Agreement on 
Principles of Social 
Partnership” (bipartite 
between the FTUCL 
and the LEC) 
July 1996 
 
1997 E7 
“Agreement on establishing guarantee 
fund for employees in case of employers’ 
insolvency”  
06.06.1997, Tallinn 
 
E8 
“Agreement on the method of calculating 
subsistence minimum” 
20.06.1997, Tallinn   
 
E9 
Agreement on adjustment of minimum 
wage 
21.11.1997, Tallinn 
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1998 
E10 
“Agreement on minimum wage and the 
limit of tax free income” 
22.10.1998, Tallinn 
LA2 
“By-law of the National 
Tripartite Co-operation 
Council”  
30.10.1998 
 
1999 E11 
“Agreement on establishing tripartite 
employment councils”  
26.08.1999, Tallinn 
 
E12 
“Agreement on minimum wage and tax 
free income” 
13.09.1999, Tallinn 
 LI2 
“Agreement on tripartite 
cooperation Between the  
Government of the Republic of 
Lithuania, Organisations of 
Trade Unions and Employers” 
11.02.1999, Vilnius 
2000 E13 
“Agreement on requirements to minimum 
wage”  
08.11.2000, Tallinn 
 
E14 
“Agreement on a common action plan to 
speed up the work to set the level of 
qualifications of employment seekers in 
accordance with the requirements of the 
employment market for the period 2001 – 
2004” 
18.12.2000, Tallinn 
LA3  
“By-law of the Labour 
Issues Tripartite Co-
operation Sub-council”  
08.03.2000 
 
LA4 
“By-law of the 
Professional Education 
and Employment 
Tripartite Co-operation 
Sub-council”  
12.07.2000 
 
2001 E15 
“Agreement on requirements to minimum 
wage” 
25.09.2001, Tallinn  
 
E16 
“Agreement on the procedures of 
appointing the national arbitration tribunal 
officer”  
26.10.2001, Tallinn 
LA5 
“By-law of the Health 
Care Branch Sub-
council”  
21.03.2003  
 
 
 
 
*a: Øyvind and Imbi Rangøy in Tartu have translated the Estonian agreement texts to Norwegian. 
 
*b: UAB “Litinterp” in Vilnius have translated the Lithuanian agreement texts to English. 
 
*c: For English translations and Lithuanian copies of LI1 – LI2, English translation LA2, Norwegian translations 
and Estonian copies of E1 – E15 and Latvian copies of LA3 – LA5; do not hesitate to inquire me at: 
Sturle10000@hotmail.com. 
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Appendix C: List of interviews59 
 
 
Harri Taliga  Social Secretary of the 
Confederation of Estonian Trade 
Unions 
 
 
Tallinn, 01 November  
2001 
 
Aija Bilzena Secretary assistant of the 
National Tripartite Co-operation 
Council 
 
 
Riga, 09 November 
2001 
 
Laimonas Pivoras Lawyer of Lithuanian Trade 
Union Unification 
 
 
Vilnius, 19 November  
2001 
 
Laura Zickute Legal advisor, Social Policy 
Department of the 
Confederation of Lithuanian 
Industrialists 
 
 
Vilnius, 27 November  
2001 
 
Daiva Petrylaite and Ramune 
Guobaite 
Specialists at the Labour 
Relations and Remuneration 
Division, Lithuanian Ministry of 
Social Security and Labour 
 
 
Vilnius, 29 November  
2001 
 
Eike Hindov Head of the ILO and Labour 
Relations Department, Estonian 
Ministry of Social Affairs 
 
 
Tallinn, 04 December  
2001 
 
Raul Eamets Researcher, Faculty of 
Economic and Business 
Administration, University of 
Tartu 
 
 
Tartu, 06 December 
2001 
 
Tarmo Kriis Deputy Director of the Estonian 
Employers’ Confederation 
 
 
Tallinn, 07 December 
2001 
 
Ieva Jaunzeme General Director of the Latvian 
Employers’ Confederation 
Riga, 14 December  
2001 
                                                 
59
 Hindov, Eamets and Zickute also answered to questions on e-mail on the 17th of December, the 19th of 
November and the 21st of November 2002. Regina Rekesiene, the Secretary General of the Lithuanian Labour 
Federation, answered to questions on e-mail on the 19th of November 2002.                
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Appendix D: List of articles from The Baltic Times:60 
Issue TBT#127 (24.09.1998): Russian woes could force unemployment up 
Issue TBT #167 (22.07.1999): Farmers' protest falls on deaf ears                                      
Rokas M. Tracevskis 
Issue TBT#149 (11.03.1999): Savisaar scores bittersweet victory: Centrists win election, not 
likely to form government, TBT staff 
Issue TBT#152 (01.04.1999): New government takes office                                               
Denise Albrighton 
Issue TBT#176 (23.09.1999): Sticky problems in sugar industry                                          
Paul Beckman 
Issue TBT#178 (07.10.1999): Sugar plant workers picket in Lithuania 
Issue TBT#179 (14.10.1999): Rescue decision gets a mixed reaction                                   
Paul Beckman 
Issue TBT#197 (02.03.2000) a: Lithuania’s workers rally while the iron is hot                     
Peter J. Mladineo 
Issue TBT#197 (02.03.2000) b: Pedophilia documents surrendered to intelligence 
J. Michael Lyons 
Issue TBT#198 (09.03.2000): Bitter taste in Lithuanian sugar industry's mouth  
Peter J. Mladineo 
Issue TBT#199 (16.03.2000): Unpaid workers vow hunger strike to death                             
Darius James Ross 
Issue TBT#200 (23.03.2000) Kaunas workers continue hunger strike after exam 
Darius James Ross 
Issue TBT#201 (30.03.2000): Kaunas workers call off hunger strike 
Issue TBT#203 (13.04.2000): Skele resigns top post for third time, 
Valters Medenis 
Issue TBT #206 (11.05.2000) a: Big cheers, but few changes for new team 
Philip Birzulis 
Issue TBT #206 (11.05.2000) b: Brazauskas makes a political comeback 
Rokas M. Tracevskis 
                                                 
60
 All the articles are available on a Word file in the enclosed disk. 
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Issue TBT#208 (25.05.2000):  High taxes under the gun in Vilnius 
Peter J. Mladineo 
Issue TBT#220 (17.08.2000): Landscape before the election battle looks colorful  
Rokas M. Tracevskis 
Issue TBT#228 (12.10.2000): Lithuanian elections: winners & losers                                                              
Rokas M.Tracevskis 
Issue TBT#248 (15.03.2001): Opposition victorious in local elections 
Nick Coleman 
Issue TBT#250 (29.03.2001): Social Democrats take Riga 
Jorgen Johansson 
Issue TBT#262 (21.06.2001): Paulauskas asks Paksas to leave 
Rokas M. Tracevskis 
Issue TBT#263 (28.06.2001): Brazauskas likely to be next PM 
Rokas M. Tracevskis 
Issue TBT#264 (05.07.2001): Lithuania welcomes new prime minister 
Rokas M. Tracevskis 
Issue TBT#266 (19.07.2001):  Brazauskas presents his program 
Rokas M. Tracevskis 
Issue TBT#271 (23.08.2001): Honest Joe plans new party 
Rita Bubina 
Issue TBT#276 (27.09.2001): Ex-communist to lead Estonia to Europe 
Aleksei Gunter 
Issue TBT#282 (08.11.2001): Central bank chief fails to illuminate 
Jorgen Johansson 
Issue TBT#284 (22.11.2001) a: New right-wing party hopes to muster support 
Aleksei Gunter 
Issue TBT#284 (22.11.2001) b: Slezevicius wins victory against Lithuanian state 
BNS 
Issue TBT#288 (20.12.2001): Savisaar conquers Tallinn 
Aleksei Gunter 
Issue TBT#289 (10.01.2002): Laar resigns, ruling block in tatters 
Aleksei Gunter 
Issue TBT#291 (24.01.2002) a: Kallas to form new government 
Aleksei Gunter 
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Issue TBT#291 (24.01.2002) b: Land sales vote may complicate EU talks 
Bryan Bradley 
Issue TBT#292 (31.01.2002): Property restitution splits Lithuanian elite 
Tassos Coulaloglou & Rokas M. Tracevskis 
Issue TBT#295 (21.02.2002) a: Independence gets stylish  
Rokas M. Tracevskis 
Issue TBT#295 (21.02.2002) b, Opinion: Social Democrats: still a monolith? 
Rokas M. Tracevskis 
Issue TBT#326 (26.09.2002), Opinion: The anti-politics election 
Philip Birzulis 
Issue TBT#328 (10.10.2002): Out with the old, in with New Era 
Steven C. Johnson 
Issue TBT#330 (24.10.2002): Balts rejoice over Irish endorsement 
Steven C. Johnson 
Issue TBT#333 (14.11.2002) a: New Cabinet 
Issue TBT#333 (14.11.2002) b: Promising transparency, Repse proclaims "new era" 
Steven C. Johnson 
Issue TBT#342 (30.01.2003): Alcohol poisoning suspects convicted 
Christel Karits 
Issue TBT#349 (20.03.2003): Coalition breakthrough expected this week 
Aleksei Gunter 
Issue TBT#351 (03.04.2003): New Parliament meets while awaiting new Cabinet 
Aleksei Gunter  
Issue TBT#352 (10.04.2003): Estonia's new government ready 
Aleksei Gunter 
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Appendix E: Laws in English translation61 and ILO Conventions 
 
 
Estonia 
 
Estonian Legal Translation Centre:  
http://www.legaltext.ee/en/andmebaas/ava.asp?m=022  
 
a) 199462: The Wages Act, consolidated text June 2001 
b) 1997: Bankruptcy Act, consolidated text May 2002 
c) 1993: Collective Agreements Act, consolidated text 1993 
d) 1996: Public Service Act, consolidated text February 2001 
e) 2002: Riigikogu Election act, consolidated text March 2002 
f) 1992: The Constitution 
 
 
Latvia 
 
Translation and Terminology Centre:  
http://www.ttc.lv/lv/EN_tulkojumi.htm   
 
g) 2002: Labour Law  
h) 2001: State Civil Service Law  
i) 1999: Official Language Law 
j) 1993: The Constitution of the Republic of Latvia (as amended 2002) 
 
Latvian Law Institute 2002: Statute Master (CD-ROM) 
      k) 1991: Collective Agreements Act  
 
 
                                                 
61
 All the Estonian and Lithuanian laws were available on the Internet on the 1st of May 2003. 
 
62
 The first year refers to when the laws first entered into force.   
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Lithuania 
 
Seimas web document search:  
http://www3.lrs.lt/n/eng/DPaieska.html 
 
l) 1991:  Law on Wages 
http://www3.lrs.lt/c-bin/eng/preps2?Condition1=21836&Condition2 
m) 1999: Wages Law (as amended and supplemented by 23 March 1999, No.VIII-1101): 
http://www3.lrs.lt/c-bin/eng/preps2?Condition1=91666&Condition2 
n) 1991: Law on Collective Agreements:  
http://www3.lrs.lt/c-bin/eng/preps2?Condition1=21098&Condition2  
o) 1996: Law on Collective Agreements and Collective Labour Agreements: 
http://www3.lrs.lt/c-bin/eng/preps2?Condition1=48320&Condition2   
p) 1999: Law on Public Service:  
http://www3.lrs.lt/c-bin/eng/preps2?Condition1=94580&Condition2 
q) 1992: Law on Elections to the Seimas:  
http://www3.lrs.lt/c-bin/eng/preps2?Condition1=21164&Condition2 
r) 1992: The Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania:  
http://www3.lrs.lt/cgi-bin/preps2?Condition1=21892&Condition2 
 
Tripartite Council of the Republic of Lithuania web: 
s) 2002: THE LAW ON AMENDING AND SUPPLEMENTING CHAPTER I OF THE 
LAW ON COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS AND EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS OF 
REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA: 
http://www.socmin.lt/trisale/DANUSTA%20(interneto%20svetainei)/kolektyv.%20sut
arc..htm   
 
 
ILO-conventions 
 
Ilolex Database of International Labour Standards:  
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm (09.05.03) 
 
a) C121 Minimum Wage Fixing Convention, 1970 
b) C 144 Tripartite Consultation (International Labour Standard) Convention, 1976 
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Appendix F: Other documents 
 
 
Estonia: 
 
a) Confederation of Estonian Trade Unions 2000: The Statute of the Confederation of 
Estonian Trade Unions, (English translation).  Passed on 3rd Congress 28th of April 2000. 
Provided by Taliga, Harri (see list of interviewees). 
  
b) Ministry of Social Affairs and EU Phare 2000: STANDARD SUMMARY PROJECT 
FICHE. Provided by Eike Hindov (see list of interviewees). 
 
 
Latvia: 
 
c) National Tripartite Co-operation Council Secretariat, undated: Tripartite Co-operation in 
Latvia at National Level, internal paper. Provided by Aija Bilzena  (see list of interviews).  
 
d) National Tripartite Co-operation Council Secretariat 1999: NACIONÂLÂS TRÎSPUSÊJÂS 
SADARBÎBAS PADOMES SOCIÂLÂS DROSÎBAS APAKSPADOMES NOLIKUMS (By-law 
the Social Security Sub-council) 
 
 
Lithuania: 
 
e) Tripartite Council of the Republic of Lithuania 1998: Regulations of the Tripartite Council 
of the Republic of Lithuania (English translation) 
(Available on TCRL web, 09.05.03: 
http://www.socmin.lt/trisale/DANUSTA%20(interneto%20svetainei)/nuostatai.htm) 
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Appendix G: Internet references 
 
Estonia 
 
Bank of Estonia;  
Direct investment stocks by countries  
http://www.ee/epbe/fdi/4b.html.en (04.03.03) 
 
Confederation of Estonian Trade Unions;  
Eesti Ametihûhingute ajaloost: 
http://www.eakl.ee/org/ajalugu.html (11.11.02) 
 
Estonian Association of SME-s: 
 http://www.evea.ee/index2.htm (07.11.02) 
 
Estonian Association of Construction Entrepreneurs 
http://www.eeel.ee/english.htm (08.11.02) 
 
Estonian Chamber of Commerce and Industry: 
http://www.koda.ee/editmodeII/eng/history.html (06.11.02) 
 
Estonian Employers Confederation;  
 
a) Members  
http://www.ettk.ee/eng/src/liikmed/ (07.11.02) 
b) History of the Estonian Employers’ Confederation 
http://www.ettk.ee/eng/src/yldinfo/?MainID=5) (05.11.02) 
c) The Business Report of the Estonian Confederation of Employers for 1999 – 2000 
http://www.ettk.ee/eng/src/yldinfo/?MainID=11&page=21  (05.05.03) 
 
Estonian Government; 
COALITION AGREEMENT OF ESTONIAN CENTRE PARTY AND ESTONIAN 
REFORM PARTY:  
http://www.riik.ee/en/valitsus/coalition_agreement.htm (28.04.03) 
 
Estonian Labour Market Board; 
Labour Market Board Development Plan 2002 3rd Quarter – 2004: 
http://www.lta.ee/eng/LMBdevelopmentplan.doc (12.11.01) 
 
Ministry of Social Affairs:  
http://www.sm.ee/gopro30/Web/gpweb.nsf/pages/indexeng.html (07.05.03) 
 
a) Structure of the Ministry (31.10.02) 
b) Estonian Social and Economic Council (25.04.03) 
c) Leppik, Laura: Social Protection in Estonia 2000 (02.10.02) 
  
Riigikogu; 
Riigikogu 1999:  
http://www.riigikogu.ee/parliament.htm (12.12.02) 
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Statistical Office of Estonia:  
 http://www.stat.ee (07.05.03) 
 
a) News release No. 23, 2003, 10.03.03: 
http://www.stat.ee/index.aw/section=72078 (07.05.03) 
b) Most recent statistical news: 
http://www.stat.ee/indicators (11.04.03) 
c) News release No. 100, 2002, 22.11.02: 
 http://www.stat.ee/index.aw/section=63873 (07.05.03) 
d) Regional development database: 
http://gatekeeper.stat.ee:8000/px-
web.2001/I_Databas/Social_life_regional/Social_life_regional.asp (08.05.03) 
 
 
Latvia 
 
Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia: 
 http://www.csb.lv (07.05.03) 
 
a) Basic Socio-Economic Indicators:  
http://www.csb.lv/Satr/rad/E7.cfm?akurs3=E7 (04.05.03) 
b) Basic Socio-Economic Indicators:  
http://www.csb.lv/Satr/rad/E1a.cfm?akurs3=E1a (04.05.03) 
c) Basic Socio-Economic Indicators:  
http://www.csb.lv/Satr/rad/D4.cfm?akurs3=D (07.05.03) 
d) Rate of job seekers: 
 http://www.csb.lv/Satr/rad/D4.cfm?akurs3=D4 (07.05.03)  
e) Press release 15.04.2003: 
http://www.csb.lv/print.cfm?tem_kods=bezd%5Fpr&datums=%7Bts%20%272003%2
D04%2D15%2013%3A00%3A00%27%7D (08.05.03) 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia; 
Domestic News: Sweden biggest foreign investor in Latvia as at end September 2002: 
http://www.am.gov.lv/en/?id=3582 (04.02.03) 
 
 
Lithuania: 
 
Confederation of Lithuanian Industrialists: 
 http://www.lpk.lt (07.05.03) 
 
a) About the Confederation:  
http://www.lpk.lt/aboutLPK.html (25.04.03) 
b) The President:  
http://www.lpk.lt/LPKpresident.html (07.11.02) 
 
Lithuanian Development Agency:  
http://www.lda.lt/ (04.03.03) 
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Lithuanian Government; Former governments: 
http://www.lrvk.lt/anglu/a-vyriaus/a-vyrsen.html (07.11.02) 
 
Lithuanian Labour Federation:  
http://www.ldf.lt/apie-en.htm (11.11.02) 
 
Lithuanian Trade Union Confederation:  
http://www.lpss.lt/eng/news/index.php (06.11.02) 
 
Lithuanian Trade Union Centre: 
 http://lpsc.balt.net/ (14.10.01)  
 
Lithuanian Trade Union Unification (LTUU): 
 http://www.lpss.lt/news/ (14.10.01) 
 
Ministry of Social Security and Labour; 
Social Statistics: 
  
a) http://www.socmin.lt/Default.asp?DL=E&TopicID=23 (04.05.03) 
b) http://www.socmin.lt/english/spg/ssstrategy.rtf   (02.10.02) 
c) http://www.socmin.lt/english/social_statistics.html.  (17.10.02) 
 
Seimas:  
http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter/w4_home.int_ang (07.05.03) 
 
a) Members of the Seimas 2000 – 2004; about Juozas Olekas: 
http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter/w3_lrs.seimo_narys?p_asm_id=7193&p_int_tv_id=0&p_k
alb_id=2&p_kade_id=0  (11.11.02)    
b) Members of the Seimas 2000 – 2004; about Juozas Olekas: 
http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter/w3_lrs.seimo_narys?p_asm_id=7193&p_kalb_id=2&p_ka
de_id=3 (11.11.02) 
c) Committee on Social affairs and Labour: 
http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter/www_lrs.padalinys?p_pad_id=583&p_kalb_id=2 
(06.11.02) 
d) Members of the Seimas 2000; about Roma Dovydeniene: 
http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter/w3_lrs.seimo_narys?p_asm_id=7256&p_kalb_id=2&p_ka
de_id=4 (06.11.02) 
e) Members of the Seimas 2000; about Roma Dovydeniene: 
http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter/w3_lrs.seimo_narys?p_asm_id=7256&p_kalb_id=2&p_ka
de_id=3 (06.11.02) 
f) Member of the Seimas 1996 – 2000 Algirdas Sysas: 
http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter/w3_lrs.seimo_narys?p_asm_id=7252&p_kalb_id=2&p_ka
de_id=3 (24.04.03) 
g) Member of the Seimas 2000 - 2004 Algirdas Sysas: 
http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter/w3_lrs.seimo_narys?p_asm_id=7252&p_kalb_id=2&p_ka
de_id=4 (24.04.03) 
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Statistics Lithuania:  
http://www.std.lt/web/main.php (07.05.03) 
 
a) Average monthly gross earnings by economic sector, employee category  
and gender in 2002 by quarter:  
http://www.std.lt/web/main.php?parent=871 (04.05.03) 
b) Information: Wages and Salaries, 6 March 2003: 
http://www.std.lt/STATISTIKA/Socialine/darbo_uzm.pdf (11.04.03) 
c) Main partners of export:  
http://www.std.lt/web/main.php?parent=626 (07.05.03) 
d) Labour force survey results: 
http://www.std.lt/web/uploads/1049380432_gyvent_uzimt_e.pdf (07.05.03) 
 
Tripartite Council of the Republic of Lithuania:  
http://www.socmin.lt/trisale/ (07.05.03)  
 
a) Tripartite partnership and Lithuania: 
http://www.socmin.lt/trisale/DANUSTA%20(interneto%20svetainei)/partneryste.htm 
(12.11.02) 
b) Tarybos nariai:  
http://www.socmin.lt/trisale/nariai.html (07.11.02) 
c) The Tripartite Council of the Republic of Lithuania (a brief historic survey): 
http://www.socmin.lt/trisale/DANUSTA%20(interneto%20svetainei)/LR%20trisale%
20taryba.htm (12.11.02) 
d) Activity of the tripartite council of the republic of Lithuania in the year 2000: 
http://www.socmin.lt/trisale/DANUSTA%20(interneto%20svetainei)/2000%20m..htm 
(30.10.02) 
e) Activity of the Tripartite Council in 1999: 
http://www.socmin.lt/trisale/DANUSTA%20(interneto%20svetainei)/1999%20m.htm 
(04.11.02) 
 
 
International organisations and databases 
 
Confederation of European Trade Unions: 
http://www.etuc.org/en/ (07.11.02) 
 
Elections around the world:  
http://www.electionworld.org/ (11.02.02) 
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European Union; 
 
a) Enlargement:  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/index_en.html (29.04.03) 
b) The Treaty of Accession 2003: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/negotiations/treaty_of_accession_2003/index.h
tm (03.05.03) 
c) Towards the Enlarged Union - Commission recommends conclusion of negotiations 
with ten candidate countries: 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p_action.gettxt=gt&doc=IP/02/1443|0|
RAPID&lg=EN&display (03.05.03) 
d) Promotion of Bi-partite Social Dialogue: Standard summary Project fiche 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/pas/phare/programmes/national/latvia/2001/le0
103-01-socialdialogue.pdf (09.05.03) 
e) Promotion of Social Dialogue on the Employers’ and Workers’ Organisations Level: 
Standard summary Project fiche 29.03.2001 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/pas/phare/programmes/national/estonia/2001/e
s%200103-promotion-of-soc-dialogue-employers-workers-organizations-level.pdf 
(09.05.03)  
  
International Labour Organisation; 
Number of ratifications of the ILO Conventions 
http://webfusion.ilo.org/public/db/standards/normes/appl/index.cfm?lang=EN 
(07.05.03) 
 
International Monetary Fund (IMF);  
            The IMF's International Financial Statistics site:  
 http://imfStatistics.org (28.04.03)
 
International Organisation of Employers; 
 
a) Latvia:  
http://www.ioe-emp.org/ioe_emp/worldwide/page_pays_html/europe/latvia.htm 
(05.11.02) 
b) Estonia:  
http://www.ioe-emp.org/ioe_emp/worldwide/page_pays_HTML/europe/estonia.htm 
(05.11.02) 
c) Lithuania:  
http://www.ioe-emp.org/ioe_emp/worldwide/page_pays_html/europe/lithuania.htm 
(05.11.02) 
 
Parties and Election in Europe:  
     http://www.parties-and-elections.de/indexe.html (07.05.03) 
 
a) Estonia (07.05.03) 
b) Latvia (07.05.03) 
c) Lithuania (07.05.03) 
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Transparency International; 
Corruption Perceptions Index 2002: 
http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2002/cpi2002.en.html (09.01.03) 
 
UCSD Social Sciences & Humanities Library; 
Lijphart Elections Archive, Lithuania’s formulaic matrix: 
http://dodgson.ucsd.edu/lij/easteurope/lithuania/matrix.html (13.01.03) 
 
Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe (UNICE): 
http://www.unice.org/unice/Website.nsf/HTML+Pages/UK_index_UK2.htm 
(05.11.02) 
 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP); 
Human Development Reports 1990 – 2002:  
http://hdr.undp.org/reports/view_reports.cfm?type=1&start=1 (07.05.03) 
 
World Bank Group; 
 
a) Data by Country, Estonia: 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.asp?SelectedCountry=EST&CCODE
=EST&CNAME=Estonia&PTYPE=CP (07.05.03) 
b) Data by Country, Latvia:  
http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.asp?SelectedCountry=LVA&CCOD
E=LVA&CNAME=Latvia&PTYPE=CP (07.05.03) 
c) Data by Country, Lithuania: 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.asp?SelectedCountry=LTU&CCODE
=LTU&CNAME=Lithuania&PTYPE=CP (07.05.03) 
d) Links to other countries: 
http://www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/countrydata.html (07.05.03) 
 
Zarates Political Collections; 
 
a) Estonian Governments 1990 – 2002:  
http://www.terra.es/personal2/monolith/0g-est.htm (07.05.03) 
b) Latvian Governments 1990 – 2002:  
http://www.terra.es/personal2/monolith/0g-lat.htm (07.05.03) 
c) Lithuanian Governments 1990 – 2002:  
http://www.terra.es/personal2/monolith/0g-lit.htm (07.05.03) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
